Sino-Russian relations: Inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Sino-Russian relations: Inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
WRITTEN BY EVA SEIWERT
15 April 2021
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) turns 20 this year. While China has been the driving force behind the regional organisation (RO), Russia and China have a roughly equal power position and have thus shared the unofficial leadership position within the SCO for the past two decades.
On the one hand, the two countries upgraded their relationship to a "comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era" just two years ago, and regularly speak of their ties being at “the best level in history”. On the other hand, however, it is no secret that the historical regional hegemon and the rising power are in direct competition with each other in Central Asia. Given this contradiction, on the occasion of its 20th anniversary, it is worth taking a closer look at Sino-Russian dynamics within the SCO. What do their interactions in the RO tell us about the general state of the Sino-Russian relationship and how do they shape their relations with the West?
So far, China and Russia have managed to present themselves as strong partners and co-leaders of the Eurasian RO to the outside, even though internally their disagreements often prevent the organisation from making any tangible achievements in regional security or economic cooperation. While these circumstances will likely continue to impede a more efficient SCO, they do not stand in the way of the RO helping both states increase the legitimacy of their own foreign policy initiatives, such as the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). As long as the SCO manages to present itself as more of a united group than it really is, it can benefit both China and Russia in their respective dealings with the West.
Russia learns to value the SCO
First things first. In the early years of the SCO’s existence, the Russian government was rather disinterested in the platform, owing to its general preference for regional frameworks in which it acts as the hegemon and does not need to share the leadership role with other powers. However, China’s increasing leverage in the region combined with Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West following its annexation of Crimea have led Moscow to become more involved and active in the SCO. In an interview in 2018, a Central Asian official working for the UN told me that even though it holds the single leadership role in other organisations, such as the EAEU or the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), post-Crimea Russia has learned to value the SCO — which includes four nuclear powers as member states — for its greater international weight.
While their disagreements behind the scenes prevent the SCO from becoming a more effective security organisation, the international images of both governments benefit from their co-leadership of the world’s largest RO in terms both of geographical and population size.
China and Russia’s opposing interests and visions for the organisation complicate cooperation within the SCO. While Beijing has always pushed for closer economic cooperation with a heavy political and strategic agenda, Moscow prioritises closer security ties. Under these circumstances, the SCO countries are in constant need of “search[ing] for the smallest common denominator of interest between these two major players”, and as a result, the organisation often ends up looking on helplessly rather than actively solving crises in the region.
This was most obvious during the Kyrgyzstan revolution in 2010 when the Kyrgyz government’s demands for more substantial support were left unanswered by the other members. More recently, it has been perceivable in the SCO’s handling of the Afghanistan issue, with more and more voices calling for more active involvement of the RO. In both cases, China and Russia have had opposing views on the degree of SCO involvement. China officially insists on a very strict interpretation of the principle of non-interference that only allows some humanitarian and socio-economic assistance, usually provided by individual member states rather than multilaterally. Russia, on the other hand, is more interested in making the SCO a more active organisation through which joint measures are taken.
On top of that, China and Russia regularly block each other’s initiatives within the organisation. It is remarkable that Russia, as the less ‘SCO-enthusiastic’ of the two, has successfully pushed through more of its initiatives than China. Examples of Russian-initiated mechanisms include the SCO Energy Club, its Business Council, and the SCO University programme. On the other hand, China’s year-long campaigns for an SCO-wide free trade area (since 2003) and for the establishment of an SCO Development Bank (first advocated by Wen Jiabao in 2010) were both blocked by Russia. Thus, Sino-Russian internal competition and disagreement over the general direction of the RO constitute a major — albeit not the only — factor impeding a more efficient SCO. Thanks to the SCO’s opacity (unlike the UN or the EU, it does not publish any meeting records), information about such disagreements is kept more or less behind closed doors.
From internal competitors to reliable partners
When it comes to unilateral foreign policy initiatives relevant beyond the SCO, though, Beijing and Moscow can rely on each other’s official backing. A case in point is Xi Jinping’s BRI. The ‘Belt’, i.e., the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’, directly passes through Russia’s former ‘backyard’ of Central Asia. Although the Russian government is wary of China’s increasing influence in this part of the world, the official government line is that it supports the BRI.
Indeed, China has used the SCO as a platform to promote its mega project. Since 2016 several SCO documents have included remarks on its member states’ approval and endorsement of the equally ambiguous and ambitious initiative. It is impossible to know for certain which factors were decisive in Russia’s decision to officially endorse the BRI within and outside the SCO. What can be assumed, though, is that the SCO’s function as a ‘docking’ station of the BRI and the Russian-led EAEU greatly helped accommodate the traditional regional hegemon.
Since the Qingdao Declaration of 2018, the SCO member states have regularly included references to the ‘docking’ of the two initiatives in their joint declarations and statements. It is unclear what exactly ‘docking’ the BRI and EAEU looks like. Generally, it seems that the SCO is used as a platform for member states to coordinate BRI and EAEU projects. Beyond that, however, the formal ‘docking’ should be understood mainly as a diplomatic means to appease Russia given China’s increasing involvement in its former backyard. By ‘docking’ the EAEU and the BRI, the two initiatives are officially put on an equal footing, which helps Russia save face while China’s influence in the region increases. Furthermore, ‘docking’ can be also seen as a political signal that China and Russia — or the BRI and the EAEU — have no conflicting interests.
A future alliance
While their disagreements behind the scenes prevent the SCO from becoming a more effective security organisation, the international images of both governments benefit from their co-leadership of the world’s largest RO in terms both of geographical and population size. Not only can Beijing and Moscow promote themselves as influential international leaders, but their co-management of the organisation helps keep speculation going over a future alliance.
That this is exactly what Beijing and Moscow want becomes apparent when considering the increase in articles by Chinese and Russian commentators titled something along the lines of “Western sanctions will only force Russia and China into closer embrace” or “Western pressure brings China and Russia closer”. Although the current trend seems to be going in a different direction, it is possible that actors like the EU may be influenced by such threats when trying to decide their future stance towards either one of the SCO leaders. To prevent this from happening, a glimpse into the actual conditions of Sino-Russian relations as played out on the platform of the SCO serves as a good reminder that the Sino-Russian partnership is actually touted as much closer than it really is. While both states benefit from speculations over a potential alliance, within the SCO, Moscow and Beijing are far from aligned.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Eva Seiwert is a doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of East Asian Studies (GEAS) at the Freie Universität Berlin. Her research focuses on China’s foreign policy towards Central Asia, in particular within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Image credit: Wikimedia.