Written by Anisa Heritage and Pak K Lee
The inherent contradictions between Trump’s America First strategy and the current calls for a coalition against China remain a sticking point. Trump has never attended an East Asia Summit, and his administration’s denigration of alliances has reduced American capacity to create a coalition of like-minded partners to support its position in the South China Sea.
Read MoreWritten by Mateusz Chatys
ASEAN's ineffectiveness in managing the South China Sea dispute was best demonstrated by events immediately after the summit. Following the videoconference, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) in Hainan announced naval manoeuvres near the Paracel Islands.
Read MoreWritten by Drake Long
The new US policy should be viewed as one more part of a coordinated effort across multiple governments to push back against China’s claims with similar diplomatic approaches and language, emphasising UNCLOS and the 2016 PCA award specifically.
Read MoreWritten by Yoichiro Sato
The United States has warned that any land reclamation of Scarborough Reef by China would trigger the US-Philippines mutual defence treaty. Thus, Washington seems to have set, for the first time, an explicit red line in the South China Sea.
Read MoreWritten by James Borton and Lucio Blanco Pitlo III
Once regarded as the “cathedrals” of the South China Sea, the coral in the Mischief and North Danger reefs, are stressed and bleached. All claimant nations are now being called upon to engage in science-cooperation before it’s too late to save them.
Read MoreWritten by Yoichiro Sato
The declaration of the East China Sea ADIZ, which purposefully enclosed the Senkaku Islands, was not only popular among the Chinese public, but also necessary for Xi Jinping as a demonstration of strength in the eyes of his CCP rivals. Might the South China Sea be next?
Read MoreWritten by Vengalil Venugopal
The US Navy’s shipbuilding plan has capped the fleet size at 355 ships by 2034. China’s own naval expansion however has progressed at pace. By 2030, Beijing could field a fleet of 450 surface ships and 110 submarines, localised entirely in the Indo-Pacific.
Read MoreWritten by Mateusz Chatys
Chinese fishing boats and coast guard ships are increasingly trespassing into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near the Natuna islands. Indonesia however has a wide range of tools it is willing to use if Beijing continues its provocative actions.
Read MoreWritten by James Borton
There are about 400 underseas cables, many owned by Amazon, Facebook and Google, that propel data down the threads at nearly the speed of light and this trove of data, includes emails, texts and more than $15 trillion of the world’s financial transactions.
Read MoreWritten by Bich T Tran
Vietnam’s Three-No’s principle makes alliances unlikely, a recent white paper states however that: “Vietnam will consider developing appropriate defense and military relations with other countries, regardless of political regimes and levels of development.”
Read MoreWritten by Vengalil Venugopal
In the last decade China has been developing its A2/AD strategy in the South and East China Seas and in the Taiwan Straits. The ambition is to disrupt the freedom of navigation for the United States and its allies and increase calculus of risk for ships operating in increasingly tense waters.
Read MoreWritten by Mansheetal Singh and Megha Gupta
China’s actions toward Taiwan and the South China Sea may seem innocuous, but they are being recognised regionally as part of a long term “salami-slicing” strategy employed by Beijing in maritime spaces and beyond.
Read MoreWritten by Zachary Haver
Beijing’s relentless pattern of assertiveness in the South China Sea is reinforcing existing perceptions of China as an irresponsible power. Beijing could have seized on COVID-19 as a chance to earn goodwill in Southeast Asia. Instead, China adopted the opposite approach.
Read MoreWritten by Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby
ASEAN’s role has never been to resolve the South China Sea dispute, only to serve as a platform on which claimant states can negotiate a solution. The challenge remains for ASEAN to agree on a collective response to China’s recent moves.
Read MoreWritten by Vignesh Ram
A common ASEAN position (if it can be enforceable) with a Code of Conduct, will be important to avoid any future close confrontations such as the one between Malaysia and China. Time however is running out as Beijing continues to assert its power in the South China Sea.
Read MoreWritten by Khushnam P N
India is not a party to the disputes with China in the South China Sea and therefore will not seek any approach that may be percieved as ‘meddling’ by Beijing. The priority for India is to preserve the “Wuhan Consensus”.
Read MoreWritten by Gaurav Sen and Rahul Jaybhay
China's claim of the nine-dash line collides with the regional capabilities of multiple claiment states, many of which are growing and developed economies. A limited program of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) could deter Beijing in the East and South China Seas.
Read MoreWritten by Chetan Rana
Since the early 1950s, Vietnam has recieved the diplomatic support of India, whether during the Vietnam War or the invasion of Cambodia. Now, with closer economic and defence ties, India may soon have to decide whether to support Hanoi in the South China Sea.
Read More
