Standing up to China could help bring Lithuania, the EU and Taiwan closer together
standing up to China could help bring Lithuania, the EU and Taiwan closer together
WRITTEN BY ZSUZSA ANNA FERENCZY
19 May 2021
In November 2016, in the context of the fifth 16+1 Summit between Central Eastern European (CEE) countries and China held in Riga, leaders reaffirmed their support for the “Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation”. Proposed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in 2015, the aim of this initiative was to develop infrastructure, including transportation hubs and industrial parks in the coastal areas of the three seas. At the time the 16 shared a brighter view of their future with China, albeit holding divergent understandings of Beijing’s true intentions behind the framework, as well as different ambitions of what to get out of it. The 16 found themselves competing for Beijing’s money, even as they faced criticism from Brussels due to fears that the mechanism could further undermine EU unity on its China policy.
As far as the Baltic state of Lithuania was concerned, it seemed that there was nowhere to go but up. After years of efforts to attract Chinese investment, in 2015 Port of Klaipėda, the Kaunas Free Economic Zone and Lithuania’s railway company signed letters of intent with China Merchants Group to cooperate to develop a logistics chain and help with the expansion of the port, on both sea and land. The Port of Klaipėda is the most important and biggest Lithuanian transport hub, connecting sea, land and railway routes from East to the West. In the words of the Lithuanian prime minister at the time, if Lithuania completed the project, competition from Latvia would be “almost out of question”, a blunt reminder of the competition driving the participants of the framework forward, but further apart from each other to Beijing’s benefit.
Divide et impera?
Beijing’s divide-and-rule tactic, not its money, has been the factor keeping the framework alive and thriving. The Chinese leadership has skillfully used grand promises of infrastructure investment as leverage to keep the CEE countries engaged. While the 16 also used the framework to achieve a better standing in negotiations vis-à-vis China and also within the EU, the fact that the framework had little to no positive economic impact in the countries involved, contrary to Beijing’s promises, became an issue for a region that remains in sore need of an infrastructure facelift to strengthen connectivity. Beijing over-promised and under-delivered; it vowed to several capitals, at once, that they would be the chosen hub for further expansion, only to leave them hanging. As a result, the framework did not thrive. Paradoxically, it might have even helped solidify the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of CEE as a region within the EU, a region that has struggled to make its voice heard in Brussels.
Backing for Vilnius in Riga and Tallinn, but also in Brussels, is not only the noble and necessary thing to do, it is also vital for the future of the Baltic and of the EU. Lithuania’s decision to open an office in Taiwan sets a precedent for Latvia and Estonia, neighbours who face similar threats from China — and Russia — and must urgently address similar vulnerabilities at home.
At the same time, Beijing’s proactive public diplomacy throughout the pandemic, including mask diplomacy, served as a wake-up call urging member states to start cooperating, instead of competing with each other, to address the China ‘threat’. Unfettered access to the European market, technology and education institutions has facilitated China’s efforts to leverage its position inside the bloc and undermine its democracy. In this time of crisis, China’s actions towards Europe have both amplified fractures across the bloc and proved to be a catalyst for talks on developing a more “geopolitical Europe”. In 2020, the intelligence services of the three Baltic countries each raised growing concerns about hostile Chinese activities, in addition to threats coming from Russia. For the first time, Lithuanian intelligence has warned of China’s increasing espionage inside the country, with Chinese intelligence services looking for targets on the social networking site LinkedIn to connect with Lithuanian citizens.
Awareness of Chinese — and Russian — threats of disinformation, fake news and cyber warfare has increased overall on an EU level, leading Brussels to take concrete measures. In a high-level report released in June, the EU, for the first time, named China, in addition to Russia, a source of online disinformation linked to the coronavirus aimed at undermining Western democracies, sowing internal divisions and projecting a distorted view of China’s response to the pandemic.
17+1 no more?
Today, the future of the CEE-China framework — counting 17 members with the addition of Greece since 2019 — appears to be in dire straits. Already, in July 2019, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said that China’s investment in the Port of Klaipėda presented national security risks, in addition to its “huge environmental impact”. Early this year, Lithuania announced it would leave the framework, and expand links with Taiwan. The announcement, followed by the government’s submission of a proposal to the parliament to amend the Law on Civil Service and remove restrictions to sending a trade representative to Taipei, is telling of the nadir bilateral relations have hit after their apparent zenith just a few years earlier.
“Looking to the future, Lithuania will develop its relations with the PRC via bilateral format and EU-China or, in other words, 27+1 format. In search of new markets in Asia, Lithuania now sees South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as potential partners”, said Laima Liucija Andrikienė, Member of the Seimas, former Member of the European Parliament. Lithuania’s departure decision is not one Beijing must have received lightly. Connectivity based on physical and digital infrastructure sits at the heart of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its world vision, one competing with the existing transparent, rules-based order. Given the CEE’s geostrategic importance to China’s global ambitions, ensuring that the framework keeps developing and, most importantly, is resilient, is expected to remain a key priority for Beijing, but not one without challenges.
Sino-Lithuanian ties today are therefore in a drastically different place compared to the 2016 Riga summit; in March 2021, Lithuania was one of the six EU member states that decided to send ministers instead of their heads of state or government to the 17+1 summit. That same month, in the tit-for-tat sanctions spat between the EU and China over human rights violations in Xinjiang, Member of Parliament Dovilė Šakalienė and three Lithuanian diplomats, including Aušra Semaškienė, Ambassador-at-Large at Lithuania’s Permanent Representation to the EU, found themselves sanctioned by Beijing. The Chinese embassy to Lithuania also condemned the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs’ discussion of the issue as “an anti-China farce choreographed by some anti-China individuals intended to smear China”.
