The Bundeswehr in the Indo-Pacific
The Bundeswehr in the Indo-Pacific
WRITTEN BY RAFAEL LOSS AND ELISABETH I-MI SUH
14 November 2022
Germany is firmly committed to rule of law and stability in the Indo-Pacific — at least this is what Berlin’s 2020 guidelines for the region and its diplomatic and political-military initiatives are supposed to convey. While stepping up high-level diplomacy to court partners in the region is long overdue, questions remain regarding Germany’s military engagement.
Recent years have seen an uptick in the Bundeswehr’s (German federal armed forces) activity in the Indo-Pacific. Germany’s armed forces have participated in joint exercises with regional partners and NATO allies at sea and in the air. Next year, the Army is scheduled to deploy to Australia. This growing presence illustrates the increasing importance Berlin attaches to the region and the challenges presented by China’s evolving military posture and ambitions. In this context, the Bundeswehr’s temporary presence in the region is a political signal of commitment, albeit somewhat ambiguous. The forthcoming National Security Strategy and China Strategy, therefore, need to clarify the goals, instruments, and courses of action of Germany's approach to the Indo-Pacific.
Ambiguous signals
In 2021, the German frigate Bayern deployed to the Indian and Pacific oceans. This marked the end of an almost 20-year hiatus for the German Navy, which had last sent a vessel to the region in 2002. In a position paper issued earlier in 2021, then-Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and Bundeswehr chief General Eberhard Zorn worried about growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific: “Our like-minded partners in the region, too, are increasingly concerned”. The Bayern was sent to show support for these partners and to participate in joint exercises.
During its deployment from August 2021 to February 2022, the Bayern conducted port calls in Pakistan, Australia, Guam, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and India. It also crossed the South China Sea. In doing so, it followed the ‘innocent passage’ code of conduct by staying on common trade routes and avoiding military activities during the passage. This left some doubtful of Germany’s commitment to upholding freedom of navigation against Chinese territorial claims. The frigate also avoided passing the Taiwan Strait. Still, Beijing denied the Bayern a port call in Shanghai.
Adopting a rather transactional take and framing the Bundeswehr’s regional engagement in the context of Washington’s focus on China is not wrong, but it is short-sighted.
From mid-August to early September 2022, the German Air Force deployed six Eurofighter jets, four transporters, and three tankers to Australia as part of the Rapid Pacific mission to join the multinational Pitch Black air combat and Kakadu maritime combat exercises — a first in Bundeswehr history. For the German Air Force, exercising alongside American and Australian F-35 stealth aircraft and demonstrating the ability to project force over vast distances were additional perks of the deployment. Germany recently decided to acquire the F-35 as well.
The Bundeswehr plans to deploy to Australia again in 2023. An Army detachment is scheduled to participate in Talisman Saber, a large-scale exercise to train inter-allied multi-domain operations that Australia and the United States convene biennially. The Navy will return to the region next year as well. Bundeswehr leadership recently announced the deployment, potentially consisting of multiple vessels this time. The establishment of temporary logistics hubs in the region is also being discussed.
Substantial engagement
For Germany, military exercises and deployments to the Indo-Pacific are useful for showcasing commitment and capability. They also serve to train personnel and assess capacities and capabilities, particularly through combined exercises to improve interoperability with partner forces. In this context, partners in the region welcome Germany’s temporary military presence, but they also expect unambiguous support for pushing back against Chinese encroachment. The hope is that the Bundeswehr’s activities signal a shifting strategic outlook in Berlin. Unfortunately, the Bayern’s route of choice — avoiding the Taiwan Strait and hoping for a port call in Shanghai ahead of its inoffensively passive transition to the South China Sea — dimmed this hope.
Combined operational training is, however, only one building block in Germany’s political-military approach towards the Indo-Pacific. Regional actors and NATO members are also improving intergovernmental relations, as reciprocal high-level visits and NATO summitry illustrate. The NATO summit in June 2022 saw a new Strategic Concept, clarifying the challenges that China poses, as well as the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea joining in Madrid. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that “NATO will step up cooperation” with these partners, including on “cyber defence, new technologies, maritime security, climate change, and countering disinformation”. Recent examples include Australia’s partnership on hybrid threats and disinformation, and Japan and South Korea's participation in cyber defence efforts.
