China’s new ‘space vehicle’

2 November 2021

China’s recent test of what appears to be a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) armed with a nuclear-capable Hypersonic Glide Vehicle does not compromise nuclear deterrence. However, it certainly calls into question Beijing’s ‘no first use’ pledge, potentially the future shape and depth of the US Missile Defence programme, and conventional deterrence of a hegemonic China in the Pacific.

In August, China reportedly tested at least one nuclear-capable HGV that was launched from a Long March 2C Rocket and orbited the earth before it attacked its intended target, one that it apparently missed by 40 kilometres. The HGV travels at an extremely high speed above Mach 5 to its target, is manoeuvrable unlike a ballistic warhead on a parabolic path, and may strike its target with little or no warning almost anywhere on the globe. China has denied reports that it tested an HGV. According to Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhao Lijian, “It was not a missile, it was a space vehicle”, it was a routine test, and it took place in July, not August. But it appears that the Chinese military took a page from the Soviet Union’s Cold War-era 1960s nuclear strategy to employ FOBS against a rival nuclear-armed superpower, the United States.

Soviet concept of FOBS back in fashion?

FOBS is designed to place nuclear warheads into a fractional orbit from the Southern Hemisphere where they would likely go undetected, instead of launching them by a ballistic missile over the North Pole. Once the nuclear warhead is in a low space fractional orbit approximately 150 kilometres high, it can be dropped over an intended target with tremendous kinetic energy likened to an artillery bombardment. The advantage of the FOBS is avoiding the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD’s constellation of radar stations looks out into arctic space and satellites are positioned to look at the Northern hemisphere, rather than south. As well, FOBS has no range limit, is incredibly fast and has no predictable path to give away its target.

This is more about an aggressive hegemonic China's conventional warfighting capabilities and ensuring they have free reign in the Western Pacific against states like Taiwan without facing the prospect of nuclear war.

The Soviets deployed FOBS most notably in the SS-9 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) that was later banned by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) in 1979. By that time, the Soviet Union had abandoned the concept in favour of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), as they were more cost-effective, could carry greater payloads, be launched with limited warning, and had much greater accuracy. In comparison, the FOBS approach was also much more geared to a surprise attack and city busting strategy than one of counterforce aimed at the enemy’s strategic retaliatory systems. Therefore, Soviet strategists concluded that FOBS was potentially destabilising even by the standards of the day.

The difference between the Soviet concept of FOBS and the Chinese approach is in using an HGV to deliver a nuclear warhead or string of warheads in the future rather than just dropping them in a re-entry vehicle from space. Russia and China are both working on developing and deploying strategic nuclear weapons capable HGVs and so apparently is North Korea after its recently reported test of the technology. All three states see the HGV as a means to circumvent the current US Missile Defense. The US plans to deploy hundreds of HGVs for precision conventional strike by 2023-2028 through the auspices of its Air Force, Navy, and Army, but it has faced some technical challenges in the development of these weapons. It should be noted that Japan, India, Australia and Pakistan have all shown an interest in HGV technology but are not as far along in development as China, Russia and North Korea.

Beijing’s endgame: Checkmate US nuclear forces in a conventional war

US missile defences as they stand now are only configured to defeat a rogue launch by a state with a limited nuclear strike capability like North Korea; they are not geared to take down a pre-emptive or first strike from Russia or China. China has 100 rail-based ICBMs that may be targeted on the US right now and has developed two new fields of some 250 silos for its reportedly growing nuclear arsenal. It could easily defeat current US missile defences and likely even a more elaborate and larger layered programme involving hundreds of interceptor rockets on naval warships and other platforms working in conjunction with existing missile defence should that come to pass. It is important to note that the increase in the Chinese nuclear strategic deterrent tends to move away from its minimalist approach to nuclear counterstrike, which it has reportedly had for decades. It suggests that Beijing is about to drop all pretences of a 'no first use' policy that was never credible in the first place given China’s lack of early warning capability.

Right now, like Russia and the United States, deterrence with China is based on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Thus, FOBS armed with an HGV do not change the basic equation of deterrence. There are many other approaches to defeating US missile defences that are much cheaper and easier to facilitate than employing FOBS armed with the HGV. Given the lack of accuracy of China’s HGV, it seems more geared to city busting than counterforce. Maybe this is a Chinese attempt to force the US to abandon Continental Missile Defence or curb future development? Additionally, perhaps this is China’s approach to defeating a future breakthrough in missile defence technology by the US and its allies or trying to push Washington into a new nuclear arms race? Could the FOBS strategy and the HGV be linked with China’s fascination for Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) attacks and pre-emption?

The real issue in China’s strategy is to find a way to avoid American nuclear coercion in times of crisis so that Beijing can use its overwhelming advantage in conventionally tipped missiles in war. This way, it could subdue US allies and forces in the Pacific all the while deterring a US nuclear counterstroke by holding US cities hostage with systems like FOBS and HGV. This is more about an aggressive hegemonic China's conventional warfighting capabilities and ensuring they have free reign in the Western Pacific against states like Taiwan without facing the prospect of nuclear war. While FOBS and HGV do not change the basic logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction, they most certainly send a clear picture as to China's true intentions short and long term to its neighbours in Indo-Pacific and beyond.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Joe Varner is a former Director of Policy to Canada's Minister of Defence and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point's Modern War Institute. Image credit: US Department of Defense.