All this is telling of an important shift away from the Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation that Vilnius had subscribed to, alongside Tallinn and Riga. But what does this change involve for Lithuania’s standing in a highly vulnerable region? What does it mean for Beijing, Brussels, and Taipei?
Vilnius, the valiant
After years of Beijing under-delivering on its promises, Vilnius taking a tough and principled stance on China is of strategic importance for Lithuania’s place and voice inside the EU. Vilnius has spoken up against China’s divisive tactics by denouncing its disinformation operations. By announcing its departure from the 17+1 framework and planning to move closer to democratic Taiwan, it has also chosen to act in defence of its interests, democracy, and the transparency underpinning its governance system. In fact, by withstanding threats coming from both China and Russia at the EU’s northeast border, the Baltic countries are not only defending their interests but also those of the EU. This is of strategic importance for the integrity and security of the bloc and deserves more attention in Brussels.
Keeping this in mind, the EU must remain mindful of the wider strategic implications of China acquiring a controlling stake in Lithuania’s port, and the unwanted political influence this could secure Beijing. A greater role for Brussels in the economic and strategic planning of the Klaipėda Port, and more funds from Europe to help make the Klaipėda 2030 vision a reality, would help mitigate some of the strategic risks of increased Chinese presence in Klaipėda to the US and NATO forces’ arrival to the port. In the near future, as the EU continues to toughen its approach to China, Vilnius’ bold posture can help it amplify its voice and relevance to shaping the bloc’s China policy. Lithuania can play a more active role in Brussels and move away from a naïve and half-hearted policy to a mature, pragmatic and principled one.
Lithuania, Taiwan, and the EU — closer together?
Backing for Vilnius in Riga and Tallinn, but also in Brussels, is not only the noble and necessary thing to do, it is also vital for the future of the Baltic and of the EU. Lithuania’s decision to open an office in Taiwan sets a precedent for Latvia and Estonia, neighbours who face similar threats from China — and Russia — and must urgently address similar vulnerabilities at home. If supported broadly within the EU, Vilnius’ position will acquire further strategic value in the region and will make Lithuania shine as an example to member states who are yet to establish a presence in Taiwan. The shift in Vilnius is about Lithuania’s ambition to shape its future in a geopolitically challenging region, seeking to position itself to better deal with an aggressive Russia, assertive China, while they remain dependent on Washington for security guarantees. Backing from its peers will also help Vilnius speak with Beijing from a position of strength, and help the EU present a united front. However, beyond Lithuania-China relations, this is also about EU-China relations and about Taiwan.
As Brussels internalises its conceptual shift towards more realism regarding China, this is a strategic opportunity for the EU to begin expanding ties with Taiwan. While the EU considers Taiwan a like-minded partner, Beijing has kept Taiwan a ‘sensitive issue’ in bilateral relations. Yet, things appear to be changing towards seeing Taiwan on its merit, as a thriving democracy and technologically advanced economy that has prospered throughout a global health crisis, as opposed to seeing it through the lens of EU-China only. The European Parliament’s decision to work on its first-ever stand-alone report on Taiwan in its Foreign Affairs Committee, tabled by Swedish Conservative MEP Charlie Weimers, is a clear indication of a genuine push for change. Its members have made it clear that Europe is not China’s “punching bag”. In an initiative led by German Green MEP Reinhard Bütikofer, Chair of the EP’s EU-China delegation and now sanctioned by Beijing, MEPs also called on the EU to identify pragmatic workarounds to allow the full practical inclusion of Taiwan in the WHO.
With a democratically elected government, and as a member of the WTO, Taiwan has the right to conduct trade cooperation with countries across the world. It is therefore the right thing to do for the European Commission to launch, as soon as possible, an impact assessment of a Bilateral Investment Agreement with Taiwan, as several MEPs have urged. In the meantime, as Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation is likely to persist, Vilnius and Taipei should both encourage a sister city partnership between their ports, Klaipėda and Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s largest harbour. Together, the two ports could engage in global sister city networks and position themselves strategically as actors in their own right, while helping to circumvent Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation and assisting Lithuania in moving closer to Taiwan.
City diplomacy is a valuable tool to help identify smart solutions that balance the use of technology with privacy protection and transparency. With Klaipėda as the European Youth Capital of 2021, this is a unique opportunity to connect with the youth of Taiwan and encourage younger generations on both sides, to actively shape their future in the spirit of cooperation, solidarity, and shared democratic values. Taiwan has demonstrated that with the right policies it is possible to thrive both economically and politically in the midst of a health emergency. Lithuania has shown that a principled foreign policy is possible. The time is right for Lithuania and Taiwan to take their cooperation to the next level.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy PhD is author of ‘Europe, China, and the Limits of Normative Power’ (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), Affiliated Scholar at the Department of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Consultant on China and Korean Peninsula at Human Rights Without Frontiers, former political advisor in the European Parliament (2008-2020). She is a Non-Resident Fellow at Taiwan NextGen Foundation and Head of the Associate Network at 9DASHLINE. Image credit: Wikimedia.