NATO and the ‘Asia-Pacific Four’: Renewed purpose for cooperation

13 July 2022

Coming off the heels of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the 2022 NATO summit was nothing short of historic. In marked contrast to the previous version, NATO’s new strategic concept clearly labels Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security”. Allied members also agreed on several far-reaching steps such as the expansion of membership to Sweden and Finland and the strengthening of the alliance’s eastern flank.

The summit was also historic with regard to Asia. For the first time ever, the strategic concept mentions China posing “systemic challenges” to the alliance, undermining security by means such as “malicious hybrid and cyber operations and confrontational rhetoric and disinformation”. In discussing threats from weapons of mass destruction, the document also makes the first mention of North Korea. Attendance at the summit by NATO’s Asia-Pacific partners — Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and New Zealand (commonly dubbed the ‘Asia-Pacific Four’ or ‘AP4’) — was equally unprecedented. This year’s summit portends a further solidification of ties between NATO and the AP4. Both sides increasingly recognise the interconnectedness of European and Asia-Pacific security dynamics, especially against the background of the Russia-Ukraine war and China’s de-facto support for Moscow.

NATO and the AP4

Anchored in a shared attachment to basic values such as democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, NATO’s relations with the AP4 countries predate recent alliance discussions on China. In fact, Japan is NATO’s longest-standing global partner, with informal contacts existing already during the Cold War and developing into a more formal dialogue in the 1990s. The real catalyst for closer relations between NATO and the AP4 was NATO’s operation in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001.

NATO has not only increased its attention to Asian security dynamics and challenges over the past years, but it has also sought to strengthen relations with the AP4 countries.

All four Asian countries either contributed troops to the mission or provided other forms of substantial support, such as refuelling allied ships and participating in reconstruction activities. NATO members and Asian partners were thus drawn together by their common cause of joining the US fight against international terrorism and supporting crisis management. Likewise, all four Asian partners also cooperated with NATO’s anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa from 2008 onwards, based on the shared recognition of the importance of secure global sea lanes of communication. The Afghanistan and anti-piracy missions served to lay the foundation for a significant upgrade in relations between NATO and the AP4 countries through both closer policy consultation and operational cooperation. This led to a further formalisation of relations, for example through individual partnership programmes that define priority areas for cooperation with the ROK and New Zealand in 2012, with Australia in 2013, and Japan in 2014.

However, the winding down of the Afghanistan and anti-piracy operations, as well as Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, seemed to turn the tide in NATO-AP4 relations. Disappointment about the outcomes of international missions, such as the one in Afghanistan, added to the sense of crisis caused by Russia’s aggressive moves, led NATO to refocus on its core mission of collective defence and deterrence. The September 2014 summit was a testament to NATO’s reorientation toward a largely Eurocentric agenda, with an emphasis on reassuring Eastern European allies in the face of the Russian threat, as well as discussing instability in the European neighbourhood (such as in North Africa and the Middle East). This shift also cast uncertainty about the relevance, substance, and direction of the NATO-AP4 partnerships. Faced with deepening regional tensions surrounding North Korea and China, Asian states like Japan and the ROK likewise refocused their attention on their more immediate neighbourhood.

Adding China to the equation

Despite lingering doubts about a more ‘global’ NATO in light of limited resources, debates in the alliance on Asia (particularly China) have intensified over the past three years. NATO discussions about China as a potential security concern began in earnest in 2019, with a December summit communiqué mentioning (for the first time) China as presenting both “opportunities and challenges” which need to be addressed together, as an alliance. The 2022 strategic concept’s more critical language on China signifies an evolution in NATO’s discourse. Two interrelated factors have combined to shape NATO’s stronger attention to China, and Asia more generally. First, economic, demographic, and political trends increasingly make Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region a global centre of gravity. European NATO members have consequently become more aware of their interests in the region. The global COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting supply chain disruptions have further laid bare the interconnections between Europe and Asia.

Second, European views of China have deteriorated significantly over the past years in light of Beijing’s international assertiveness, human rights abuses, disinformation campaigns, and its flagrant dismissal of international rules (as happened after the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling). As a result, transatlantic gaps in terms of perceptions about China have narrowed. European NATO members are particularly concerned about growing Chinese activities in their region and immediate surroundings, for example through cyber and disinformation activities, investments in critical infrastructure, or military exercises with Russia in the Euro-Atlantic area. In this way, as NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has emphasised, NATO is not moving eastward, but rather China is “coming closer to us”. A similar logic applies to North Korea, whose intercontinental ballistic missiles now pose a direct threat to NATO territory, even if a military conflict with the isolated regime may seem an unlikely prospect.

These developments underline that it would be a delusion to think that Asian security dynamics can be kept off the NATO agenda by reference to the alliance’s original Euro-Atlantic focus. At the very least, Europe has direct stakes in Asian stability given its economic links, and it is also not immune to activities by countries such as China on its own home turf. The tendency among some Europeans to see Asia as a distant region and an unwelcome diversion has progressively lost ground. Against that background, NATO has not only increased its attention to Asian security dynamics and challenges over the past years, but it has also sought to strengthen relations with the AP4 countries. In December 2020, the AP4 participated for the first time in a NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting, with another such meeting following in April 2022. As early as February 2021, Stoltenberg had floated the idea of including the leaders from the AP4 countries at the 2022 summit.

Nevertheless, the actual invitation and participation of the AP4 in the summit was imbued with new meaning due to the Russia-Ukraine war, with the realisation in Europe and Asia of the mutual relevance of the revisionist powers in their respective regions. In the context of the summit, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, for example, repeatedly emphasised that European and Indo-Pacific security are inseparable. Notably, Eastern European states that had previously tended to perceive Asia as a diversion from their key security concern of Russia have reconsidered their assessments about China, as Beijing has rhetorically backed Russia by blaming NATO for stirring the Russia-Ukraine war.

Moving forward in NATO-AP4 relations

While NATO and the AP4 countries have deepened their cooperation (with the Russian invasion of Ukraine serving to accelerate this trend), there are limits to the level of cooperation between the two sides. NATO will not expand eastward or seek to influence Asian security dynamics by committing military assets to the region to counterbalance China’s growing power. For their part, the AP4 countries would not expect nor necessarily welcome that kind of engagement.

However, both sides can significantly gain from exchanging information and analysis on security challenges in their region — including Russia, China, and North Korea, as well as the relations between those states. Given that Russia and China operate with similar tactics, such as disinformation campaigns and grey zone activities below the threshold of war, the two sides can consult on responses and share best practices. Cooperation between NATO and the AP4 countries in the field of cyber defence has already deepened significantly over the past years. This is a promising area for further collaboration and exchange — given that geography is irrelevant to the cyber sphere.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Alexandra Sakaki is the Deputy Head of the Asia Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik — SWP), an independent think tank that advises Germany’s parliament and federal government on foreign and security policy issues. Her research focuses on Japanese politics, regional relations in East Asia, and European Indo-Pacific policies. Image credit: Wikimedia.