High-level visits illustrate the deepening of direct intergovernmental ties, particularly between Berlin, Canberra, and Tokyo. Most recently, the dialogue track between Germany’s and Japan’s foreign and defence ministries agreed to negotiate a cross-servicing pact that would provide for the mutual provision of fuel and ammunition. But Europeans must be mindful of deep-seated local sentiments and regional perceptions of informal hierarchies. Such perceptions manifest in anecdotal examples of optics and substance, such as the lack of high-level visits to South Korea, the size of Australian and Japanese flags compared to others on the Bundeswehr Eurofighter, or Australia’s ‘Enhanced Opportunity Partner’ status with NATO. Disgruntling local partners does not necessarily undermine bilateral relations per se, but it points to some unmet expectations and room to step up relationships with stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific.
Germany and the EU have pursued initiatives to strengthen multilateralism with and in the Indo-Pacific. This inter-regional multilateralism could also intensify in the military security and defence realm. NATO’s Asia-Pacific partnerships and the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy can both serve as frameworks to foster inter-regional exchange on military issues, risks, and needs as well as on contingency planning, deterrence, and defence strategies. One particular point of common interest and potential is strengthening maritime security and relevant capacities to support non-proliferation efforts and sanctions enforcement in the region.
In addition to engaging governments, there is room and a need to improve defence-industrial cooperation. Australia, Japan, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, for example, are each looking to boost their military capabilities. In doing so, these regional actors are both deepening and broadening their defence relationships: They are not only intensifying cooperation with one another, but they are also seeking to bring new partners into the fold. Bilateral deals serve to simplify defence procurements, information sharing, and combined training. South Korea stepped up military drills and high-level talks bilaterally with the United States as well as trilaterally to also include Japan against the backdrop of North Korea’s accelerating missile testing campaign. Taiwan is boosting its air defence and anti-ship capabilities with purchases from the United States.
Notably, there is a growing appetite for the joint development and manufacturing of armaments as illustrated by the production of US precision-guided missiles in Australia and ongoing talks between Taiwan and the United States on co-production. The German defence industry is a valued partner, too. Rheinmetall, for example, is producing Boxer multirole armoured fighting vehicles in Australia. Less positive: German-designed ship diesel engines power parts of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. Some of these engines have also found their way to the Russian Navy. Still, expanded German defence-industrial cooperation with like-minded partners would signal a substantial commitment to democratic solidarity, the rule of law, and stability in the Indo-Pacific. It can also contribute to deterring authoritarian revisionism by improving inter-regional interconnectedness.
Strategic outlook
The Bundeswehr’s activities in and strengthened defence relations with the Indo-Pacific are taking place against the backdrop of a particular domestic political moment: Germany is set to issue its first National Security Strategy and China Strategy in 2023. These documents will need to clarify Berlin’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
Adopting a rather transactional take and framing the Bundeswehr’s regional engagement in the context of Washington’s focus on China is not wrong, but it is short-sighted. A more comprehensive outlook that focuses on the rules-based international order and the “security, stability, and freedom” of Germany and its partners in the region makes Berlin’s activities more sustainable. It is also more likely to endure irrespective of who occupies the White House.
Germany has an interest in upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific, promoting the rule of law and stability, and working with others to do so. The forthcoming strategic documents should be the starting point for deepening relationships with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific and for underpinning the Bundeswehr’s engagement with a robust strategic outlook.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Rafael Loss is a project coordinator at the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) Berlin office, where he focuses on German and European foreign policy, security and defence, transatlantic relations, and nuclear strategy and arms control. Prior to joining ECFR, Rafael was a research associate at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. He was a Fulbright fellow at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, where he earned an MA in international relations.
Elisabeth I-Mi Suh is a PhD fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) and a research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Her dissertation discusses North Korea’s nuclear signalling. Issues of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and security in the Asia-Pacific are part of her work. Previously, Betty held positions as visiting fellow and research assistant at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and student assistant at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Image credit: Flickr/US Indo-Pacific Command.