The US should prioritise the Indo-Pacific over Ukraine, but the clash of interests should not be overstated

29 July 2022

As Russia’s egregious invasion of Ukraine has directed the US and global attention towards Europe, will supporting Ukraine hinder the rebalancing of the US towards the Indo-Pacific? As Moscow’s war of aggression continues, Beijing has further advanced its economic, diplomatic, and military prowess in the Indo-Pacific, posing an immense challenge to Washington’s interests in this vital strategic region. An effective response demands enormous willpower and resources, but the US is not omnipotent and cannot draw upon limitless resources to act in every arena of political salience. However, it is important not to overstate the incompatibility between assisting Ukraine and protecting US interests in the Indo-Pacific.

When conflict occurs between US interests in Asia and those in Europe, the former should be prioritised, but the choice between acting in these two theatres is not an entirely binary one. There are many ways in which Washington can champion Ukrainian sovereignty while not depleting the resources required in the Indo-Pacific, while a strong Europe is a necessary ally to counter China. Therefore, while the Indo-Pacific carries much higher stakes for the US and some trade-offs may arise, Washington can and should support Ukraine in ways that do not distract from its continued rebalancing.

US priorities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific

A distracted, overextended US will not be able to counter China. The US has limited resources and endeavouring to disperse these among many regions will deprive its Indo-Pacific strategy of any efficacy. The Strategy outlines a vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient" through maintaining US military operability, fostering partnerships and bolstering alliances, protecting freedom of navigation and commerce, and preserving the rules-based order.

The US must ensure that it remains competitive by enhancing its military capabilities to deter an invasion of Taiwan, as well as by extending its diplomatic reach to counter China’s extensive regional engagement, and by formulating a comprehensive economic and climate policy.

Maintaining US leverage in the Indo-Pacific requires a multifaceted approach backed by colossal financing and political energy, which inevitably means that other issues will be relegated further down Washington’s agenda. For years, various US presidents pleaded futilely with their NATO counterparts to increase defence spending and not to neglect security concerns in their economic engagements. Eastern European and Baltic states were cognisant of the risks of energy dependency and Russian belligerence, but Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has jolted Western Europe into understanding that it must bolster its military capabilities.

Indeed, it is unsustainable and illogical for the US to be the main provider of European security when the continent is abundant with wealthy states capable of funding the requisite expenditure. Europe must take the lead in supporting Kyiv and build its military capabilities to ensure that Putin fails to realise his irredentist ambitions. That is not to remotely suggest that the US should renege on its NATO commitments, cease providing any assistance or equipment, or that the region is geopolitically irrelevant, but Europe should cater for its own security concerns whenever feasible. Being a free rider is no longer an option.

The funding and attention dedicated to European defence over the last few decades now need to be deployed in the Indo-Pacific where major challenges to US interests lie. Militarily, China has advanced its capabilities for an invasion of Taiwan. As Elbridge Colby notes, it is essential for the US to have a well-executed strategy of deterrence by denial, which effectively involves taking measures which reduce the likelihood that an act of aggression will succeed in achieving its objectives and thus will convince the adversary not to initiate offensive action. Further, China’s rapid naval build-up potentially alters the balance of capabilities in a conflict with the US in this arena, while it entrenches its militarisation of the South China Sea.

Washington also needs an enormous diplomatic campaign to counter China’s extensive outreach, with Beijing’s active diplomacy filling a lacuna formed by years of US political neglect. Numerous Indo-Pacific states are immensely vulnerable to climate change, and China’s rhetoric on this issue is more appealing to affected nations than the rhetoric of the United States in recent years. Tangible US support to combat this existential challenge is a prerequisite for maintaining leverage, and more importantly, is just the right thing to do. China has also recognised the importance of economic growth to the region’s developing states, offering large infrastructure investments to boost development, with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) recently being remoulded to focus more narrowly on Beijing’s neighbourhood.

Its willingness to join trade accords while the US wallows in inimical protectionism is a major asset in this superpower competition for regional influence. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, an economic initiative launched this year, is a small step in the right direction for Washington. However, remaining outside the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a Pacific trade pact, remains a brutally self-inflicted wound. Evidently, these are an immensely broad panoply of issues which require enormous strategic resolve and resources, and these cannot afford to be deployed unnecessarily elsewhere. This applies particularly in Europe which contains multiple states capable of leading efforts to repel Putin and who should shoulder a greater security burden.

Overstating clashing priorities

However, presenting the choice of acting in Europe or the Indo-Pacific as completely dichotomous overstates the clash of US priorities. First, the weaponry required for the Indo-Pacific and Ukraine differs somewhat. Critics of arming Kyiv argue that military arsenals should be reserved for defending Taiwan, but these constitute varying conflict types, with the equipment needed to repel an amphibious invasion diverging from that required in attritional land warfare. Furthermore, assisting Ukraine — without overextending — may even bolster the US position in competing with China. A strong Europe that can overcome Putin’s rapacious militarism is a necessary and beneficial ally in countering China in the economic, diplomatic, and technological realms.

Close cooperation is imperative to prevent Chinese dominance in these areas. Moreover, sovereignty and territorial integrity are imperative for Indo-Pacific states, and a US which is unwilling to act robustly to defend these principles may precipitate regional nations bandwagoning with Beijing, instead of trusting an unreliable and weak Washington. Therefore, support for Kyiv, although not unlimited, is important for achieving US objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and so Washington should continue to supply weapons which are not required to attain strategic goals in the Western Pacific. While Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is an appalling transgression, the US possesses much greater strategic stakes in the Indo-Pacific. Scarce resources necessitate that in any trade-off between Europe and Asia, the latter is prioritised while Europe should take the leading role in defending Ukraine.

However, the conflict between the interests of the US in these two arenas should not be overstated, and Washington can continue to assist Ukraine in ways which do not undermine its Indo-Pacific rebalancing. It is imperative to respond effectively to Beijing’s increasing influence in the region. The US must ensure that it remains competitive by enhancing its military capabilities to deter an invasion of Taiwan, as well as by extending its diplomatic reach to counter China’s extensive regional engagement, and by formulating a comprehensive economic and climate policy. It is a colossal challenge for any presidency and one which the Biden Administration must surmount.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Áine Cooke is an MPhil in Politics and International Studies graduate from the University of Cambridge. Her research interests include China, Southeast Asia, and US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific. Image credit: Flickr/US Pacific Fleet.