That Biden had spent more time than any US official with China’s Xi Jinping, despite recent campaign rhetoric, reinforced the concern that Biden may be less effective against China. This is a concern which will linger through at least the early months of Biden’s term of office.
Tokyo, New Delhi, and Jakarta have all had serious challenges with Beijing, but their relations never fell to the depths of the current China-Australia tensions. These countries might offer some useful advice here, too.
In February we invite articles that seek to explore issues relating to the South China Sea dispute and implications for the region for the months and years ahead. In addition to articles focused on specific issues such as land reclamation and/or specific claims we also welcome features designed to connect key issues such as trade, resources, governance freedom of navigation and great power competition.
The time is opportune for the US to rebuild its goodwill by integrating climate diplomacy within the larger umbrella of foreign policy outreach. We saw a glimpse of this in 2016 during Obama’s China visit when the two largest carbon-emitting nations pledged emission cuts and financial contributions post-Paris.
For India in particular — which sees China’s stern claim in the Galwan valley as a distinct breach of its sovereignty, a departure from bipartite consensus, and a unilateral attempt to change the status quo means trust has now been lost — permanently.
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Malabar 2020 may be trumpeted as a triumph of the Quad, but defining it as a ‘Quad exercise’ is unnecessarily narrow, and would likely preclude participation from other countries in the future, should the organisers wish to include them.
Although the motivations underlying the protests in Hong Kong and Thailand are different from those in India and the US, in all cases they indicate growing popular dissatisfaction with prevailing institutions and political leadership in each country.
The days of ‘one country two systems’ — which is supposed to allow for Hong Kong’s specific legal status — appear to be long gone. This will inevitably have repercussions for the territory’s status as an important business and legal hub.
To operate in China, firms like IBM and Goldman Sachs will have to accept a new reality: algorithms are the new face of the Chinese government and they will decide if foreign companies succeed (or fail) in China.
How was it possible that China could end up with a string of illegal military island bases in international waters on one of the world’s most pivotal trade routes without any real confrontation, without a single shot fired in anger? This reality defines the new balance of global power and China’s reach within Asia.
The Australian media has also played a role in amplifying anti-Beijing viewpoints to such an extent, it has had a deadening effect on reasonable discussion about managing the country’s China policy more effectively.
With New Delhi distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic and a wave of protests against its domestic policies, Beijing is seeking to incrementally change the status quo in Bhutan and the Himalayas.
In January we invite articles that seek to predict and analyse events across the Indo-Pacific for the year ahead. We welcome features that may focus on a specific country or issue (i.e. North Korea or multilateralism) in addition to pieces aiming to address the Indo-Pacific as a whole such as an ‘Indo-Pacific Top 10’.
Some critical observers warn that Taipei will inevitably have to deal with the unyielding demands of Chinese nationalism. But that is not the only reality that has to be faced. Beijing must also face the reality of the Taiwanese nation.
The lack of an heir apparent and the middling popularity of the rest of the NLD raises the question of whether the party can even exist without Aung San Suu Kyi at the helm. Let alone govern with continued majorities.
In recent elections, the voters have punished the KMT for appearing too close to the Chinese Communist Party. Opinion polls consistently show the Taiwanese people overwhelmingly want to remain separate from mainland China.