Written by Vengalil Venugopal
The US Navy’s shipbuilding plan has capped the fleet size at 355 ships by 2034. China’s own naval expansion however has progressed at pace. By 2030, Beijing could field a fleet of 450 surface ships and 110 submarines, localised entirely in the Indo-Pacific.
Read MoreWritten by Mateusz Chatys
Chinese fishing boats and coast guard ships are increasingly trespassing into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near the Natuna islands. Indonesia however has a wide range of tools it is willing to use if Beijing continues its provocative actions.
Read MoreWritten by James Borton
There are about 400 underseas cables, many owned by Amazon, Facebook and Google, that propel data down the threads at nearly the speed of light and this trove of data, includes emails, texts and more than $15 trillion of the world’s financial transactions.
Read MoreWritten by Bich T Tran
Vietnam’s Three-No’s principle makes alliances unlikely, a recent white paper states however that: “Vietnam will consider developing appropriate defense and military relations with other countries, regardless of political regimes and levels of development.”
Read MoreWritten by Vengalil Venugopal
In the last decade China has been developing its A2/AD strategy in the South and East China Seas and in the Taiwan Straits. The ambition is to disrupt the freedom of navigation for the United States and its allies and increase calculus of risk for ships operating in increasingly tense waters.
Read MoreWritten by Mansheetal Singh and Megha Gupta
China’s actions toward Taiwan and the South China Sea may seem innocuous, but they are being recognised regionally as part of a long term “salami-slicing” strategy employed by Beijing in maritime spaces and beyond.
Read MoreWritten by Zachary Haver
Beijing’s relentless pattern of assertiveness in the South China Sea is reinforcing existing perceptions of China as an irresponsible power. Beijing could have seized on COVID-19 as a chance to earn goodwill in Southeast Asia. Instead, China adopted the opposite approach.
Read MoreWritten by Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby
ASEAN’s role has never been to resolve the South China Sea dispute, only to serve as a platform on which claimant states can negotiate a solution. The challenge remains for ASEAN to agree on a collective response to China’s recent moves.
Read MoreWritten by Vignesh Ram
A common ASEAN position (if it can be enforceable) with a Code of Conduct, will be important to avoid any future close confrontations such as the one between Malaysia and China. Time however is running out as Beijing continues to assert its power in the South China Sea.
Read MoreWritten by Khushnam P N
India is not a party to the disputes with China in the South China Sea and therefore will not seek any approach that may be percieved as ‘meddling’ by Beijing. The priority for India is to preserve the “Wuhan Consensus”.
Read MoreWritten by Gaurav Sen and Rahul Jaybhay
China's claim of the nine-dash line collides with the regional capabilities of multiple claiment states, many of which are growing and developed economies. A limited program of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) could deter Beijing in the East and South China Seas.
Read MoreWritten by Chetan Rana
Since the early 1950s, Vietnam has recieved the diplomatic support of India, whether during the Vietnam War or the invasion of Cambodia. Now, with closer economic and defence ties, India may soon have to decide whether to support Hanoi in the South China Sea.
Read MoreWritten by Lupita Wijaya
Indonesia has increasingly been drawn into the South China Sea dispute, and although a non-claiment state, media narratives are forming. Perceptions of China within Indonesia are being shaped in the media by recent events in the Natuna Sea.
Read MoreWritten by Pawel Behrendt
The Cold War set the stage and script for later acts we are now seeing in the South China Sea drama. When China took islands from Vietnam it showed that under favourable conditions, the decline of the USSR, that it was ready to use force.
Read MoreWritten by Yoichiro Sato and Sek Sophal
The outbreak of COVID-19 has slowed down the world economy, and forced two U.S. Navy carriers into port, but it has not visibly slowed down the activities of China's patrol boats in the South China Sea.
Read MoreWritten by Muhamad Arif.
An alienated China is not in Jokowi’s interest. Provoking China and prompting it to act more aggressively would escalate tension in the region and be detrimental to Jokowi’s domestic economic development agenda.
Read MoreWritten by Phillip Orchard
Southeast Asian states are finding it ever-harder to trust that the US will show up if and when push comes to shove with China. And this dynamic might just make it even harder for the U.S. to do so.
Read MoreWritten by Panos Iordanidis
South China Sea is a region full of geopolitical competition. No wonder why: Almost one third of global shipping trade passes through this maritime route, as well as the overwhelming majority of China’s oil imports.
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