The Indo-Pacific is calling Israel
The Indo-Pacific is calling Israel
In an Indo-Pacific century, Israel must break from the Asia-Pacific paradigm in order to see beyond the US-China rivalry and contribute to greater middle-power cooperation.
WRITTEN BY TUVIA GERING
27 September 2021
An early August appearance of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken at the ASEAN-led East Asian Summit (EAS) echoed that of his predecessor Hillary Clinton a decade earlier when she declared Washington's "pivot" to Asia. Since then, the "Asia-Pacific" has evolved into a more broadly defined "Indo-Pacific”, and the concept has made its way to the forefront of US foreign policy and security, with the publication of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy. Blinken's virtual visit is just the latest run in a long line of official visits to the region, culminating in Vice President Kamala Harris' visit to Singapore and Vietnam in late August.
Where US officials and its allies affirm their commitment to an inclusive "free and open Indo-Pacific" and a "rules-based international order", Chinese policymakers see an American plot "to weave an ever-tightening net to contain China" and a strategy to counter the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, in his first speech to Congress, Biden pitted the US and its allies against China in a competition "to win the 21st century," with the Indo-Pacific as the arena. As early as the turn of the century, Japan, India, and Australia recognised the shifting centre of gravity. Gradually, more US allies around the world have picked up on the trend to adopt their own Indo-Pacific strategies, with the EU joining as recently as 16 September. In contrast, while Israel was an early adopter of the Asia-Pacific framework, pivoting to the region in a "clear and purposeful way" by 2017, today it no longer speaks the same language as its most important ally.
Push and pull
When compared to the US presidential election, where China was front and centre, Israel has had four elections in the last two years, none of which had China on the agenda, let alone the Indo-Pacific. Nothing captures this divide better than former national intelligence agency ("Mossad") head Yossi Cohen's exasperated criticism of the US' China policy in June: "I don't understand what the Americans want from China. If anyone does, please tell me. China is not against us and it's not our enemy". Similar remarks were made this week by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
If, over the last decade, Israel sought to diversify its global focus away from the US and Europe toward China and India, it now must go a step further and strengthen its integration with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN countries, particularly by normalising relations with Indonesia.
The US pivot to Asia came at an opportune time for Israel. After the 2008 financial crisis, the intensification of boycotts, divestment, and economic sanctions (BDS) movements in the West, as well as the Obama administration's rocky relationship with former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, the latter sought ways to bolster Israel's economic and political resilience. Consequently, upon his return from Beijing in early May 2013, the Israeli government decided to concentrate its effort on strengthening Sino-Israeli economic ties. The hard work paid off. The volume of bilateral trade in 2020 was $11.9 billion, up 45 per cent from 2011, and Chinese FDI and construction reached $13 billion over the decade. China overtook the United States as Israel's largest source of imports and second-largest trading partner overall in January 2020, and the Bank of Israel predicts that it will do it again as Israel's leading trading partner by 2035.
Good bilateral relations with Israel are also in China's long-term interests. China had recognised the "Silicon Wadi's" potential to contribute to the contest for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and as a result, innovation became a cornerstone of bilateral relations. In 2014, the two governments formed the Joint Committee for Innovation Cooperation, and in 2017, they elevated bilateral relations to an "Innovative Comprehensive Partnership". Despite the fact that China accounts for less than 10 per cent of total foreign investment in Israel, the Trump administration has criticised Israel's growing ties with Beijing and threatened to withhold security and intelligence cooperation over Chinese involvement in Israel's high-tech sector and strategic infrastructure. Under Biden, the US has ratcheted up the pressure on Israel to "get its act together," as evidenced by CIA Director Bill Burns' visit to Jerusalem in early August, where he delivered the message personally.
