Why the Quad will endure
Why the Quad Will Endure
WRITTEN BY WILLIAM CHOONG
13 April 2021
It took four years of lower-level talks, but the four leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Grouping (Quad) finally met for 90 minutes last month. The meeting of Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, his Japanese counterpart Yoshihide Suga, Indian premier Narendra Modi and United States President Joe Biden has put the grouping back on the map.
The passage of time and China’s recent assertive behaviour has instilled wisdom in the four democracies. In 2007, virulent Chinese opposition resulted in the demise of Quad 1.0, particularly after Canberra backed out. This time, the Quad countries have been more careful not to incur Beijing’s ire, so much so that in a joint statement released on 12 March, China was given nary a mention. Instead, the focus was on high principles: a free, open and inclusive order unaffected by coercion, the rule of law, freedom of navigation, shared prosperity and more importantly, the centrality of ASEAN.
While there have been negotiations for a formal Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, ASEAN has found no solution to Chinese assertiveness. This is where the four Quad navies can bring power and presence to bear.
China will give short shift to such principles, particularly as applied to the South China Sea. This time, however, Quad 2.0 is being more adroit at addressing the region’s needs, as seen in its plan to convene three working groups on vaccine delivery, climate change, and critical and emerging technologies. As Rory Medcalf has opined, this is “hardly hawk talk”.
Economic overtures
Addressing the economic prosperity angle will go far with ASEAN. As the 2021 State of Southeast Survey of 1,032 respondents has indicated, China is considered the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia. However, 72.3 per cent of those polled also said this is a concern. In a series of phone calls with Modi, Morrison and Suga in November, Biden employed the formulation of a “secure and prosperous” Indo-Pacific, suggesting that the new administration knows how to gain better traction in the region.
More can be done, however. Australia and Japan are both part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The US withdrew from the earlier version of the CPTPP in 2017; India backed out of the RCEP in November 2019. And while China’s Belt and Road Initiative has been much pilloried for its ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, it’s financing of regional infrastructure addresses a real need. The Quad will need to work on its Blue Dot Network (BDN). The BDN — which involves Australia, Japan and the US — is an international certification programme to promote “quality infrastructure” with a focus on sustainability and transparency. It applies particularly to lower and middle-income countries and offers a “standard of excellence” counter to the dept traps and cheap infrastructure that the BRI is said to entail.
Managing ASEAN and China
The biggest obstacles for the Quad, in the long run, are China and ASEAN. China has dissed the Quad as “seafoam” that will dissipate but has at the same time expressed concern about the danger that an “Asian NATO” might pose to Beijing. The bigger challenge will be ASEAN. For the longest time, the high priests of ASEAN orthodoxy have castigated any sect that could undermine it. Kevin Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community is a case in point. In 2009, Rudd proposed a region-wide forum that would invite “key government officials, academics and opinion-makers” from around the world to attend a 1.5-Track conference. While Canberra had planned for both greater powers and smaller regional powers to be part of this community, sustained resistance from ASEAN put paid to Rudd’s idea.
While Quad 2.0 has expressly stated that it supports ASEAN centrality, the grouping’s diplomats privately scoff at such boilerplates. Some suggest that the Quad be kept at arm’s length and that any Quad-ASEAN cooperation be done via the East Asia Summit. The issue here is one of perspective. Unlike individual members of the Quad, ASEAN states do not see Beijing as a threat to the regional rules-based order, but rather, as an economic opportunity to be harnessed. Seen in this light, the 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is a classic exposition — the organisation refused to employ any “Indo-Pacific” terminology that would cast China in a geopolitical (as opposed to a geographical) frame.
That said, the Quad will endure in the long run, simply because it addresses areas that ASEAN has found challenging. One of these areas is maritime security, particularly in the South China Sea. While there have been negotiations for a formal Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, ASEAN has found no solution to Chinese assertiveness. This is where the four Quad navies can bring power and presence to bear.
In early April, for example, France joined the Quad-Four navies in the La Perouse maritime exercise in the Bay of Bengal. The first edition of the La Perouse exercise in 2019 did not involve India, but New Delhi’s involvement in 2021, and the Quad’s renewed emphasis on the need for maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific, has triggered negative reactions from China. The 2021 La Perouse exercise follows the Malabar series of naval exercises, which in November 2020 saw the re-admission of Australia into the exercise format. The Quad and Quad-plus formats, the latter involving the four Quad navies and interested regional navies, will become more significant if they are turned into regular events that could attract non-Quad countries in the region. Likewise, Quad countries can also continue to pursue minilateral cooperation with like-minded Southeast Asian states that are at the forefront of maritime disputes with China — such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Another area is Myanmar. Quad leaders have prioritised an early and peaceful solution to the recent coup in the country, and India and Japan, with their access to the country, could provide an opening to the Quad. Thai scholar Thitinan Pongsudhirak has argued that external powers may “play a great role” in Myanmar if ASEAN cannot stop what some deem to be crimes against humanity. Frustration with ASEAN’s “inertia and incoherence” has manifested itself in the Quad, he added.
Time to get driving
ASEAN’s continued lack of effective action to resolve the Myanmar crisis has raised the question of its centrality and effectiveness. As Ralph Cossa argues, every ASEAN document proclaims the need for ASEAN to remain in the “driver’s seat” when it comes to dealing with regional security challenges. The time has come for ASEAN “to drive”. This could involve getting the ASEAN troika — consisting of the current, immediate past and next ASEAN Chair — to send a “quieter message” to the generals. Another scholar who has studied Southeast Asia for decades was more direct. He pooh-poohed the stress on ASEAN centrality: “Don’t want the Quad? Get your s*** together, ASEAN”.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
William Choong is a Senior Fellow at the ISEAS — Yusof Institute in Singapore. He is the Managing Editor of Fulcrum, the Institute’s commentary and analysis website. Image credit: Wikimedia.