Russia's anti-satellite weapons test: A strategic flash in the pan
Russia: anti-satellite weapons test a strategic flash in the pan
WRITTEN BY JOE VARNER
7 December 2021
On Monday, 15 November 2021, Russia conducted a direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missile test that littered space with debris from a destroyed target latterly forcing astronauts aboard the International Space Station to seek shelter. The test came as Russia stepped up its troop build-up opposite Ukraine and hybrid warfare activities against the European Union and NATO. The test also coincided with the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security when it passed several draft militarisation of space resolutions geared to prevent an arms race in outer space. Not surprisingly China and Russia voted against the draft resolution on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”.
All concern aside for the people seeking shelter in the International Space Station from the 1500 pieces of major trackable debris and thousands of pieces of minor debris — what does this mean in real terms for Indo-Pacific security and that of the World? China created a similar mass of space debris in 2007 when it destroyed an old weather satellite and sent 2000 pieces of trackable debris screaming through space with several thousand more pieces flying about undetected and threatening global space assets.
What is an anti-satellite weapon?
A-SAT weapons are any weapons that can be used to temporarily render a satellite unresponsive or simply destroy it. There are three basic forms of A-SAT weapons and in the case of the recent Russian test the weapon used was a direct-ascent kinetic A-SAT. This can be launched from the ground or an aircraft to strike and destroy a satellite in space. The second form of A-SAT weapon is an orbital vehicle that can be placed into orbit and then manoeuvred into a target to destroy it. Finally, the third form of non-kinetic A-SAT technology is based on laser technologies that disable enemy satellites without smashing them to pieces. By 2019 Russia, China, the United States, and India demonstrated their capabilities to destroy satellites in space but it is a double-edged sword in that the space debris threatens everyone’s commercial interests in orbit above the earth just as it threatens military assets. While some debris may fall to earth, some may also find their way to higher altitudes.
Needless to say not only does China want to protect its proxy against India but also bristles at any event that strategically places India on an equal footing with Beijing as it fights its psychological war for the hearts and minds of Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
In a sense, the A-SATs are a relic of the Cold War when the United States first developed Bold Orion in response to fears around Russia’s Sputnik but today they occupy a ‘grey zone ’ in modern arms control that has given them renewed hype because in one sense they are what they are described to be but space debris could be an anti-satellite weapon too. The United States developed Bold Orion to destroy orbiting nuclear weapons in space. In the 1960s and 1970s, Russia developed orbiting A-SATS capable of being moved into the path of a targeted satellite in order to be detonated in close proximity to enemy vehicles. The United States moved to air-launched kinetic energy hit-to-kill A-SATS during the Reagan administration destroying a target in 1985 with an ASM-135. Russia is reportedly developing an A-SAT weapons system known as “Nudol,” which is a Lower Earth Orbit killer that moves between orbital paths, capable of threatening more than just one satellite.
It was also reported that Moscow was upgrading its Krona optical space surveillance system with the Kalina laser dazzler system, meant to blind the optical sensors of United States spy satellites and developing satellite jamming systems that disrupt the stream of data between satellites and the ground. China is reportedly developing a direct ascent A-SAT system the SC-19 derived from the DF-21C Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), a ground-based anti-satellite laser weapon system and ground-based jammers to disrupt data streams. The United States military has some anti-satellite weapons capability based on the Ground-Based Interceptor Missile based in Alaska and Hawaii and the United States Navy’s SM-3 interceptor missile. The Boeing X-37B unmanned space plane may also have anti-satellite capabilities in its ability to release three small CubeSats into orbit. Japan is reportedly considering building anti-satellite weapons that use the same radar and SM-3 missile system.
During the Cold War the nexus of A-SAT and nuclear strategy was the conflict between East and West, today the nexus appears to be the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. Today, United States A-SAT capability is geared toward defeating Russian and Chinese satellites, and those of rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. China has no early warning satellite capability making it less of a threat in wartime than Russia. China and North Korea have both shown great interest in exploding nuclear weapons in low earth orbit over the United States in times of war to create a debilitation Electro-Magnetic Pulse Attack (EMP). There is a great deal of conjecture that North Korea’s KMS-3 and KMS-4 satellites launched in early 2017 on south polar trajectories resembled a Russian weapon developed during the Cold War, called the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). FOBS would see nuclear weapons placed in a fractional orbit and then dropped on a target state (such as the United States) to carry out a surprise decapitation strike. Similarly, China’s recent launch of a hypersonic glide vehicle employed south polar trajectories that have the advantage of avoiding the US’ north-facing missile defence early warning systems. China’s A-SATs are geared to defeating the United States in a conventional and nuclear war by leaving Western forces blind and without communications or guidance systems. Russia still has its A-SATs directed at strategic competitors such as the US, NATO, and China while India’s A-SAT weapons threaten Pakistani and Chinese assets.
A-SAT: The double-edged sword
A-SAT systems are a potential tool to deter nuclear war by degrading the satellite systems so linked to the command and control of nuclear forces and missile defences. Conversely, A-SATs can be geared toward a surprise attack designed to blind an opponent in both conventional and nuclear war without triggering a nuclear response. In real terms, to be effective, and to dominate space, an opponent of the United States and its allies would have to shoot down satellites between 1000 and 36000 kilometres into space which presents a huge challenge given existing technology. To be effective, many A-SAT weapons would have to be launched quickly and with effect to strike United States networks in order to see a devastating impact. The chances of disabling the United States Space-based, air-based, and land-based strategic systems all at the same time is extremely unlikely meaning the US retains robust overlapping systems for warfighting and deterrence. Therefore, any hopes Russia and China might hold to blind-side and defeat the United States through A-SAT warfare remain a pipe dream.
Ultimately, while the ASAT test was a spectacular event that saw astronauts and cosmonauts racing for shelter, it does not change the calculus of deterrence. Just as deploying hypersonic glide vehicles, FOBs, and A-SAT are not an effective counter to a United States-based strategic counter strike from American nuclear missile submarines. In the case of the November Russian A-SAT test, it was geared to warn the West from defending Ukraine and frontline NATO states in Central Europe and to push back on the UN's space-based arms control initiatives. Historically, the United States has been very good at pulling or pushing strategic competitors down what are nuclear-related 'rabbit holes' particularly around technologies and arms races centred on missile defences and this is seemingly a case in point as illustrated by the recent Russian test and the FOBS armed HGV test in China and HGV test in North Korea. There is a common thread between Russian, Chinese and North Korean strategy in pursuing paths that lead to their abilities to deploy their dual-capable missile forces to dominate their opponents and destroy United States bases on a regional basis while simultaneously avoiding United States’ strategic nuclear coercion.
All three powers have taken this route to challenge the United States and its nuclear-armed Western allies and to avoid nuclear coercion. If any country is the real beneficiary of this technology, it is India that now has a likely edge over Pakistan and that poses a real threat to Beijing. Criticism of the India test by both the United States and Russia was muted. China and Pakistan were a little more strident in their statements of concern. Needless to say not only does China want to protect its proxy against India but also bristles at any event that strategically places India on an equal footing with Beijing as it fights its psychological war for the hearts and minds of Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Joe Varner is a former Director of Policy to Canada's Minister of Defence and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point's Modern War Institute. Image credit: Wikipedia.