Architect of the Indo-Pacific: How will Abe's legacy continue?

14 July 2022

Last Friday, the global community was shocked to hear that Shinzo Abe had been shot by a lone gunman in broad daylight in the streets of Nara, a city in western Japan. The former prime minister of Japan had been touring the country, campaigning for Liberal Democratic Party candidates ahead of the House of Councillors election scheduled for the following weekend. The shock of the veteran statesman’s death is compounded by the fact that Japan has one of the lowest crime rates in the world. Since the news, world leaders have been sending their condolences to the people of Japan, citing Abe’s global impact throughout his political career.

Abe first emerged on the international political stage in 2006, when he led the country as prime minister for one year (resigning due to health issues in 2007). He staged a triumphant return to the premiership in 2012, with a clear victory in the national elections. Abe remained the steadfast figurehead of the Japanese government until 2020 when he once again stepped down due to health concerns. The stability of Abe’s eight-year administration marked a change from the previous governments, which had seen five different prime ministers over six years. While his conservative domestic politics were considered contentious at times (including his economic policies, ‘Abenomics’, and his desire to return the country to more nationalist ideals), he is acknowledged as helping Japan transition into a strategic geopolitical and geoeconomic powerhouse.

Strategic cooperation: Quad

As the architect of the Indo-Pacific construct, Abe was a driving force in the establishment of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — an ongoing strategic and military dialogue between Japan, India, Australia, and the US, established to counter China’s increasing global influence and its continuing challenge to the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. In its simplest form, the Quad exists as a military and strategic counterweight to China’s influence, as Beijing aggressively asserts itself territorially and militarily in the region. Instrumental in launching the first iteration of the Quad in 2007, Abe envisioned the Quad’s “ideological and geographic foundations” through his ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ speech made at the Indian parliament in August 2007 — which included Abe’s now-famous ‘broader Asia’ concept. As per Japan’s diplomatic strategy of developing and intensifying cooperation with fellow democracies, as well as reaching further afield to create such new alliances (the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ strategy), Abe’s ‘broader Asia’ concept aimed to bring together the democracies that surrounded the Indian and Pacific oceans in the spirit of partnership. This concept looked beyond geographic borders, linking ideologically aligned nations with similar geopolitical concerns.

Time will tell which aspects of Shinzo Abe’s legacy will live on most faithfully and whether the role of Japan as a buffer between competing global forces in the region will continue.

Nicknamed the ‘Asian NATO’ by an irritated Beijing, Quad 1.0 was short-lived. The talks fell apart when Australia withdrew from the dialogue months later. This failure — although attributed to the Australian prime minister — was also due to insurmountable initial misgivings about the cooperation, such as the ambiguous nature of the initial proposal, the conflicting interests of the different countries involved, and the global financial crisis. Following years of increased destabilisation in the region, the four-way dialogue was renewed in 2017 due to growing convergence between the foreign policies of the four Quad countries.

Abe once again “took the diplomatic lead”, aligning the four countries around securing a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific. This followed a vision established in Abe’s speech in Kenya in 2016, which discussed “the union of two free and open oceans”, promoting a rules-based system in the region while simultaneously juggling the need to cooperate with Beijing on an economic (and diplomatic) level due to competing and overlapping foreign policy interests. In this way, the fundamental values of the Quad have always centred around Abe’s conception of the necessary relationship between the nations. Abe’s successor, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, is continuing to uphold this open-armed international stance, stating that “The “future of Asia” is no longer just for Asia”.

Renouncing pacifism and remilitarising Japan

One of the main features of the Quad is the joint military exercises conducted by the four countries, including naval drills under the Malabar exercises. Strengthening this cooperation and the increased military posturing in the region ran parallel to Japan’s own internal efforts in developing its security and defence architecture. The renewal of the Quad dialogues coincided with Japan’s emerging military reform and the government’s hope for a new, more active, defence framework. From the start of his second administration, Abe used the rhetoric of increased military power equalling a more “proactive” form of peace.

He had a clear focus on security as a top policy priority, seeking to repudiate the country’s pacifist stance (as laid out in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution). This was obvious in a host of developments, including the formation of a new National Security Council; legislation to allow the country’s military to defend allies abroad (a highly controversial national security legislation); the easing of arms export restrictions; and the removal of defence spending caps to increase Japan’s military budget. These developments divided the public, with opposition party politicians and citizens staging large protests against the legislative changes. However, once the changes were pushed through, dissatisfaction with Abe’s government never lasted long, with public opinion bouncing back surprisingly quickly.

