Abe attempted to reorient Japan’s security policy with regard to a rising and increasingly assertive China and in so doing expanded its security and strategic ties with Australia, India, France, the UK, and several countries in Southeast Asia. Abe has therefore left an indelible imprint on the country’s foreign and security policy.
The real significance of these guidelines lies in the signal they send — to China, to partners in the region, and to other European countries. Timing is significant — coinciding with Germany’s EU Council presidency, releasing this document suggests Germany will make a real push, along with France and other Member States, towards an EU-wide approach to the Indo-Pacific.
While Abe may have had his most obvious successes in foreign relations, he also leaves his successor a full in-tray of foreign policy problems, not least a failure to advance on a territorial dispute with Russia and relations with South Korea that are at their lowest ebb since the 1965 bilateral normalisation treaty.
Thai demonstrators’ sense of malaise stems from a number of factors: The unfair nature of the 2019 election; a restrictive political environment in which activists are disappeared; the disbanding of the opposition party; vast economic inequality (the widest in ASEAN); and an economy that was already anaemic even before COVID-19.
The arguments made by the Philippines and Vietnam about the legal status of maritime features in the South China Sea are in line with the 2016 PCA Award; on the other hand, China has denied such an analysis and has continued to assert itself in the littorals through sheer force of will.
Tit-for-tat consulate closures in Houston and Chengdu, the expulsion of journalists, ideological rhetoric from the likes of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and increased military manoeuvres in the East and South China Seas have led many to conclude the world is on the cusp of a second Cold War.
Russia’s ‘return’ to the Indo-Pacific strengthens India’s claim for a multipolar Indo-Pacific and opens up another avenue, beyond defence, for closer cooperation with a long-term partner. The presence of a strong military power such as Russia can increase the weight of middle powers such as India in the increasingly bipolar contest between the US and China.
Abe Shinzo will also be remembered for his efforts to redefine Japan’s bilateral relations. Under his premiership, he strengthened Japan’s ties to the US through his adept management of President Donald Trump, built on Japan’s ties to actors like Australia, India, and a host of Southeast Asian countries.
India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently announced a five-year import embargo on 101 defence items beginning in December 2020. The embargo aims to boost the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ and ‘Make in India’ initiatives promoted by the Modi government.
The latest RIC meeting took place on 23 June 2020. For India, however, questions arise about whether the RIC fits New Delhi’s aims as it increases its strategic engagement with the United States, Japan, and Australia. This goes against the RIC’s objective to undermine a growing American presence in the Indo-Pacific.
It came as no surprise that a month later, the honour guards of the People’s Liberation Army marched in Red Square as part of grand celebrations to mark the 75th anniversary of Soviet victory over Germany. The event was heavy on symbolism — yet another way for the two rivals to signal their growing closeness.
Like Modi, Duterte’s approach is based on caution and building mutual trust to avoid a wider geopolitical conflict, and setting aside territorial disputes in exchange for trade and investment opportunities. This policy has continued despite regular harassment of Filipino fishing vessels by Chinese coast guards.
In the past few years, in particular, under Modi’s premiership, India has developed increasingly close ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which has gone beyond the narrow realm of religious connections. India has also been successful in upgrading its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to the strategic level.
The violence in Ladakh, also allowed Beijing to examine the degree of coordination that exists within the Indo-US strategic partnership. As Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed with medieval-style weapons in the Galwan Valley, Beijing paid close attention to how the United States reacted.
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Beijing's presence in the Bay of Bengal’s waters has provoked a level of strategic competition among regional and extra-regional actors not seen since the Cold War when Soviet and American Indian Ocean squadrons competed for influence in South Asia.
Written by Prashant Kandpal and Koushlender Singh Bundela
Recent attacks from extremist splinter groups, including the resurgence of Islamic State in the region has forced Duterte to put his weight behind a reformed terrorism bill. Those protesting against the new anti-terror bill fear that provisions within it will give Manila unsupervised power over the citizens of the country.
The inherent contradictions between Trump’s America First strategy and the current calls for a coalition against China remain a sticking point. Trump has never attended an East Asia Summit, and his administration’s denigration of alliances has reduced American capacity to create a coalition of like-minded partners to support its position in the South China Sea.