Given the foregoing, it's easy to understand why Israeli and American policymakers and commentators have been urging Jerusalem to pay more attention to the escalating power struggle between the two superpowers and take a stand with America ad nauseam. But this is precisely the "binary fallacy" that Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan warned against, a deterministic horserace for the ascendency of the 21st century. As Rory Medcalf argues, this simplistic framework of "choice" belies a far more complex future in the pivotal Indo-Pacific region, an order that neither Washington nor Beijing will mould, but rather the region's middle players themselves.
A new Indo-Pacific superpower?
Faced with China's rise and the relative decline of post-Cold War US unipolar dominance, Indo-Pacific middle-sized actors that have a beef with Beijing feel even smaller. From Tokyo to Delhi and from Canberra to Jakarta, everyone is searching near and far for partners to join new multilateral and minilateral frameworks that will be greater than the sum of their parts. Due to its zero-sum stance, Indo-Pacific countries do not necessarily want to include a post-Trump America in these frameworks, nor do they want to exclude China outright. In the arm-wrestling match that has become of Sino-US relations, the middle players place their palms on top, preventing either side from "winning" and, as a result, dragging everyone down with them.
Within these attempts to form a new balance of power, Israel is sought to lend a helping hand. Sitting at the crossroads of three continents and two seas, the State of Israel's unique historical conditions — a developed and highly educated Jewish and democratic nation-state in existential danger for most of its existence — forced it to learn to punch above its weight. With this in mind, Indo-Pacific nations have made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem for strategic collaboration. The most overt outreach was made in August by the country that started it all when Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu visited Jerusalem to introduce Japan's concept of a "free and open Indo-Pacific". Its architect, Abe Shinzō, had observed how sea lanes connect Japan to the Middle East like arteries, supplying 90 per cent of the country's crude oil imports and most of the world's maritime trade, making regional peace and stability a strategic imperative. With the coalition between Israel and moderate Sunni Gulf states now in the open, Tokyo sees in Israel an even stronger pillar to keep the balance against spoilers like Iran, Russia, and Turkey.
Even when they refused to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in the past, Asian nations from China to Singapore were eager to learn from its military prowess and purchase its weapons. Over the last decade, military-security cooperation has paved the way from Israel to Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. In the future, Israel is expected to remain a mecca for weapons and disruptive military technologies. Standing head and shoulders above the rest is the eponymous "Indo" in "Indo-Pacific". Between 2016 and 2020, Israel was the world's eighth-largest arms exporter, with India accounting for 43 per cent of its total sales. The former British colonies upgraded their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership in July 2017, when Narendra Modi paid the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel and an exceptionally cordial visit at that. Efraim Inbar pointed out that the Doklam standoff on the Sino-Indian border was going on at the time, highlighting the countries' shared perception of existential threat and the genuine common threat of radical Islam.
Unfortunately, the Israeli cyber and intelligence sector has recently been linked to international hacking scandals. In better days, an IISS report defined it as one of the Five Eyes' top two cyber-capable partners, on par with China, Russia, and the UK. On 21 July, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, himself a cybersecurity entrepreneur, extended an open invitation for "like-minded countries" to join the Global Cybernet Shield (GCS), an international cybersecurity initiative. "If you try and fight alone", Bennett reasoned, "you're going to lose".
His call made it to the other end of the Indo-Pacific. The following week, Taiwan's Digital Minister Audrey Tang and Foreign Minister Joseph Wu came out of left field to publish an op-ed in the Jerusalem Post expressing their eagerness for Israel's help. The self-governed democracy claimed by Beijing is allegedly subject to 30 million cyber attacks per month, half of which can be traced back to the mainland. Taiwan's plea came just as an unprecedented US-led coalition named and shamed China's Ministry of State Security for a massive cyberattack on Microsoft, and cybersecurity companies implicated China for massive campaigns across Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In security, military, cyberspace, intelligence, technology, and innovation, Indo-Pacific middle powers see Israel as a force multiplier to counter China's coercive behaviour and the United States' confrontational impulses. This trend is most evident in Israel's relations with the Quad and Five-Eyes members down under. Since 2015, Israel and Australia have hosted the annual Be'er Sheva Dialogue, which brings together top brass and thought leaders to discuss how they can collaborate and align on all things strategic. At the last summit, the "China challenge" was high on the agenda, but the two parties also criticised an increasingly isolationist and protectionist America.
