The Taliban continues to struggle for international recognition
The Taliban continues to struggle for international recognition
WRITTEN BY DANTE SCHULZ
17 February 2023
On 17 January 2023, Afghan Acting Minister of Interior Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani met with members of the European Union delegation to Afghanistan. The meeting agenda included discussions on the EU’s humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people and promoting the safety of its aid workers in the country. Through mechanisms such as these, the Taliban has managed to conduct the country’s foreign affairs; by participating in multilateral summits, attending high-level diplomatic visits, and accepting foreign investment opportunities from its economic partners without receiving official recognition from any country.
While the slew of diplomatic and economic engagements with the Taliban could suggest that some countries — in particular Afghanistan’s neighbours — are readying to officially recognise the group, it is more likely that simply maintaining an active presence in Afghanistan best serves the foreign policy, security, and economic agendas of these countries. During the September 2021 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan outlined three prerequisites for official recognition of the Taliban regime, including establishing an inclusive government, recognising human rights, and preventing violence from spilling over the border. Over a year later, violent spats along the shared border with Pakistan, a breakdown in human rights nationwide, and terrorist groups actively operating within the country have hampered the Taliban’s aspirations to gain formal recognition even from neighbouring states.
International recognition would grant the Taliban legitimacy to continue its rule over Afghanistan and could remove diplomatic barriers to attracting much-needed finance and investment deals from abroad. However, as the security and humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan continue to deteriorate, the Taliban has a much more difficult task convincing the international community to extend formal recognition to its regime.
Diplomatic and economic engagements
Since the Taliban seized control of Kabul in August 2021, its leaders have participated in over 375 diplomatic meetings with more than 30 countries. Afghan Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Amir Khan Muttaqi has travelled to Turkey for the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, China for the Tunxi Neighbouring Countries Meeting, and Uzbekistan for the Tashkent International Conference. The Taliban’s frequent participation in bilateral and multilateral arrangements with its diplomatic partners ensures that Afghanistan avoids diplomatic isolation. Diplomatic exchanges also promote mechanisms for dialogue between countries and the Taliban to address regional energy, economic, and security concerns.
The Taliban’s inability to address the security and economic concerns of its partners will only exacerbate the glaring issues plaguing Afghanistan.
Some of Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours were among the most receptive to the Taliban’s quick rise to power. Less than a week after the Taliban seized control of Kabul, Turkmen diplomats met with Taliban leaders, citing the “fraternal nature” between Ashgabat and Kabul. Uzbekistan embraced rapprochement with the Taliban and stepped up to become a mediator between the Taliban and Western countries. For example, the Tashkent International Conference convened 100 representatives, including US diplomats and Taliban members. Some Central Asian states believe it to be too costly to alienate the Taliban due to Afghanistan’s geographic proximity and the potential for a humanitarian or security crisis to spill across the border.
In addition, several countries have resumed or reopened diplomatic operations in Afghanistan. Shortly after the Taliban assumed power, Turkey reopened its embassy in Kabul, becoming the only NATO country to do so. Likewise, India re-established a small diplomatic presence in Afghanistan in July 2022. The Indian government stated that it would use its reopened embassy in Kabul to safeguard Indian national security amid growing concern about the spillover of violence. In total, 14 countries maintain embassies in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the Taliban scored the first international agreement since taking power with China. In early January 2023, the Taliban leadership inked a 25-year contract with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company to bring in over USD 500 million in Chinese investment to extract oil from Afghanistan’s Amu Darya river basin. The agreement also stipulated that the crude oil will be processed within the country, suggesting that the Chinese company could build a refinery in Afghanistan. The agreement is likely the first step in a growing Chinese-Taliban economic partnership and could sway other countries to consider Afghanistan to be a viable investment partner.
Challenges to Taliban recognition
However, several challenges continue to impede the Taliban’s ability to attain international recognition. The Taliban’s decision to ban women from attending universities was met with stark criticism from the United Nations. Foreign ministers from 11 countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom joined the EU and the United States in denouncing the ban on female aid workers. The United States announced that the ban would “come with consequences for the Taliban”.
Even the Taliban’s closest diplomatic and economic partners, like some of Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours, have expressed criticism of its rule. Due to the large proportion of ethnic Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks residing in Afghanistan, the Central Asian states are keen to see the Taliban build an inclusive government. Nevertheless, these communities have been met with harsh rule under the Taliban. In late 2021, Taliban officials reportedly displaced more than 1,000 ethnic Tajik and Turkmen from their homes. Likewise, ethnic Tajiks were forcibly recruited by Taliban fighters to join their ranks. The absence of protections for ethnic minorities in Afghanistan taints the Taliban’s legitimacy and hinders Central Asian countries from officially recognising the Taliban.
In addition, the Taliban is struggling to properly rein in terrorist groups operating within Afghanistan. For example, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) seeks to topple the Taliban-led government in Kabul while Islamabad has accused Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of using Afghan land as staging grounds for launching attacks in Pakistan. ISKP has launched numerous terrorist attacks targeting foreign partners to delegitimise Taliban rule. On 5 September 2022, an ISKP-sponsored suicide bombing outside of the Russian embassy in Kabul claimed six lives, including two Russian embassy staff members. In December, two ISKP fighters attacked the Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan, Obaid ur Rehman Nizamani, wounding his guard in the process. One week later, ISKP assailants targeted a Kabul hotel often frequented by Chinese nationals. Five Chinese nationals were injured in the assault. Most recently, on 11 January 2023, an ISKP attack outside of the foreign ministry building in Kabul killed five people.
ISKP has proven to be an obstacle for the Taliban to demonstrate its control over Afghanistan’s internal security situation. In its plight to establish a global caliphate, ISKP has targeted several diplomatic offices in Afghanistan and launched rockets into neighbouring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Unabated ISKP attacks against foreign governments present in Afghanistan, like Russia, China, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states, could deter other countries from returning to Kabul or investing in its economy. In the wake of the terrorist attack on the Kabul hotel, Chinese Ambassador Wang Yu called for the “Afghan interim government to take strong and resolute measures to ensure the security of Chinese nationals, institutions, and projects in Afghanistan”.
Political violence from terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan is spilling across the border into Pakistan. Following the formal end to the ceasefire between the TTP and Islamabad, the TTP has scaled up sporadic attacks against civilian and military infrastructure across Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban agreed to facilitate negotiations between Islamabad and the TTP but has been elusive in its role, preferring to let the two address their issues internally. The Taliban’s indifference to TTP attacks in Pakistan is souring relations with Islamabad and could be a factor in Pakistan’s decision to not extend official recognition to the group.
The Taliban’s inability to address the security and economic concerns of its partners will only exacerbate the glaring issues plaguing Afghanistan. Thus, Kabul’s partners have little reason to change the status quo and are likely to continue engaging with the Taliban government without affording it the formal recognition it desires. As the Taliban government already struggles to address the legitimate concerns of its diplomatic and economic partners, it will grow more difficult in the future to achieve international recognition.
Author biography
Dante Schulz is a Junior Fellow with the Stimson Centre South Asia Programme. Image credit: Flickr/Utenriksdepartementet UD.