Southeast Asia's silence over China's clashes with Vietnam
Southeast Asia's silence over China's clashes with Vietnam
WRITTEN BY YOICHIRO SATO AND SEK SOPHAL
17 April 2020
A collision between a Vietnamese fishing boat and a Chinese Coastguard patrol boat off the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea on April 3, resulted in sinking of the heavily damaged Vietnamese boat. The crew were then subsequently detained by China before being handed back to Vietnamese authorities. In response to the incident both the U.S. State and Defense departments issued their respective statement on the sinking on April 6 and 9.
Tensions over fishing activities by both Vietnamese and Chinese trawlers around the disputed Paracel islands have led to increasing clashes between both nations in recent years, including another similar collision between their fishing fleets, which resulted in the sinking of another Vietnamese vessel in 2014. Vietnam is growing increasingly concerned over China’s enhanced fishing, naval, and maritime enforcement capabilities in the region, and in response this has led Hanoi to a search for new defense and security partners across the Indo-Pacific region.
In this endeavour Vietnam has been successful, with the signing of a Comprehensive Partnership with the United States in 2013, which was upgraded in 2017, and the signing of a procurement agreement with Japan in 2017 to receive six newly-built coast guard patrol boats. Port-call visits by naval vessels of both of these countries, including most recently the U.S. Navy’s USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier in March 2020, symbolically sent a message of deterrence towards China and its recent conduct in the South China Sea.
The outbreak of COVID-19 has slowed down the world economy, and forced two U.S. Navy carriers into port, but it has not visibly slowed down the activities of China's patrol boats in the South China Sea.
The United States for its part, has avoided taking a stance on specific disputes over land and underwater geographic features (such as reefs and banks) of the South China Sea and stated its general objection to China’s Nine-Dash Line, which claims a broad area of the South China Sea as Beijing’s “historical” rights.
The recent U.S. State and Defense Department statements walk a fine line however on the sinking of the Vietnamese fishing boat. Both statements blame China for the collision and go on to denounce Beijing’s wider “unlawful” actions in the South China Sea in general. Interestingly however the statements don’t seek to tie the two issues together. The statements thereby sidestep the question altogether of sovereignty over the Paracel islands. Moreover, the Defense Department statement three days after the State Department statement called “all parties to refrain from actions that would destabilize the region.”
This implicitly warns Vietnam against using fishing boats and its own maritime militia to challenge China’s growing control of the adjacent waters near the Paracels.
A report by Yoshihiro Makino on Forbes Japan (April 13, 2020) cites anonymous Japanese “government” and “foreign ministry” sources and states that the Japanese government is under strong pressure from the United States to issue a similar statement to denounce China. Whilst Tokyo does not rule out doing so, Japan is also faced with the pending issue of rescheduling an upcoming visit by President Xi Jinping, on hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As of writing, no official statement has been issued by the Japanese government on Vietnam or the South China Sea.
The governments of Southeast Asia are likewise not visibly eager to toe the U.S. diplomatic line either. The Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, which did not attribute fault to either party and instead expressed appreciation for rescuing of the Filipino fishermen by Vietnamese fishing boat in another collision event with a Chinese boat. The statement also expressed appreciation for China’s cooperation and assistance in combatting the COVID-19 outbreak in the Philippines.
Thailand has also chosen to remain silent over Vietnam’s clashes with China. In response to economic downturn caused by COVID-19, Thailand looks set to have to cut its large defense budget to support the domestic fight against COVID-19. Cutting the defense budget, however, will affect numerous defense projects, including the procurement of a second submarine by the Royal Thai Navy from China. Thailand is handling the suspension of arms procurement carefully to minimize negative impact on Thailand-China military to military relations.
Furthermore, 2020 marks the 45th anniversary of Thailand-China diplomatic relations (1975-2020). Thailand still hopes to revive the suspended planning of President Xi’s visit to Thailand. It is critically important that Thailand avoids an unnecessary diplomatic tension with China.
Like Thailand, Cambodia is also silent on the boat collision issue. In the wake of Covid-19 outbreak in Southeast Asia, Cambodia instead watched Vietnam with dismay. According to a report by Khmer Times on March 19, 2020, Cambodia was disappointed that Vietnam unilaterally closed its border with Cambodia on the same day. Although Vietnam’s decision did not apply to Vietnamese and Cambodian citizens holding official or diplomatic passports, it interrupted businesses and generated a huge negative impact on economic cooperation along the border.
As Cambodia is struggling to fight against COVID-19, it is looking at China for further support. Despite Vietnam too offering Cambodia medical assistance, Prime Minister Hun Sen once again expressed his disappointment at the border closure in his remarks during the ASEAN Special Summit on COVID-19 on April 14, 2020. “unilateral measures such as a closure of cross-border checkpoints without prior notice,” according to his remarks “can possibly affect production, supply chains, trade flows between countries in the region and the entire regional economy, particularly travelling, businesses, and the daily lives of the citizens living in the ASEAN region.” Even though Hun Sen did not mention the country by name, it was clear Vietnam was implied.
The outbreak of COVID-19 has slowed down the world economy, and forced two U.S. Navy carriers into port, but it has not visibly slowed down the activities of the Chinese patrol boats in the South China Sea. Efforts by the Trump Administration to forge an anti-China diplomatic coalition, however, are viewed across the region as half-hearted at best, especially by countries bordering the South China Sea’s disputed waterways.
China’s recent attempts to portray itself as having brought the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan under control has however been more successful. Beijing looks set to emerge as a helpful and reliable partner for ASEAN member states in the fight against COVID-19. The U.S. thus needs to both quantitatively catch up in the aid volume and medical supplies to stricken Southeast Asian economies and a qualitative reorientation of its now incoherent Indo-Pacific and South China Sea policy. Nationalistic rhetoric on key economic interests such as trade and a dogmatic hatred of China by Washington are clouding considerations of diplomatic nuances in dealing with the key countries in Southeast Asia.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Yoichiro Sato holds a Ph.D in Political Science from University of Hawaii. He is a professor at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His recent books include Re-rising Japan (co-edited, Peter Lang, 2017), Regional Institutions, Geopolitics and Economics in the Asia Pacific (co-edited, Routledge, 2017).
Sek Sophal holds a Master degree in Asia Pacific Studies from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. He is a researcher of the Center for Democracy Promotion, Ritsumeikan Center for Asia Pacific Studies, at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University and a guest columnist at Bangkok Post. Image credit: CC BY-NC 4.0/Rush Murad/Flickr