But now I see
Tactically, Israel continues to pursue a proactive and inclusive foreign policy in what it still refers to as the Asia-Pacific. Strategically, however, Jerusalem is inactive. Its proclivity to focus on domestic affairs and regional challenges, plan operatively, and conduct a bilateral foreign policy continue to weaken its starting position in the face of larger and more strategic players from inside and outside the region. More broadly, this is a symptom of Israel's "blindness to the maritime space", as described by Brigadier-General (Ret.) Professor Shaul Horev, who has for years been urging the Israeli government to publish a maritime security strategy. Just in the past year, the shadow war between Israel and Iran spilt over into the naval arena, COVID-19 disrupted global sea lanes, and Israel turned into an energy exporter for the first time, owing to the discovery of massive gas deposits in the Mediterranean Sea.
It is important to stress that China is not seen as a strategic competitor or threat to Israel. Quite the contrary, both parties have voiced their interests in strengthening bilateral relations. Likewise, there was never a question of choice between the United States and China. Israel's strategic commitment to the US was showcased at the turn of the century when it had to cancel major weapons sales with Beijing at Washington's behest. China has also stated unequivocally that it recognises Israel's "special ties with certain countries". And yet, China has not shied away from openly coercing Israeli companies, interfering in its internal affairs, infringing on citizens' freedom of expression, and exploiting its membership in international organisations to get at the US and win the favour of the Muslim countries. China's weapons exports, economic lifeline to Iran, and alternative peace and security initiatives are just a few examples of how it can destabilise the Middle East even with "friendly relations with all countries".
The Israel Defense Force (IDF) is not the Afghan military, and drawing conclusions from America's calamitous withdrawal from Kabul about its commitment to Israeli security, or Taiwan's, for that matter, is meaningless. But when the US National Security Advisor makes this exact connection, it underlines the urgency for allies to enhance their security postures and deterrence to ensure their strategic independence and freedom. The challenges above are not unique to Israel. Because China sees the US alliance system as a threat to its interests, it takes advantage of any schism to divide and conquer. Middle powers must bridge the gap by strengthening their leverage through new minilateral and multilateral groupings. This week marks the first anniversary of the Abraham Accords, which provide Israel with an unprecedented opportunity to integrate into such frameworks, and previously unheard-of coalitions like an India-Greece Arab-Med Corridor, Indo-Abrahamic alliance or a security partnership between Israel, Australia, and the UAE are no longer inconceivable.
On a conceptual level, Israel needs a paradigm shift from Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific. It should prioritise the publication of a maritime security strategy so that Jerusalem can adapt its goals, manpower, budget, knowledge base, and theories in diplomacy and security. On a practical level, it is premature for Israel to join the Quad+ or the Five-Eyes Alliance, which it perceives as too antagonistic to China. Still, it does have room to collaborate with its members on issue-specific initiatives such as the Quad Tech Network. Prime Minister Bennett's Global Cybernet Shield initiative exemplifies how Israel can leverage its comparative advantages to lead Indo-Pacific frameworks that are inclusive and amplify their members.
Finally, if, over the last decade, Israel sought to diversify its global focus away from the US and Europe toward China and India, it now must go a step further and strengthen its integration with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN countries, particularly by normalising relations with Indonesia. In recent years, Jakarta has repositioned itself as a leading maritime nation among ASEAN members, and it is expected that by 2050, the democracy will have risen from 16th to become the world's 4th largest economy. Even if the world's largest Muslim state is not yet ripe to recognise Israel, connections can be facilitated through Israel's Pacific allies, namely Australia.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Tuvia Gering is a research fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) specialising in Chinese politics and foreign policy, and emergency and disaster management. Image credit: Wikimedia.