Taiwan: Partisanship and identity struggles create exploitable loopholes for Beijing

8 April 2022

While the government of Taiwan is ramping up its defence amid growing threats from mainland China, some Taiwanese retired generals have been publicly apologetic about Beijing’s military actions. Retired air force general Hsia Ying-Chou said in an interview with Beijing’s mouthpiece Global Times that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has every right to fly over Taiwan’s air defence identification zone because it is China’s territory. Asserting Taiwan’s defence inferiority vis-à-vis the PLA, the retired general and head of veteran affairs for the opposition Kuomintang Party (KMT) expressed confidence that China would achieve unification with Taiwan by 2027 and criticised the Pentagon for undermining this vision.

Throughout the last decade, several retired Taiwanese generals have visited official meetings in Beijing, or openly defended Beijing’s military manoeuvres against Taiwan’s territories. Unofficial exchanges between retired Taiwanese and Chinese military leaders ran into the late 2000s, and individual visits persisted until 2019 when an amendment to the Cross-Strait Act banned retired officials from visiting the mainland. Many of these visits were organised by China’s united front groups and appealed to nationalist pro-unification sentiments among the military’s conservative camps. The same General Hsia who defended Chinese warplane activities over Taiwanese airspace was quoted in one of the exchanges saying there was no distinction between the PLA and the Republic of China (ROC) militaries since they are “all China’s military”.

More than just worshipping

Beijing’s proxies in Taiwan have been calling for the overthrow of the Tsai administration. In mid-2021, Chang An-Le, leader of the pro-Beijing China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP), openly called for an insurrection in Taiwan during a forum organised by China’s Cross-Strait Relations Research Centre. Chang is known for his strong ties to the Taiwanese crime underworld and as a leader of the Bamboo Union triad gang, one of Taiwan’s key triad fractions and a notorious crime syndicate. Chang has also organised several rallies for reunification under Beijing’s banners and has been indicted for accepting Beijing’s political donations. In a speech peppered with praise for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chang alluded that his influence over the island-wide temple system — a network of communities composed mostly of working-class youth — has helped him amplify his reunification cause by propagating his pro-China discourse through loyalist figures sympathetic to Beijing’s united front strategy. He went on to admit to having allies within the Taiwanese military community, who he believes would surrender and switch loyalty if China launches an invasion.

The acutely partisan nature and resentment between pan-Blue and pan-Green politicians could render it a continuous shouting contest and ultimately desensitise the population from any genuine concerns and escalation.

Taiwanese temples have long been a social problem. Spread across the island and often out of the authorities’ reach, temples are laden with gangsters and have caused ample law and order problems in different communities. Factions receptive to Beijing’s funds and advancements, including Chang An-Le’s Bamboo Union, have been using their network and workforce to do China’s bidding. This includes organising and participating in rallies and disseminating disinformation as part of Beijing’s information warfare to interfere in Taiwanese politics and weaken cognition of policy-related facts, which often get broadcast via traditional media. Meanwhile, a video of retired ROC lieutenant general Kao An-Kuo calling for a mutiny against the incumbent government has emerged on the internet. He called on Taiwan’s servicemen to take up the “heaven’s mandate” of achieving the reunification’s “sacred mission”. Kao commented that the CCP is now the legitimate upholder of the founding “Three People’s Principles” of the ROC and KMT: nationalism, democracy, and livelihood. He argued that Taiwan’s military, which is nominally tasked to uphold the principles of the ROC’s constitution, should switch allegiance to Beijing.

“China is my God”

In recent years, support for formal independence has gained considerable traction among the Taiwanese society as many, especially among the youth, no longer consider themselves Chinese. This has generated a reactionary resentment among a section of the population who cling on to their Chinese roots, which is especially prevalent among the older waishengren — who arrived from China with the KMT as refugees in 1949 — and their descendants. Critics have questioned the formerly dominant KMT’s stance of putting politics over the island’s security. The KMT’s opposition to the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) cross-strait policies is diverse, ranging from expressing genuine concerns over security asymmetries to downplaying Taiwan’s defence capabilities and even questioning security commitments from democracies and Taiwan itself. A recurring theme is a knee-jerk opposition to the Tsai administration’s cross-strait policies and the DPP’s sympathy for Taiwan’s desire for self-determination.

