Japan’s strategic policies under the current global order
Japan’s strategic policies under the current global order
WRITTEN BY ELLI POHLKAMP
7 April 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fundamentally threatens the international order. At first glance, the escalating war in Ukraine may seem to be mainly a European problem and a potential threat to NATO allies leading various Western countries to shift their foreign and security policies. But the threat to global peace and stability as well as to energy security and supply chains has already led to political reactions and policy shifts in Indo-Pacific countries, such as Japan. Japan’s decade long engagement policy with Russia, aiming to solve the territorial dispute of the Northern Territories, has been dropped to allow for the political condemnation of Russia’s actions.
Russia’s breach of international law and the underlying principles of the UN Charter have forced the Western alliance and its partners to take unprecedented measures by adopting a wide range of far-reaching economic sanctions. In this context, Japan’s stance on Russia has emerged as one of the toughest in the Indo-Pacific, and there is now widespread recognition in Tokyo that there is no prospect of achieving a territorial settlement in the near future. As a country committed to the multilateral rules-based order, Japan is now faced with a global order challenged by growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, as well as by deepening Russia-China ties. China’s attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas, and in the Taiwan Strait, present an imminent threat to Japan. As Russia's unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force overlaps with China's aggressive moves in the South China Sea, Japan fears that if Russia's actions are tolerated, there could be spillovers in its neighbourhood.
This behaviour of inactivity and standing on the sidelines has changed now, driven by the concern that one day Japan might need help from its Western alliance partners should the security situation around Japan change.
Particularly the intensification of Sino-Russian military cooperation and joint exercises that took place in the Tsugaru Strait and around Japan worry policymakers in Tokyo. This makes Japan’s active reaction of showing unity and supporting its European allies by joining the sanctions against Russia and agreeing to share surplus LNG with Europe all the more important, because it shows that Japan tries to step up for its European partners in times of crisis and thus hopes to be able to count on their assistance should escalations occur around Japan. Current developments in light of the war in Ukraine highlight that we are dealing with a situation of rules versus power. This state of play only makes Japan's perpetual efforts to defend the rule of law and political transparency as well as its current path in its security approaches all the more important. It also offers Japan an additional incentive to support the values of unity and promote deeper cooperation with like-minded partners to build resilience.
One important tool in this context is Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP), which commits the country to uphold the rules-based international order, the freedom of navigation, peaceful settlement, and the rule of law. Since the formal announcement of the FOIP vision in 2016, economic as well as military resources have been used to demonstrate Japan’s proactivity for a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Tokyo’s strategy since then is continuously evolving as conditions demand, but it is generally multi-layered.
It ranges from building a network of strategic partnerships beyond its traditional ally the United States — for example, with the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia and India — to multilateral inclusive initiatives and mega trade deals (e.g. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU (EPA). The outreach generated through FOIP has allowed Japan to take a clear stand against China’s bullying behaviour without yet compromising its inclusive Indo-Pacific vision. However, it must now navigate precarious security dynamics, depending on the future development of Sino-Russian relations, which makes Japan’s strategic networking and alliance building more significant. Future developments will show how complementary the inclusive nature of FOIP still is with security policy steps initiated in recent years.
Security developments
Japan had already gradually introduced changes in its security and defence policy before the Ukraine war. Besides strengthening its engagement in the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which was re-established in 2017 as an informal security format to counter China’s growing assertiveness and is now serving as an anchor for cooperation among the participating countries (Japan, United States, India and Australia), the Japanese government is going to introduce far-reaching changes in its foreign and security policy this year by revising the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and the Medium Term Defense Force Buildup Program (MTDP). Given the profound changes in the global landscape since 2013, when the NSS was first formulated, wider-ranging changes are to be expected, including deeper concern for new security domains such as space, cyberspace, and economic security.
Apart from internal policy changes, Japan is also trying to establish a new strategic framework by expanding and diversifying its security relationships. Thus, Japan had eight 2+2 meetings within the last 12 months with the United States, Germany, the UK, Australia, India, Indonesia and France to confirm their mutual commitment to promote cooperation to contribute to a rules-based, free and open Indo-Pacific. As a result, Japan has signed a new defence and security cooperation treaty with Australia in January this year. The Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) is Japan’s second formal defence pact with another country besides its most important security ally, the United States. The treaty does not only include hard security cooperation but also deeper collaboration on economic security.
Japan has also expanded its defence relationship with Southeast Asian countries; it signed a deal with Indonesia to facilitate transfers of defence equipment and technology, agreed to provide defence equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam, entered a cybersecurity pact with Vietnam, and this March agreed to boost its security cooperation with Cambodia. Besides exploring these new partnerships, Tokyo has also made it a priority to further develop its traditional security relationship with the US since the recent 2+2 meeting in January, resulting in ambitious terms to modernise the alliance in an integrative manner and with Japan “committing to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities to bolster its national defense and contribute to regional peace and stability”.
Although the Ukraine war has impacted debates on security spending and capacity around the globe, Japan’s debate on building up its defences, with the LDP even noting a 2 per cent of GDP aspiration up from its current 1 per cent, started already since the beginning of Kishida’s campaign for the premiership. Nevertheless, what used to be possible long-term issues or taboo topics, including obtaining a strike capacity or the possibility of “nuclear sharing” as suggested by former Prime Minister Abe, may gain traction due to recent global developments and could cause the imminent need for an honest political and societal debate about Japan’s future security policy.
Economic Security
As a resource-poor nation, guarding its economic vulnerabilities by defending the rules-based international system is a vital tool for Japan. Economic dependence used as leverage is becoming more frequent and confrontation is overshadowing the advantages of interdependence. Economic coercion is being used for political purposes and often against economic rationales. The current war in Ukraine shows that countries must be more attuned to threats posed by economic linkages and find ways to reduce their vulnerabilities. Augmenting economic, digital, and cyber cooperation based on a broader framework built on shared principles of economic security, therefore, takes on a new meaning.
With its economic security bill, approved in February this year, Japan has introduced a path to chart and mitigate dependencies and build resilience. But Japan does not have the single-handed legal tools to also launch offensive economic measures — this is only possible in unity with the UN and the G7. It is therefore imperative for Japan to have allies and partners and develop joint tools so that adversaries cannot use their levers of influence against them. The first step in this direction has been the agreement between Japan, Australia, and India to develop principles that strengthen supply chains through better data management in the Indo-Pacific region.
For Japan, the current global situation poses a threat to the rules-based order and torpedoes the foundations of its FOIP vision. The war in Ukraine helps Japan strengthen its argumentation of why it is so important for Europe and the United States to not lose sight of the Indo-Pacific and China's aspirations and defend the principles of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Not infrequently, Japan was accused of not engaging enough internationally and “paying its way out”. This behaviour of inactivity and standing on the sidelines has changed now, driven by the concern that one day Japan might need help from its Western alliance partners should the security situation around Japan change.
Finally, last month’s events only highlight the risks for Japan and its Western allies that come with economic dependence on countries that have a politically troubling leadership that ignores the rule of law. Considering the recent events in Eastern Europe and their implications for economic and energy dependencies across the globe, a necessary but sudden radical shift in a long-standing Russia policy was a meaningful step for Japan to take. As China-Russia relations evolve and the threat of China’s expansionist behaviour in the Indo-Pacific grows, a critical evaluation of Japan’s overall China policy might soon become necessary.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr. Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp is a Visiting Fellow at the Asia Programme of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Her research focuses on Japan-EU relations, Japan and the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s cybersecurity and tech policies. Image credit: Wikimedia/Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ボン外相会合.