ASEAN and the regional solution to the South China Sea dispute
ASEAN and the regional solution to the South China Sea dispute
WRITTEN BY VIGNESH RAM
18 May 2020
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been one of main the organisations embroiled in the brinkmanship driven regional security dynamics in the South China Sea. There has been a substantial change in the China and Southeast Asia relationship over the years. At odds with China over the dispute but tied to it economically, the Southeast Asian claimants to the dispute have remained in a state of constant flux in trying to deal with their complex relations with China.
The latest salvos were drawn in the South China Sea amidst one of the worst virus outbreaks the world has ever seen. China’s coastguard vessels were seen confronting Malaysian vessels supporting the operations of state-owned company Petronas. However, keenly watching the South China Sea dispute, analysts may not be alarmed at China’s swift progress in claiming islands and features in the South China Sea.
Historically, China’s preference in asserting itself in the South China Sea has come at points where either the regional setting has weakened due to a geopolitical shift in the foundational regional military or diplomatic arrangements or for that matter, regional leadership has been weakened due to bilateral relations between China and host nations of ASEAN (the ASEAN chair). Hence, it would be prudent to understand the approach of China and the approach of ASEAN (as a part of the approach of Southeast Asian nations) towards the South China Sea dispute.
China has risen: now what?
Over the years there has been a rapid shift in the narrative involving China’s rise. While each passing day, there is a substantial increase in military and economic outreach in the Indo-Pacific, the reordering of the Geopolitics with its Belt and Road initiative firmly entrenched the idea of China’s arrival on the global stage. Military faceoffs have increased in China’s immediate periphery or militarily, its first island chain. While China’s power projection capabilities have grown beyond comprehension for smaller neighbours, over the years especially in the past two years the ongoing challenges in China, have signalled a need for Beijing to push for a stronger position in external disputes to project its power.
Unless the Southeast Asian countries can find alternatives to China in the economic space and rebalance their position to bargain from a position of strength, the ASEAN-led Code of Conduct, even it materializes, will be an empty document .
Multiple theatres have been used for this matter, the South China Sea provides Beijing with more flexibility as it can take advantage of its deep economic interdependence with its smaller ASEAN neighbours and their relatively disproportionate military capabilities vis-à-vis China. While other disputes such as increasingly tense confrontations with Taiwan do exist, in comparison lesser complications and more room for diplomatic manoeuvring make it easier for exerting power and capability in the South China Sea much easier.
In this context, the latest confrontation between China and Malaysia in April 2020 has once again proved that agreements on the regional (ASEAN) level are riddled with inconsistencies and loopholes which are used as a premise for intrusion and display of power. In previous instances dilution of sovereignty claims in exchange for a more cordial time buying tactics such as joint exploration and (joint) scientific research has helped create inconsistencies. In several confrontations, these watered-down arrangements have led to friction. As the economic stakes grow and the ability to withstand geopolitical accommodations diminishes increasing close encounters will test the limits of confrontation avoidance. The regional and bilateral approaches which ASEAN claimants follow adds more to the evolving security architecture in the region.
ASEAN, power politics and a lost opportunity in the South China Sea
Historically, throughout the post-cold war period, Southeast Asia’s response to the United States and China and even for that matter India has been mixed and often driven by the logic of enmeshment of powers rather than a balance of power approach. ASEAN formed an interesting vehicle for this very purpose of engaging multiple powers. The regional engagement mechanisms in the form of the ASEAN summit meetings, ASEAN plus arrangements including the ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional forum are some of the “inclusive” mechanisms put in place for this regional experiment.
In specific to the South China Sea dispute the primary analysis of the behaviour of ASEAN in the South China Sea since 1992 will give an understanding of the multiple variables that play a key role in limited returns in terms of an ASEAN position and engagement in the South China Sea dispute.
Since the fallout or a “non-consensus” indicating ASEAN failure to abide by its core principle in 2012 surfaced, the indication of great power politics triumphing over regional decision making was certain. The following summits ASEAN witnessed heckling by China. Whether it was the summit in Laos in 2016 with the divisive ‘four-point consensus’ or the summit in the Philippines which discarded the complete aspect of militarization in the South China Sea, a common position has been weakening due to the changing intra-regional dynamics in within the grouping.
Geopolitical tensions, domestic factors and the multilateral option
In 2018 amidst rising tensions, China and ASEAN agreed on a single draft document to negotiate the proposed Code of Conduct (CoC). However, analysts have argued that in the view of heightened military assets placed on islands including missiles, the militarization of the South China Sea would just give more leverage for China to negotiate with ASEAN. In this changed scenario, a concert of positions among the Southeast Asian claimants would form a bulwark to add to the external balancing provided by the United States and its allies. Several factors have contributed to the loss of a combined ASEAN position in the South China Sea.
The debate over national interest vs regional interests have been one of the key issues for ASEAN’s functioning. A key challenge has been in maintaining a “regional” stance over the issues. The fallout in 2012 in Phnom Penh, 2016 in Vientiane and continuing challenge in adherence of principles of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties (DoC) and for that matter International provisions such as the UNCLOS undermine any progress made at the regional multilateral level.
While economic considerations have become paramount, domestic constituents have also acted as key challenges, the Philippines leadership under president Duterte has been quite cold towards, internationalizing the South China Sea issue. While dealing with China in a more cordial fashion, the government has been at logger heads with the United States, recently even putting in motion the scrapping of the US-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement. This instability provides important clues in why an ASEAN agreement if successful may not be enforceable. The positive security guarantees on behalf of the United States and other powers may not be as strong in reassuring a china move to expand its presence in the South China Sea.
The worst case scenario of an increased China presence might be coming true for the Philippines which has seen increased Chinese fishing armada in its waters and also placement of two Chinese radar systems in islands which are disputed and even legally belong to Philippines as per the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the landmark case against China. Nevertheless, the Philippines which is the country coordinator for China in ASEAN has been trying to push for a code of conduct before president Duterte’s term as president ends.
An ASEAN position, symbolism and why it matters?
As the US-China relationship stands at a new juncture due to the onset of COVID-19, the South China Sea dispute seems to reflect the same if not a worsening situation in terms of China’s projection of power in the region. The denotation of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea is the last straw in the solidification of China’s claims over the whole of the region. The chain of radar networks backed by missile capabilities and the legalization of islands and allocation of administrative capabilities all point to a difficulty in reversing China’s effective occupation of the islands, its waters and the airspace.
A common ASEAN position (if it can be enforceable and not only achieved) with a Code of Conduct will be important to avoid any close confrontations such as the one between Malaysia and China in April 2020. It will be important to use the multiple levers which the organisation has such as its relations with other powers to subdue the overwhelming influence of China in the region.
There are three scenarios which can be possible in the South China Sea. Brushing aside the issue of sovereignty, which has been a non-negotiable issue for China, its ability to enforce the claims in the region and continued militarization will see opening up to joint exploration of resources and other cooperative measures which have been long standing alternatives to settling claims. Time may be running out for Southeast Asian claimants to find any possible reversal to territorial possessions. Unless the Southeast Asian countries can find alternatives to China in the economic space and rebalance their position to bargain from a position of strength, the Code of Conduct even it materializes will be an empty document which may merely remain in paper and not actualize on the ground.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Vignesh Ram is the Division Head, Political Risk and Intelligence Services Management (PRISM), COVINTS Network, Bengaluru, India. Dr Vignesh holds a PhD in Geopolitics and International Relations from Manipal University, India specializing in the geopolitics of Southeast Asia and decision making within ASEAN. Image credit: US Mission to ASEAN.