Difficulty in building consensus over Taiwan’s position vis-à-vis its neighbour often stems from partisan disdain for the Tsai administration, which has given pro-Beijing discourse room to flourish. Conservative elements within the KMT have questioned the island’s capability against China’s military actions, and some politicians would rather abstain from confronting or even collaborating with Beijing than support the DPP’s policies. The former head of KMT Hung Hsiu-Chu flew to Beijing for the 2022 Winter Olympics to express her support for the 1992 Consensus and ‘One China’ Principle, while former President Ma (KMT) questioned the Tsai Administration’s ability to govern Taiwan, and reiterated that any policies towards self-determination would anger Beijing and put the island in danger. In February 2022, KMT chairman Eric Chu blamed President Tsai’s rejection of the 1992 Consensus for worsening cross-strait relations, though Beijing argued that the Consensus should eventually bring reunification under its banner.

Beijing’s gradual encroachment is already slowly playing out, as Taiwan is suffering under a major Chinese espionage campaign. Beijing has allegedly penetrated all levels of Taiwan’s military and defence planning through agents and compromised serving and retired military officers. Proactive counterintelligence efforts are being implemented, and Taiwan’s intelligence agency has warned against possible “cognitive warfare” and attempts to demoralise the Taiwanese society. Retired Taiwanese military officers are now liable to fines of up to USD 360,000 and the cancellation of pensions, and the maximum penalty for spying for China has been raised from five years of imprisonment to seven.

Remaining vigilant

Countering threats to Taiwan’s defence takes two forms. First, it rests upon the Taiwanese public remaining informed and seeing through the partisan noise regarding the island’s political and security issues. But it is also up to the island’s military and intelligence to identify potential secessionists or espionage agents and deny them any opportunity in their deeds, no matter whether it is espionage, demoralising the public or staging unrest on Beijing’s behalf. Chang An-Le was recently convicted for his role in the temple system. While this may seem like a welcome move, it was based on his forgery of official documents rather than his embezzlement or subversive activities. Besides being free to continue their activities, figures like Chang run the risk of trivialising Taiwan’s security commitment.

Chang has openly expressed almost contemptuous defiance over Taiwan’s National Security Law (NSL) — he was seen donning a vest with texts calling for an armed insurrection after being investigated by authorities. Together with the fact that the NSL only mainly criminalises intellectual theft, security and financial loopholes from Taiwan’s extensive temple system remain. Such trivialisation is also evident at the parliamentary level. Though debates on the island’s security issues are becoming mainstream, the acutely partisan nature and resentment between pan-Blue and pan-Green politicians could render it a continuous shouting contest and ultimately desensitise the population from any genuine concerns and escalation.

Authorities and civil society ought to inform the public about the real issue of security threats and debunk dismissals or even denials of Taiwan’s security reality from politicians. Taiwan’s government is proactively closing this gap and building genuine trust with the public. For example, the Ministry of Defence’s daily press updates on the island’s air defence identification zone is a great effort to bring timely and authoritative information to the public. Another focus should be to target and debunk defeatist rhetoric from politicians. Though concerns over defence asymmetries can be valid, there is a clear difference between partisan argument and disseminating defeatism, let alone aiding Beijing’s encroachment activities. While Taiwan’s hard-earned freedom of speech must be upheld dearly, deliberate disinformation must be highlighted, named and shamed through thorough debunking efforts by media fact-checking.

While some observers have cautioned against a general comparison of both situations, the debate on Taiwan’s situation in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has begun. Some ideologically-charged actors and politicians might exploit the historical and cultural ties as well as political entanglement with the neighbour to weaken defence, downplay plausible threats or even outright invite an invasion. Taiwanese authorities need to instil confidence in their people as capable defenders and emphasise that the country is facing a genuine security threat. At the same time, it must keep a close eye on any subversive activities from Chang and his ilk that may already be brewing under the radar.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Thomas Chan is an independent commentator and researcher on Asian affairs. He has previously worked as a research assistant at HKU and a freelance journalist. His previous work has been featured on ASPI Strategist, The Diplomat, The Guardian and Vice News. Image credit: Flickr/Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan).