From Spratly to Senkaku: Why China’s bid for control can be deterred
From Spratly to Senkaku: Why China’s bid for control can be deterred
WRITTEN BY GAURAV SEN AND RAHUL JAYBHAY
12 May 2020
A number of significant events have unfolded in the South China Sea in the last seven weeks. Chinese aggressive behavior was witnessed in a recent standoff near Borneo when China targeted the Malaysian drillship West Copella. Prior to this, the Chinese Coast Guard ship 4301 was involved in the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Paracel Islands on April 4.
That same month, Beijing went on announce two new districts in the Spratly island chain, violating the Philippines sovereignty. In the meantime, with international attention focused on the South China Sea, Chinese aircraft and ships also intruded into Japanese waters in the East China Sea.
Within this context, an important question arises: how to deter or de-escalate Chinese moves in both of these vital maritime spaces? This article argues that states like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan should not be dismissed militarily and that an integrated approach between the states targetted by China coupled with Area Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)capabilities could serve to deter Beijing’s recent moves, and in a military scenario thwart China’s offensive posture.
Challenging China’s role in the South China Sea
In order to challenge China’s recent moves, support should be lent to the region’s littoral states to boost their defensive capabilities via the establishment of limited Area Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrines. Operationally, A2/AD capabilities deny any control to force projector, while greater distance creates problems for refueling and reloading. The effectiveness of A2/AD capabilities depends on the state's ability to find, track, and strike the projecting platforms. Sensing and tracking mechanisms use components like GPS, micro-electronic, and switching sensors that are increasingly available to even modest state actors, while striking precision is facilitated through networking that disseminates information about the opponent's activity among member states.
A comparative analysis of military capabilities between Japan and China shows that the associated costs involved in a conventional military campaign could deter Chinese maritime aggression. Japan is better placed than those economies in the South China Sea, with 35 modern destroyers against China's 21.
The South China Sea has been labeled as the 21st Century's "defining battleground", characterized as one of the most contentious zones in the Indo-Pacific, with claims by six countries. Chinese force projection is serving to destabalise other littoral states and their claims, but building a strong A2/AD defensive capability has the potential to nullify Chinese maritime aggression against the region’s smaller actors. Geographically, these states, except China, are located close to the contested maritime zone, providing an opportunity for states like Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia to work in tandem to debilitate Chinese naval movements
In a military theater of operations, Vietnam remains a contender for the role of main challenger to China in the South China Sea, with the two states having crossed swords before. In 2016, Vietnam purchased mobile shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles(ASCM) batteries that can target China’s maritime intrusions to within 200 miles of Vietnam’s territory.
In contrast, China could use its air superiority to destroy such anti-ship missiles, but Vietnamese air defenses are well equipped and are supplemented with the SPYDER system, thus Hanoi can counter Chinese airstrikes, which is no doubt in the minds of the Central Military Commission. In addition, Vietnam possesses the early warning radar systems to identify the threat and initiate prompt action through its own aircraft, the Su-30MK2Vs armed with multiple supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. Vietnam has recently purchased diesel-powered Kilo submarines, with characteristics ranging from low acoustics and effective weapons systems like anti-ship cruise missiles. These submarines whilst small in number have the capability to deter Chinese attacks and impose a limited naval blockade around Malacca Strait, which would heavily reduce freight and rolling stock for China’s economy.
Supplementing Vietnamese efforts, Indonesia and Malaysia as key regional economies should also be encouraged to engage to boost their defensive capabilities to deter Beijing, though their present capacity remains relatively weak. Indonesia has diesel-electric submarines, fitted with systems like electronic defense and radar detection to trace the target while simultaneously destroying it through lethal ASCM. Others defensive weapons include frigates and corvettes implanted with anti-ship missiles.
Similarly, Malaysia possesses two submarines developed in France, but the operating crew is better trained than their Indonesian counterparts. Malaysia also has frigates and patrol boats, armed with French and Italian made anti-ship cruise missiles. These limited A2/AD capabilities, coupled with the export of smart sensing and tracking technologies, facilitated through a diplomatic network, offer the opportunity among the key littoral states of the South China Sea to deter conventional Chinese maritime aggression.
Closing the East China Sea to China
The possibility of a clash between China and Taiwan continues to be the principal concern in the East China Sea. The diplomatic competition between the two, combined with the general truculence from Beijing towards the government of Tsai Ing-wen since 2016 has seen tensions become more engraved and with greater animosity.
China under Xi Jinping prime aim is for Taiwan's reunification with the mainland, but China's ability to do so via military means remains contested. Ian Easton in his book, The Chinese Invasion Threat provides an account of Taiwanese military capabilities to rebuke a potential military misadventure by China across the Taiwan Strait. The Republic of China is equipped with one of the best early warning systems in the world. It has 524 long-range missile launchers and a number of short-range missile launchers. For the offensive strike, Taiwan’s armed forces possesses 12 road missile launchers, 50 short-range ballistic missile launchers, 300 howitzers located on an offshore island along with 400 fighter aircraft, 73 ships, and 2 submarines.
In other words, as Robert D. Kaplan suggests "Taiwan is undoubtedly feisty and its occupation of 'the Pratas and Itu Aba islands prove it". If it had to, Taipei could establish an effective A2/AD barrier in the Taiwan Strait to Chinese shipping.
Tensions with Japan too play a role. In the East China Sea, China's mounting pressure to claim the Senkaku islands and Japanese determination not to cede the chain could also escalate into a military conflagration, witnessed in 2014 when China increasingly tested Japan’s military readiness.
Once again a comparative analysis of military capabilities between Japan and China shows that the associated costs involved in a conventional military campaign could deter Chinese maritime aggression. Japan is better placed than those economies in the South China Sea, with 35 modern destroyers against China's 21. Japan possesses 17 advanced submarines with a wide network of underwater sensors scattered around the East China Sea.
Moreover, Japan is overwhelmingly capable of mine warfare whereas China lacks mine-clearing capabilities, an often overlooked aspect of maritime conflict. Additionally, Japan stocks a pool of 200 plus fourth generation fighter aircraft and currently awaits to receive F-35A's from the United States, making it one of the most advanced airforces in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite China's power projection capabilities, Japanese defensive weapons could impose heavy costs on China should the day ever arrive when Beijing moves to take the Senkaku Islands by force.
In short, as Michael Beckley puts it, "although the balance of naval tonnage is shifting in China's favor, geographic and technological factors give Japan an enduring A2/AD capability that can plausibly deny China sea and air control in East Asia".
Conclusion
In summation, China's claim of the nine-dash line and threat to occupy the "cow's tongue" collides with the regional capabilities of multiple states, many of which are growing and developed economies.
Moreover, the United States continues to play an active and engaged role in the region that cannot be discounted. The US security umbrella for Japan and Taiwan, along with growing security ties with Southeast Asian countries and a general committment to freedom of navigation provides a decisive balancing force against China’s maritime ambitions.
Given the events of the last few weeks and the larger possibility of skirmishes between China and other Asian countries, the effective "coupling" of investment in A2/AD capabilities and the close alignment of key littoral states to the United States, could serve to prevent any escalation in the South and East China Seas, and mitigate recent Chinese aggressive behavior.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Gaurav Sen, Masters student in Politics and International Studies at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Areas of interest include the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific with US-China balance of power and Indian foreign policy.
Rahul Jaybhay, Masters student in Politics and International Studies at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Area of interest includes the Realist theories, Great Power Competition(USA-China), and Politics in SouthEast Asia. Image credit: US Pacific Fleet/Flickr.