Vietnam’s evolving South China Sea policy
Vietnam’s Evolving South China Sea Policy
WRITTEN BY BICH T TRAN
15 June 2020
The South China Sea disputes, in which China and Vietnam are involved in bilateral and multilateral disputes over the ownerships of the Paracel and the Spratly Islands respectively, have lasted for decades. As Beijing has become increasingly assertive, there is a shift in Hanoi’s South China Sea policy.
China has repeatedly intruded into Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In May 2014, Beijing deployed a state-owned oil rig into the Vietnamese side of the hypothetical median line of the overlapped EEZs under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s provocative action led to a series of anti-China protests and riots in Vietnam. The most recent intrusion was between early July and late October 2019. Beijing sent a survey vessel with armed escorts to Vanguard Bank, which came as close as 65 nautical miles from the coast of Phu Yen Province.
Second, China has systematically interfered with oil and gas development of other claimants in the South China Sea, including Vietnam. In 2017, Beijing reportedly threatened to attack Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands if Hanoi continued its exploration in Blocks 136/03 and 07/03. The blocks are largely within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam’s EEZ but overlapped with China’s so-called “9-dash line,” which was ruled invalid by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal initiated by the Philippines.
In Vietnam’s most recent defense white paper published in November 2019, China was mentioned by name for the first time in such a document, expressing Hanoi’s concerns over the situation in the South China Sea.
Yielding to China’s pressure, Vietnam ordered Spanish energy firm Repsol to suspend two of its projects in July 2017 and March 2018. In the Vanguard Bank standoff, China was pressuring Vietnam over its work with Russian energy firm Rosneft. The United States issued two statements criticizing China’s coercion as a threat to regional energy security and the free and open Indo-Pacific energy market.
Furthermore, China has conducted large-scale reclamation and militarization of contested features since 2014. It has deployed a wide array of missiles on those artificial islands, which could be used to deny other countries access to the maritime and air domains of the South China Sea.
Emphasizing a foreign policy of independence and self-reliance, the first thing Vietnam did in response to China’s threats was starting a modest program to modernize its naval and air forces in the mid-1990s. Since 2004, Hanoi has intensified its military modernization with the purchases of dozens of Su-30MKs jet fighters and six Kilo-class submarines from Moscow. In addition to purchasing modern weapons, Vietnam has tried to develop its defense industry. Ba Son Corporation was in charge of building six missile ships designed by Russia.
Despite Vietnam’s modernization efforts, its military power is only a fraction of China’s. The World Bank’s most recent data on military expenditure for 2018 (in current USD) show China’s spending at $250 billion, which was 45 times higher than that of Vietnam’s at $5.5 billion.
With limited resources and capacity, Vietnam realized the need to work with other countries in dealing with China. First, Vietnam turned to the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) to seek a collective voice when it became a member in 1995. In 2002, ASEAN and China agreed on the Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and have worked for a conclusion of a Code of Conduct ever since. Besides ASEAN, Vietnam has also raised the South China Sea disputes at other international forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, where it can express its concerns and gain international supports for its stand on the South China Sea issue. Vietnam welcomes the Freedom of Navigation Operations by the United States and its allies, which are important in upholding international law.
After the oil rig incident in 2014, Vietnam has intensified defense cooperation with major powers. Japan and the United States have offered patrol boats to help Vietnam improve its maritime capability. India has provided defense training and Lines of Credit to Vietnam.
Notably, in Vietnam’s most recent defense white paper published in November 2019, China was mentioned by name for the first time in such a document, expressing Hanoi’s concerns over the situation in the South China Sea. Vietnam's longstanding Three-No’s policy of “no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, and no foreign military bases” became a fourth no as it added “no use of force or threat to use force”.
The fourth “no” first appears as a recitation of an obvious norm of international behavior; however, it signals Vietnam's extreme concern over China’s actions as China has twice used force against Vietnam in the South China Sea. In the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974, China invaded the islands, held by the South Vietnamese regime at that time, and killed more than 70 Vietnamese soldiers. In 1988, China again used force to seize several features from Vietnam in the Battle of the Spratly Islands, that led to the death of 64 Vietnamese soldiers.
Although Vietnam’s Three-No’s principle makes alliances with other countries unlikely, the 2019 white paper states that: “depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Vietnam will consider developing necessary, appropriate defense and military relations with other countries…regardless of differences in political regimes and levels of development.” This is the first time Hanoi has explicitly given room for interpretation of its 3-no principle, which will pave the way for Vietnam to deepen defense cooperation with the United States, Japan, India, and other countries in the future.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Bich T. Tran is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Antwerp, a researcher at the Global Affairs Research Center in Kyoto, and a former Asia Studies Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, DC. Image credit: Rush Murad/Flickr.