Disappointingly for him, Abe was never able to achieve his great ambition of revising the Constitution. However, some are already saying that his death and the Liberal Democratic Party victory in the elections last Sunday might bring this discussion back to the table. Although it could be claimed that the US-written Japanese Constitution should be updated to suit the 21st century and reflect Japanese values and the current geopolitical situation, the public is highly polarised on this issue. It is feared that altering the document could weaken Japanese peacekeeping values — an unsurprising fear considering the ongoing efforts to remilitarise the country. Indeed, even earlier this year Abe commented that Japan should consider reopening the discussion on nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind the country’s past and its citizens’ aversion to nuclear weapons, this was quite a controversial statement and indicative of a desire to put Japan on a more balanced footing with its geographic neighbours who have considerable military power (i.e., China, North Korea, and Russia).

Abe’s international diplomacy

Abe’s focus on defence was not restricted to the domestic level or to members of the Quad. A key part of Abe’s legacy will be his diligence in maintaining regional and international relationships. In his second administration, Abe’s foreign policy strategy was characterised by his frequent interaction with other political leaders, seeking out new trade and defence alliances across the globe. In his first twelve months in office, he visited 25 countries. Within his first two years, this number reached 49. Often on the road, Abe invested in face time to build relationships and was even the first international leader to meet in person with former US President Trump after his inauguration. His pragmatic approach allowed him to deal with difficult or unpredictable leaders, engaging in tactical hedging to keep Japan’s head above water in the uncertain geopolitical landscape.

Although he favoured cooperation with fellow democracies, he also deepened security, defence, and financial ties with Japan’s closest neighbours. Under Abe, Japan invested heavily in financially supporting the region. This included foreign direct investment in development projects (e.g., building transport infrastructure in India and Thailand), writing off debts (e.g., Abe’s almost USD 2 billion write off of Myanmar’s debt in 2013), and providing aid (e.g., official development assistance to the Philippines worth USD 8.66 billion). However, this was not simply to boost the Japanese economy. Encouraging bilateral relationships also served the purpose of attempting to hinder China’s growing infrastructure investment and growing maritime strength in the region. This is why Japan also invested in security and defence as a tool for creating alliances, such as by donating military vehicles and equipment to ASEAN members.

However, he never developed a favourable relationship with South Korea. This is despite what should be a profitable partnership between two technologically advanced and economically strong nations, as well as the practical need to cooperate on the threat posed by North Korea. Abe’s traditionalist and regressive views on Imperial Japan (particularly the ongoing contention of ‘comfort women’) drove a wedge between Japan and South Korea, making their already strained relationship even worse. Prime Minister Kishida shares many of the same uncomfortable views in this respect — although he acknowledges that “strategic cooperation between Japan and South Korea … is needed more than ever”. However, with Kishida turning down bilateral talks with his South Korean counterpart, President Yoon Suk Yeol, at the NATO summit in Madrid in June 2022, we can expect the tension between the two nations to continue to simmer.

Abe’s geopolitical legacy

The legacy that Shinzo Abe leaves behind is that of stability and diplomacy. His tactical repositioning of Japan as a global force in the Indo-Pacific — as well as his instrumental role in devising the Indo-Pacific concept — redefined the international understanding of strategy and defence in the region. We have yet to see how Japan’s domestic politics will be affected following his death. The fatal shooting of a world leader is a rare event, and will doubtless have repercussions for both Japan and the international diplomatic community. Time will tell which aspects of his legacy will live on most faithfully and whether the role of Japan as a buffer between competing global forces in the region will continue. Currently, the Liberal Democratic Party and Prime Minister Kishida are taking up Abe’s metaphorical mantle, for instance in pushing for higher defence spending and re-discussing constitutional reform. Therefore, it seems likely that Japan will continue to part from its pacifist past, using Abe’s legacy to move towards a remilitarised and wary country. However, it will have to do so without Abe’s diplomatic clout and international leadership.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Perle Petit works at the European Policy Centre, a Brussels-based independent, not-for-profit think tank dedicated to researching European policy. Her main fields of study are democratic backsliding, authoritarianism, and media freedom. Image credit: Wikimedia.