The question at the heart of the South China Sea dispute
THE QUESTION AT THE HEART OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE
WRITTEN BY PHILLIP ORCHARD
4 April 2020
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s abrupt move to terminate his country’s Visiting Forces Agreement with the U.S. in February exposed an uncomfortable reality for defense planners in Washington: Southeast Asian states are finding it ever-harder to trust that the US will show up if and when push comes to shove with China. And this dynamic might just make it even harder for the U.S. to do so.
Consider the context surrounding the U.S.-Philippines rupture. The U.S. is unquestionably Manila’s most powerful and least coercive option for a defense partner, and the Philippines occupies the most strategically valuable geography in the South China Sea. The VFA — which facilitates hundreds of annual bilateral exercises and implementation of a landmark 2014 basing agreement that would have had the potential to become the U.S.' biggest check on China’s expansion into the South China Sea — is what gives the alliance teeth. Similar moves by Manila in the past to weaken bilateral defense cooperation only accelerated Chinese encroachment (while also leaving the AFP ill-equipped to address militant threats in the country’s restive south, to boot).
Surveys suggest the U.S. remains broadly popular with the Philippine public. This, along with deep institutional support for the alliance, had largely prevented Duterte from acting on his personal antipathy for the meddlesome Americans. By most metrics, the alliance has remained on sound strategic footing.
The question will linger in regional capitals just how how much Washington thinks China’s expansion in the waters matters to U.S. interests — and just much faith they should put in U.S. willingness to defend them.
Yet, as it stands, the VFA will disappear in August. Conspicuously, there’s little evidence of much urgency in Manila to save it. This suggests that dismay has become widespread in the Philippines over the U.S.' reluctance to intervene on its behalf in the South China Sea. And if the Philippines — the U.S.’ oldest ally in Asia — has concluded that allying with an aloof U.S. courts more Chinese aggression than it deters, then there’s little hope of getting the other, more ambivalent regional states to take risks on the U.S.’ behalf.
The U.S. Dilemma
Just how much the U.S. would benefit from a greater ability to project power inside the First Island Chain, particularly around the Spratlys, is a hot topic of debate. But the U.S. is basically content with the status quo in the South China Sea. To contain China on other fronts, it doesn’t really need to escalate matters there — by, say, attempting to forcefully evict Chinese forces from its new bases on the man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago. To be sure, the U.S. would not stand idly by if China tried to use these to shut down crucial sea lanes.
It conducts regular FONOPS to make this (and only this) point. But so long as the U.S. has the capability to cut off Chinese commerce flowing through chokepoints along what’s known as the First Island Chain and through the Malacca and Sunda straits, China likely couldn't afford disrupt maritime traffic in the South China Sea, even if it had a good reason to. The Chinese economy would be crippled, and the world would be united against it. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, the military assets stationed on the artificial islands would likely prove only of marginal value if an all-out conflict between China and the United States did erupt.
Keeping the Philippines, in particular, on its side is critical to the U.S. deterrent. Ultimately, to blow a hole in the U.S. containment line, China needs one of the countries along the First Island Chain to flip fully into its camp — and given the Philippines’ weakness, it may be China’s best bet. But the U.S. also doesn’t want to get dragged into a war with China — at least not one that wasn’t started on its terms -- and so it doesn’t want to give the Philippines reason to think the U.S. will automatically have its back if it picks a fight it can’t win on its own. Thus, it has kept the commitments outlined in the Mutual Defense Treaty vague. And it’s done very little to protect its material and territorial interests — by, say, protecting Philippine access to fishing and energy resources in their exclusive economic zones.
This approach may make strategic sense for the U.S., at least on paper. But its downsides are becoming increasingly apparent. For one, as acknowledged by Admiral Philip Davidson last year, is that China is "now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios, short of war with the United States.” This gives countries like the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia little choice but to do whatever they deem necessary to remain friendly with China. It's a core reason why Duterte has routinely sought to limit cooperation with the U.S., while allowing China to gradually expand its commercial and political influence in the country in ways that could come back to haunt the U.S. And leaders can build public support for their moves to accommodate China when they can credibly argue: If the Americans are unwilling even to stop armed Chinese fishing fleets from dominating our waters, what good are the Americans? Trump’s own personal disregard for distant allies only amplifies such doubts.
This plays into the Chinese narrative that Southeast Asian states would be wise to accept its ascension as regional hegemon as a fait accompli. And it becomes a real problem for U.S. strategy if it compels regional states to abandon cooperation with the U.S. at Beijing’s behest and allow China to take up positions that allow it secure access through critical chokepoints. In such a scenario, the U.S. would lose its trump card and its status as guarantor of global maritime trade.
As a result, the U.S. has been trying to find ways to reassure littoral states without escalating the risk of war. But it doesn’t have many great options — especially if its 2014 basing agreement with Manila falls apart. It can ramp up security assistance and training and try to pressure China with tools like targeted sanctions. Ultimately, though, to stop Chinese encroachment off littoral states’ shores, the U.S. would probably need to bring power to bear directly. Yet, its warships would be ill-suited for policing tasks even if the U.S. was inclined to intervene in relatively low-level disputes, and China’s expanding A2/AD buffer would make the risks of trying ejecting the PLA from disputed reefs unacceptably high.
Thus, the question will linger in regional capitals just how much Washington thinks China’s expansion in the waters matters to U.S. interests — and just much faith they should put in U.S. willingness to defend them.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Phillip Orchard is an analyst at Geopolitical Futures focused on the convergence of military, political and economic forces in the Indo-Pacific. Image credit: CC BY-NC 4.0/U.S. Navy/Flickr.