South China Sea: media contestations in conflict narratives

29 April 2020

Geopolitics and the complexities of international maritime law are two essential perspectives needed when examining the South China Sea dispute. However, there is a third factor that needs to be examined when discussing the central claims of this maritime dispute and that is the underlying media discourse and its role as an important determinant for conflict enactment.

Therefore, in this article I propose to embark from the perspective of mediatised conflict, to develop a more nuanced and dynamic approach that ultimately links media discourse to foreign policy decision making. A pioneering scholar in mediatised conflict, Simon Cottle, argued that the media is actively ‘enacting’ and ‘performing’ the conflict, exerting capabilities beyond disseminating ideas, images and information.

There are at least two main issues at play in the dispute that witness mediatised conflict in the South China Sea (SCS), namely narratives of nationalism and ‘frenemy’ positions in media.

Narratives of nationalism

One of the most salient ways to comprehend narratives of nationalism is by analysing metaphors in news reports. The metaphors arise as products of our cognitive abilities by reflecting historical imperatives, for instance the past conflict experience.

Historical imperatives are the features that emphasise the sociocultural situatedness of metaphors. In the South China Sea dispute, territorial conceptualisations of the nation are easily linked to the ‘nation as an extension of family’, resulting in the ‘homeland’ metaphor which allows readers to conceptualise the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The narratives in the disputed waters have also evolved into a storyline of ‘threat’, seeing China’s activities in the South China Sea as an act of bullying.

Another example comes from Indonesian media, where they coined the term of maritime colonialism to depict China’s Nine-Dash Line claim, ongoing land reclamations and the implementation of the Maritime Silk Road. The way Indonesian news media refers to maritime colonialism and suspicious attitudes toward China cannot be separated from the historical imperatives of Indonesia’s recent history and in Indonesia-China relations.

From Soekarno (1945) to Wahid’s administration (2001), Indonesia’s main obstacle in handling the South China Sea dispute was on ideological imperatives. More importantly, the long historical consequences of the 32-year New Order regime under the Suharto that served to maintain suspicions and insecurity within Indonesia towards anything relating to China.

Although Indonesia's primary interest has now been transformed (from ideological interest to economic interest) in Joko Widodo’s administration, Indonesia maintains a similar posture by suspiciously reckoning China’s foreign investments, the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Jakarta-Bandung high speed railway project, and disputes surrounding the Natuna islands. Long before the contested sovereignty issues in the South China Sea rose to prominence, the terms “China” and “Chinese” in Indonesia already has many negative connotations in political, economic, security and cultural settings.

A survey conducted by Setijadi (2017) confirmed the existence of negative prejudice against ethnic Chinese and their percieved influence in Indonesian politics and the economy, and many pribumi (native) still believed that Chinese Indonesians may harbour divided national loyalties. In one academic seminar about ‘Writing and Researching in the Southeast Asian’ that I attended back in 2017, as an Indonesian of Chinese descent, I found that I was asked about whether I would sympathise China. Evan Laksamana, a CSIS researcher, added how issues involving China could easily become a “major domestic political problem” in Indonesia as even small things could snowball into a big “China problem”.

Simply put, the historical imperatives will always be a fundamental challenge in dealing with China regardless of the ever-changing national interests and foreign policies across administrations. This issue is increasingly pivotal since China is the emerging global power and also the dominant claimant in the South China Sea.

Although Indonesia initially sought to play a mediator role in the dispute, ostensibly as an honest broker and as non-claimant state, its position has become blurrier when a series of incidents occurred in 2016. These included Chinese fishing boats clashing direclty with the Indonesian Navy, the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision brought forward by the Philippines, a rising military presence by both China and Indonesia, and the completion of islands constructed by China in the disputed area.

All these collective concerns have finally led to ‘renaming’ actions in the region. Despite the protests from Beijing, Philippines President Benigno Aquino III signed a mandate to that used the term “West Philippine Sea” when addressing the South China Sea in 2012. This action was then followed by Indonesian President Joko Widodo in 2017, who named the bordering water as the “North Natuna Sea”.

Meanwhile, Vietnam and China address the region as “East Sea (Biển Đông)” and “South Sea (南海)” respectively. Although it is important to note that all these geographical terms refer only to the specific border areas in the respective countries. China is the only disputant that claims almost of the entire South China Sea and has claims on Nine-Dash Line.

‘Frenemy’ positions

With a frenemy, intense dislikes and prolonged disagreement are present, but social or business obligations require friendliness in a interdependent situation. Whilst narratives of nationalism cover the historical imperatives, the frenemy position often involves a framing of national interest, foreign policy and in events covered by the news media. That is why the position reflects changing attitudes as an effect of balancing risk and reward whether they will get investment or punishment. The example of frenemy position in the South China Sea conflict can be seen in topic coverage and dominant sources in news reports.

The coverage is differently apparent when the news media highlights the two dominant themes of politics and economy. When it pertains to economic, trade and business with China, the Indonesian media tend to demonstrate a dominant, positive tone of articles. On the contrary, the media tends to take a negative tone toward Beijing in stories about security and politics. Frenemy is best to understand where the conflicted parties are involved in both ‘constructive’ cooperation and ‘destructive’ military actions simultaneously.

Another case to look at frenemy positions is when the term ‘Balkanization’ is used in the media. The term refers to an intentionally fragmented regional situation that later develops into divisions between ministries of a nation state. Multiple multilateral agreements, such as the SCS Code of Conduct, have been dragging too long because of the incohesive approach between claimants. We have seen, for example, how dramatically the Philippines changed its approach to China within less than a decade, transitioning from Aquino III to Duterte’s administration. Now observe the high level of disagreement between ministries, look at the example when Indonesia tackled the illegal fishing.

In 2016, when Chinese fishing boats conducted illegal fishing activities in Natuna, Indonesia’s Minister of Marine Resources and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti took a tough stance by seizing and sinking foreign fishing vessels.

This position was totally different with Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Luhut Panjaitan. Luhut depicted Indonesia and China as good neighbours. In an article Luhut: Indonesia Tak Ingin Ribut dengan Tiongkok [Eng: Luhut: Indonesia is Reluctant to Make a Fuss with China], Luhut stated directly, “we don’t want to wrangle with China”. This article, as a part of national rubric, apparently highlighted how Indonesian government searched for solutions to resolve the South China Sea dispute.

In the end, domestic news media plays a central role in understanding this conflict. Since the nexus of the South China Sea dispute is literally in the middle of a major ocean and the military-like confrontations with other nations are hundreds of miles away from where populations live, this media perspective plays an important role in portraying this international conflict in the minds of the claimant’s public-at-large.

The two factors of ‘narrative of nationalism’ and ‘frenemy positions’ enable us to spend more time on recasting our understanding of conflict construction and the interaction between the elite, the media, and the public.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Lupita Wijaya is a PhD Candidate in Media Studies and Communication at Monash University, Australia. She holds a Master degree in the same field from Chinese Culture University, Taiwan and previously worked as a full time lecturer in Indonesia.Image credit: CC BY-NC 2.0/Trey Ratcliffe/Flickr

Southeast Asia9DLApril 29, 2020China, Indonesia, South China Sea