Will China’s escalations in the South China Sea lead to an ADIZ?
Will China’s escalations in the South China Sea lead to an ADIZ?
WRITTEN BY YOICHIRO SATO
8 July 2020
In late May 2020, an anonymous Chinese military source indicated that China might declare an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea (SCS). This generated numerous commentaries, some of which speculated about the feasibility of enforcing an SCS ADIZ. While the most alarmist analyses seem to argue that China’s recent deployment of various military assets to the reclaimed island bases have brought the country closer to such an enforcement capability, no one is confidently saying that China can do so now.
Most of these analyses assume that China is unlikely to declare an ADIZ until its enforcement capability is ready. The reasoning behind making such an assumption is usually implicit—China previously declared an ADIZ over the East China Sea (ECS) in November 2013, but suffered a political embarrassment when American, Japanese and Taiwanese military planes defied the ADIZ. Although this precedent appears to inform current speculation regarding an SCS ADIZ, it may only have limited relevance to China’s strategic calculations behind announcing an ADIZ over the SCS.
Impact of public opinion on policymaking is exaggerated
Western observers often emphasise China’s opaque domestic policymaking, its authoritarian top-down leadership style, and the likelihood of grassroots nationalist backlashes. However, public opinion about foreign policy is well controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In short, the CCP leaderships have not suffered a domestic backlash over the ECS ADIZ. Therefore, drawing on the ECS ADIZ precedent has only limited relevance in estimating China’s readiness for declaring an SCS ADIZ.
The declaration of the ECS ADIZ, which purposefully enclosed the Senkaku Islands, was not only popular among the Chinese public, but also necessary for Xi Jinping as a demonstration of strength in the eyes of his CCP rivals during the early days of his transition to leadership.
China publicly announced its ECS ADIZ on 23 November 2013. Japan-China relations had been sliding downhill since 2012 over Prime Minister Noda’s decision to have the government purchase three of the Senkaku group of islands from their private Japanese owner. China disputes Japan’s sovereignty claim and has challenged Japan’s administrative control with frequent incursions into the territorial waters around the islands. Widespread demonstrations against Japan in 2012 were well controlled, however, ensuring that CCP conservatives would not take advantage of the turmoil to disrupt leadership succession within the modernizer camp from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping.
Japan continued to be a potential problem for China throughout the following year. Noda’s successor Shinzo Abe publicly pledged to visit the Yasukuni Shrine as the new prime minister. Following this announcement, China slightly escalated it’s provocations over the Senkakus with a drone overflight in September 2013. However, Abe went ahead with his shrine visit on 26 December 2013, despite repeated warnings from China against doing so because of the shrine’s association with Class-A War Criminals of World War Two. In this context, the declaration of the ECS ADIZ, which purposefully enclosed the Senkaku Islands, was not only popular among the Chinese public, but also necessary for Xi Jinping as a demonstration of strength in the eyes of his CCP rivals during the early days of his transition to leadership.
News about the inability of the Chinese military to enforce the ECS ADIZ has been well controlled, to prevent any public backlash. Although news of the U.S. B-52 overflight in late November was not banned in China, it was recast as evidence of realistic self-restraint on the part of the Chinese military, which claimed to have identified numerous U.S. and Japanese military planes by their types. Japan likewise did not react. The CCP leadership thus avoided two potential domestic backlashes—first against allowing Japan to nationalize the disputed islands and its prime minister’s visit to the controversial Shrine, and second against failing to enforce the ECS ADIZ. By announcing the 2013 ECS ADIZ, the Chinese leadership attempted to incite an overreaction from Japan. When Japan did not follow through, China gracefully backed down without enforcing the ADIZ and accepted a draw with Japan in the diplomatic competition.
In analyzing China’s intentions behind declaring the ECS ADIZ in 2013, Carl Thayer listed three likely objectives in an interview with Bloomberg Brief on 28 November 2013: 1) “to get an overreaction from the other side,” 2) “a back down” to eventually claim a diplomatic concession, and 3) “an incremental shift in the status quo.” None of these goals indeed requires real enforcement capabilities. Analyzing incentives in terms of the diplomatic symbolism in line with points 1 and 2 helps us think about whether China is about to declare a SCS ADIZ.
Did China want the US to escalate?
China has inadvertently managed to force the U.S. military to increase its SCS patrols during the first half of 2020. As it attempted to showcase its ‘swift recovery’ from the COVID-19 outbreaks and ‘generosity’ in aiding its Asian neighbours, American absence was more preferable for China.
However, despite seasoned U.S. analysts’ view that China has not accelerated its plans to militarize the SCS to take advantage of the pandemic, U.S. perceptions of on-going Chinese actions have turned more negative, leading to an increased U.S. naval presence in the region, most recently in the deployment of aircraft carrier battle groups. This upgraded U.S. commitment has already encouraged Vietnam’s courting of the American presence, the Philippines’ last-minute decision not to let the Visiting Forces Agreement with the U.S. expire, and Indonesia’s filing of a legal note to challenge China’s claim and activities. Declaring an SCS ADIZ now would only drive Southeast Asian claimants further into Washington’s embrace.
China may have already backed down
The leak suggesting China may declare an Air Defence Identification Zone was intentional but delivered without specifying redlines that other countries must not cross. The announcement of an upcoming amphibious exercise near the Taiwan’s Pratas Island predictably alerted Taiwan, which in turn invited a more visible U.S. naval presence.
The Beijing-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) on its Twitter account quickly “identified” U.S. planes by various types in the Bashi Channel and the SCS on 25 June, just as China did in 2013 in the East China Sea. Since then, escalation has shifted to the Paracel Islands area with the announcement of another naval exercise, seemingly in response to Vietnam’s leading role in the elevated criticism of China at the ASEAN leaders’ virtual meeting on 26 June.
Domestic stability is paramount
Domestic political manoeuvring is a more important factor in China’s strategic calculations regarding the SCS ADIZ than its enforcement capabilities. Its recent activities have been tailored to raise tensions in a controlled manner, setting the stage for pushing through the National Security Law over Hong Kong—a key issue about which Xi Jinping was unwilling to back down.
Above all else, maintaining domestic leadership stability is key for Xi, who is seeking to change party rules to allow him to lead China for a third term. The most probable wildcard challenge to this goal would be a second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, which would also deal a devastating blow to the already weakened economy. Short of such happenings, China is unlikely to declare a South China Sea ADIZ just yet.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Yoichiro Sato is a Professor at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His recent books include Re-rising Japan (co-edited, Peter Lang, 2017), Regional Institutions, Geopolitics and Economics in the Asia Pacific (co-edited, Routledge, 2017). Image credit: US Navy/Flickr.