Abe Shinzo: A legacy in review
Abe Shinzo: a legacy in review
WRITTEN BY FELIX KUHN
14 April 2021
No Japanese prime minister served longer in office than Abe Shinzo. His influence on Japanese foreign policy and grand strategy has been profound and possibly enduring, and he remains an important force in Japanese politics today. Suga Yoshihide, the current prime minister, proclaimed before his election that he would seek Abe’s advice on foreign policy matters; he recently made good on this promise, meeting Abe to discuss his upcoming visit to the United States (US). Thus, even though he left office in September 2020, Abe’s reflections on international relations are not only of intrinsic interest but can also give us a better understanding of Japan’s foreign policy today.
Abe has provided us with a deeper insight into his thinking in a recent interview published in Diplomacy (外交), the in-house journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of the most important Japanese journals for foreign relations. The three parts of the interview that have been published so far are wide-ranging. Among many other issues, Abe provides his thoughts on the value of G7 meetings, domestic immigration legislation, the alliance with the US, and Abe’s relationship with former US President Donald Trump, a topic he had already discussed in an earlier interview. Here I will focus on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept and Japan’s strategy towards China.
Abe and the origins of the Quad
The FOIP concept remains the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. Where did it come from? Abe says he initially developed the idea when he served as a high-ranking official during the premiership of Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006). Relations with China and South Korea were in bad shape and Abe thought that Japan needed to look elsewhere: he developed “a deep interest in India”. As he puts it, “It goes without saying that India was the great power of South Asia, the world’s biggest democracy, and it had friendly relations with Japan. There was of course also no history issue”. However, while he felt his visit to India as prime minister in 2007 was a success, “Prime Minister Singh lacked enthusiasm for a ‘Japan-US-Australia-India’ framework”— what is now commonly referred to as the Quad.
Pragmatism served Abe well, making it possible to steady Japan’s relationship with China while building up a coalition of partners in the region. Suga has so far shown no inclination to depart from Abe’s footsteps. But it is not yet clear whether Abe’s policy is sustainable over the long term.
In Abe’s telling, even keeping this framework at a lower level came to naught with his leaving office and changes of administrations in other countries. But when he returned to office in 2012, he soon proposed the concept of “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” to again push for a collective framework, which over time took on concrete form. While it is not very surprising that a politician would place himself at the very centre of important international developments, in this case, it is not mere bluster. Abe can indeed claim a vital role in bringing the Quad about, though the first leadership meeting of the Quad was only held in March this year after he had left office. This not only points to his personal diplomatic skills but more importantly, to Japan’s ability to be an active shaper of regional developments.
Abe’s FOIP vision is expansive; it includes non-regional powers, especially from Europe. He specifically mentions Britain, France, and Germany, noting that their involvement in Indo-Pacific affairs “surely can be called a cooperation framework between like-minded countries sharing values with each other”. Britain appears as an especially important partner in the interview, with Abe discussing his conversations with Theresa May, then prime minister of Britain. According to his recollections, May expressed the desire for Britain to “re-establish its presence in the Indo-Pacific region”, and that Japan would be a vital partner in this regard. Abe does not provide any further information on what this could entail, but he says that he expressed his general enthusiasm, noting fondly the Anglo-Japanese Alliance established in 1902. Since Japan-Britain relations have significantly progressed since then, this was more than an empty exchange between two leaders.
With important meetings also held between Japan and other European countries, Abe’s policy of looking for partners outside the region, which has been continued by Suga, who also identified Europe as a vital regional partner, is coming more and more to fruition. Not all of these countries will make significant military contributions to regional defence; especially in the case of Germany, this is more than doubtful. But creating a diplomatic coalition has its own benefits, and so does building up expectations among countries that they will be partners in case of conflict, even if some partners may only contribute economically — a factor that should not be underestimated.
FOIP and Japan’s China strategy
The obvious question of what the FOIP policy is for has an equally obvious answer: China. While Abe rejects the idea that FOIP is about “anti-China encirclement”, he stresses that China, with its military conduct and its “excessive lending”, ought to mend its ways. “I think if FOIP can contribute to this, it would also be highly significant”.
That China comes up again and again during the interview shows its central place in Abe’s foreign policy thinking. He conveyed his sentiment towards China to Trump at their first meeting: “The most pressing issue is North Korea; the medium to long-term issue is China”. To deal with China, he stressed, Japan and the US had to cooperate closely. This perspective is shared widely among the Japanese foreign policy establishment and there is no reason to expect any major changes in this regard in the foreseeable future.
China dominates other issues as well. Asked why there had been little progress on the territorial conflict with Russia, Abe points out that Japan-Russia relations did not exist in a vacuum: “[W]hile China was increasing its military power in East Asia and was trying to unilaterally alter the status quo in the East and South China Seas, the basic thinking was that it was incumbent to improve the relations with Russia and not drive it towards China. This was not just my strategic perspective; it was discussed thoroughly internally and was shared by the entire administration”. Since Suga was a vital member of this administration, it is quite possible that he shares this view and that he will continue Abe’s Russia policy. We can thus expect a low-key approach towards the territorial conflict so as not to undermine further attempts at engaging Russia.
One country that is left aside in Abe’s China strategy is South Korea. Abe mostly expresses frustration about this neighbour, especially about the Moon administration’s negative attitude towards the “comfort women” agreement of 2015, which according to the Japanese government settled the issue. He says that the Moon administration “treated the agreement like wastepaper” and calls its stance “extremely regrettable”. Suga appears to have a similar opinion: in an important speech, he listed “the United States, ASEAN, Australia, India, and Europe” as partners in the FOIP strategy, notably leaving out South Korea. Later in the same speech, Suga noted relations with South Korea are “currently in an extremely difficult situation”. While the US is creating spaces for security cooperation between the two countries, it is unlikely that Japan will come to see South Korea as a central partner in its broader regional strategy anytime soon.
Pragmatism combined with alertness
While building ties with like-minded countries was one important component of Abe’s strategy, so was engaging China directly. He notes, for instance, that he was always willing to meet Chinese leaders, at least as long as they did not demand any preconditions. Abe’s general stance is reflected in how he describes one foreign leader, Rodrigo Duterte, president of the Philippines: “When you meet him, he is a very realistic leader; in the foreign policy field, he maintains a pragmatic relationship with China, while also being alarmed about the fact that its influence is increasing excessively”. In this depiction of pragmatism combined with alertness, Abe may to some extent also be describing himself.
This pragmatism served Abe well, making it possible to steady Japan’s relationship with China while building up a coalition of partners in the region. Suga has so far shown no inclination to depart from Abe’s footsteps. But it is not yet clear whether Abe’s policy is sustainable over the long term. The greater assertiveness of the US poses one challenge for this policy, but the bigger challenge comes from China. What is seen as pragmatism in Tokyo, does not necessarily look the same way in Beijing. But as long as Japan is not forced to adjust its policy, we can expect Tokyo to follow along Abe’s path, trying to combine engagement of China with coalition-building in and outside the region.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Felix Kuhn is a lecturer at the Beijing Foreign Studies University-Keele University Collaborative Programme on Diplomacy in Beijing. Image credit: Wikimedia.