New Zealand’s strategy in the Pacific: Intentional and consistent

19 May 2022

In the last month, politicians, diplomatic, and intelligence officials from the US, Australia, and Japan have all hurriedly made their way to Honiara to discuss the security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands with Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. However, New Zealand, which has relied upon in-country diplomats to engage on its behalf, was notably absent from the scramble for the Honiara International Airport runway. This is not surprising, as New Zealand’s approach in the Pacific is intentionally predicated on having long-standing trusted relationships with the Pacific Islands region, emphasising Pacific agency rather than acting reactively and impulsively.

New Zealand’s independent approach to soft power relationships in the Pacific makes it a critical and credible actor in regional cooperation. However, even though NZ Prime Minister Ardern “absolutely” recognised the sovereign ability of Pacific states to sign agreements, New Zealand did take a notable stance against the need for the China-Solomon Islands security agreement, recognising the agreement’s regional security implications.

Mature relationships still acknowledge security concerns

New Zealand has always walked a fine line between its trading relationship with China and the security concerns that both New Zealand and its allies hold. Despite the country’s 2018 “Pacific Reset” being largely linked to combatting China’s influence in the region, its leaders and officials rarely mention China by name, particularly regarding geopolitical competition in the Pacific. New Zealand’s foreign policy suggests that within a “mature relationship”, it can raise points of concern with its trading partners (for example, human rights, or security challenges) without being antagonising. However, recently the balance appears to be shifting towards siding with its traditional ‘western’ allies, with Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern questioning China’s motives and “growing assertiveness” in the Pacific Islands region.

As Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta stated, “I don’t want to conflate New Zealand’s position with Australia’s — we stand on our own two feet in relation to the way in which we work with our Pacific neighbours”.

Prime Minister Ardern has said that there is no need for a security pact between the Solomon Islands and China, as “collectively, we are ready and available to meet the security needs of our neighbours” (for instance, via the Biketawa Declaration). She highlighted (and not for the first time) her concerns with the militarisation of the Pacific, and while this is not akin to some of Australia’s hyperbole, New Zealand’s stance stresses that it does acknowledge the regional security implications of China’s influence in the region.

Reactive and hard-line approaches are not necessarily effective

Still, these similarities in concern and language between New Zealand, Australia, and the US, do not mean that New Zealand will necessarily act in the same way. The American, Australian, and Japanese reactive runway scramble intended to halt the deal was ineffective, in that by the time the US plane had landed, the deal was already signed. Washington has since recognised that it was too late, as the 29-year absence of a US diplomatic mission in Honiara (which they are now re-establishing) signals the lack of meaningful and ongoing connections with the Solomon Islands.

The US and Australia indicated they shared a “red line” when it came to China setting up military bases in the region. It remains unclear what either party would do if the red line was crossed. There are concerns in Washington that New Zealand is perhaps naïve or soft because it has not taken the same hard-line approach to the Solomon Islands-China deal that Australia and the US have. But this hard-line approach has not been received well in the Solomon Islands — Prime Minister Sogavare took it to indicate threats of invasion (which have since been refuted by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison).

Relationships and soft power are critical to foreign policy

New Zealand’s 2021 “Pacific Resilience” foreign policy steers away from the security-informed basis of the Pacific Reset. Instead, the Resilience approach focuses on how New Zealand would engage with the region, through five principles of working together. It highlights Pacific ownership of security cooperation, indicating that Pacific states should request New Zealand's assistance and that such cooperation is in line with Pacific interests and priorities. This is the future of foreign policy in the region — influence through nurtured and valued relationships.

Indeed, this is why New Zealand is so valuable to its allies. Australian Prime Minister Morrison himself has emphasised that New Zealand has “a lot of expertise working within our Pacific family of nations”. Evoking a critical role for soft power in the region, New Zealand stands by its commitments on climate action, nuclear-free zones, and its partnership with the region. Under Prime Minister Ardern’s leadership, it has attempted to mend and maintain relationships with Pacific states, apologised for past wrongdoings , and put the agency of Pacific Island states first. New Zealand’s foreign policy is not naïve, but intentional. Its soft power is its biggest contribution to security cooperation.

An independent foreign policy actor, grounded in relationship-building

New Zealand is clear about its independence too, despite having long-standing relationships with the US and Australia. As Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta stated, “I don’t want to conflate New Zealand’s position with Australia’s — we stand on our own two feet in relation to the way in which we work with our Pacific neighbours”. In the wake of the AUKUS agreement, where Australia is perceived to have cut Pacific Island states out of consultation and potentially compromised the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, New Zealand’s role is bolstered by its consistency — it is the actor who can have trusted relationships and conversations, who is committed to the interests and priorities of the region.

New Zealand shares a long relationship with the Solomon Islands, albeit not as long or deep as Australia’s. New Zealand contributed to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and has assisted in crises in the Solomon Islands since, including as recently as the November 2021 riots where New Zealand sent police to assist with peacekeeping. Even then, New Zealand’s approach was predominantly in the policing rather than military space. Both a small police and military presence remain today, focusing on community engagement. Such a continued (even if small) presence is far more effective for maintaining an ongoing relationship, rather than having to re-establish relationships every time there is a crisis.

This is no time to be complacent

Holding existing relationships does not mean that New Zealand, or its security partners, can afford to be complacent. In response to questions about New Zealand and Australia not being privy to the China-Solomon Islands security agreement, Mahuta stated that “this is a relationship failure”, rather than a failure of intelligence. Trusted, longstanding, and well-maintained diplomatic relationships, with government, opposition, and local government, will ensure that local political tensions are understood, that information is more likely to be passed on in advance, and that New Zealand and the Pacific region will be the first call if Pacific Island states are in need of security assistance.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Henrietta McNeill is a PhD Candidate in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. She is a 2021-22 Fulbright New Zealand General Graduate Awardee, currently hosted at the University of California Los Angeles. Image Credit: New Zealand High Commission, Suva, Fiji.