South China Sea: Is countering China still possible?
South China Sea: Is countering China still possible?
WRITTEN BY PANOS IORDANIDIS
1 April 2020
The past decade’s tectonic geopolitical changes have once again brought both great power competition and the Asia-Pacific region to the foreground. The United States under both the Obama and Trump administrations have recognized Beijing’s growing influence and the reemergence of Moscow as a military threat by subtly shifting the focus from terrorism as a national security priority to states like Russia, Iran and China. At the start of a new decade the China-US relationship, as has been acknowledged, is wide ranging and tensions have increasingly expanded far beyond the tariffs or trade goods.
In this era of great power tensions, the South China Sea has become a key region for geopolitical competition between great powers and given the regional economic interests alone there is little wonder why: Almost one third of global shipping trade passes through the strategic maritime routes, as do the overwhelming majority of China’s oil imports. It is also widely held amongst claiment and non-claiment states alike that there are significant levels of mineral wealth in the South China Sea. The territorial disputes between China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia however are in the spotlight beyond trade tensions. Beijing is seeking to establish a new regional hegemony in the disputed waterways of the South China Sea, at the same time, Washington is attempting to rise to meet this rising challenge but with mixed results.
China’s Nine-Dash Line, which claim’s the entire South China Sea as belonging to the historic sphere of Beijing’s influence, is a concept much older than the People’s Republic of China dating back to Chang Kai-shek’s republic. Chinese forces first began being deployed in the 1980s but the South China Sea dispute has arguably heated up during the Xi Jinping era, when China started began pursing a more overt role in the disputed waterway. At the end of 2013, satellite images released by US intelligence and scholars revealed that Beijing had undertook a programme of land reclamation in the Spratly Islands, an act which kicked off both growing regional concern and international condemnation that have now become the norm in this contemporary phase of the dispute.
Regional mechanisms are not capable of countering Beijing’s resolve in the South China Sea and the United State’s regional allies cannot pose a challenge either. All that remains is Washington’s naval presence around Chinese reclamations to act as a balancing force and leverage.
The United States under President Obama, having undertaken a major pivot of diplomatic and military interests to the Indo-Pacific region early in his presidency, answered to China’s changes to the status quo with a limited but growing Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) by US Navy guided missile destroyers. In addition, the American military began to increase its forward deployed presence and engagement with regional allies, especially Japan and Philippines, especially after 2013. The US however did not however try to unseat China from its island fortresses, a move Beiijing fully expected.
A gradual militarization of the region seemingly began, with smaller states such as Singapore concerned over tensions between the two regions preeminient military and security powers. On its own terms, the fait accompli of China’s approach to the South China Sea seems to have been paid off. Beijing has successfully established missile and airbases in the heart of the world’s most important waterway, lending it a major advantage against US carrier battlegroups. The enhanced naval presence of the People’s Liberation Army, alongside with numerous military outposts established in Paracel and Spratly Islands, has given Beijing significant power and influence. On top of this, Chinese vessel surveys are contributing towards preventing states like Vietnam and the Philippines to fish into what Beijing now views as its own exclusive economic zones. In other words, Beijing’s power in South China Sea is now firmly established.
ASEAN countries involved in the disputes have themselves overlapping claims in the region with each other and not only China. Without a cohesive sense of unity against Beijing, the bloc remains unable to fully influence the dispute beyond issuing diplomatic rebukes and even then only when ASEAN is chaired by Vietnam. The diplomatic efforts conducted by the bloc towards establishing a code of conduct in the region have futher failed, owing to internal differences. Chinese influence within the bloc is not a matter that can be overlooked when discussing the trade bloc’s response to China. Recently, ASEAN introduced a common strategic standpoint for the Indo-Pacific region. While this is a step forward, it is as far as it can get regarding regional efforts to counter China in the South China Sea.
If regionalism cannot provide concrete results, there is always bilateralism. That basically means how much US engagement can contribute into shifting the balance of powers. The American alliance with Philippines, no matter how revived may seemed under the Trump administration, is collapsing. At the same time, US-Vietnam relations are steadily growing in the face of confronting a common regional rival. The case of Malaysia though is rather complicated. Despite that problems with China are posing as hindrances, its non-aligned policy remains. The optimism from the US side that this is going to turn in its favor is still an issue left wide open.
With all these in mind, sketching the correlations within the South China Sea results in some important implications. China’s rapid actions since Xi Jinping assumed power brought China into a space above any other claiment states in the disputed area. Regional mechanisms are not yet capable of countering Beijing and the key regional allies such as Australia or the Philippines cannot hope to challenge China’s strength either. All that remains is Washington’s naval presence around the Chinese reclamations to act as a balancing force. This situation continues to risk further escalation. But this is as much as China can get pressured in order to abandon its regional claims.
For the time being, China cannot be countered in the South China Sea and time plays into its hands. The balance of powers can only be changed through enhanced regional cooperation, targeted bilateral engagement and US unilateral (solely military) actions. Neither option is viable as we approach the presidential elections. This round goes to China.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Panos Iordanidis is a journalist/writer, based in Athens, Greece, dedicated to global politics. He focuses in the fields of power politics, security and human rights. Image credit: CC BY-NC 4.0/U.S. Secretary of Defense/Flickr.