India and the EU: Small steps through summits
India and the EU: Small steps through summits
WRITTEN BY CHIRAYU THAKKAR
21 May 2021
As Europe concedes the ‘rise of Asia’ as a major trend in global politics, it is imperative for the European Union (EU) to turn eastwards. Correspondingly, as India emerges in the international order, it needs to negotiate its rise with extant political and economic power centres like Brussels. Although India and the EU have engaged continually through the Annual India-EU Summits since 2000, its latest iteration on 8 May 2021 — conducted virtually because of the pandemic and amidst the devastating second wave of the coronavirus in India — had an unprecedented global context.
Pressing issues such as post-Brexit trade, health cooperation, post-pandemic recovery, China’s rise, the renewed emphasis on the Indo-Pacific as a strategic theatre, and climate change exigencies will overwrite the existing agenda comprising political, economic, and developmental cooperation. Brussels and New Delhi have set out an ambitious “Roadmap to 2025” to enhance their partnership to a strategic one and instituted 31 bilateral dialogues to that end. This India-EU Summit was also the first time an Indian leader participated along with all 27 European leaders. India and the EU should continue building their strategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific, minimise friction on outstanding political issues, and place additional emphasis on trade and climate change.
Strategic convergence: Indo-Pacific
It took some time for the EU’s strategic community to accept the Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept and a brewing political reality. Initially, just three Western European countries — France, Germany, and the Netherlands — embraced the idea through their versions of an Indo-Pacific policy. Some believe the EU is not yet prepared for a collective Indo-Pacific policy given the differences between the Western and Eastern blocs on how to engage with China. Beijing continues to engage the Euro-sceptic governments of Central and Eastern Europe (politically and economically) through sub-regional formats, which many consider a ‘wedge strategy’ to subvert a cohesive geopolitical stance by the EU.
Regardless of such efforts by Beijing, the Council of the European Union recently approved a joint “EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” with a focus on advancing the EU’s political, economic, defence, and connectivity interests in the region. Even before Brussels launched this formal policy, it instituted the “India-EU Maritime Dialogue”, hinting at the seriousness of maritime security on both sides. The policy announcement means the EU is now on board with additional issues ranging from resilient supply chains to stable and secure cyberspace in Asia. However, in practice, the EU’s commitment may differ widely based on the Union’s ability to overcome internal contradictions between member states and the mobilisation of corresponding resources.
Even though there would remain a considerable gap between the EU’s policy commitment to the Indo-Pacific and actual maritime efforts, India should appreciate and build upon the moral strength that the policy brings to multilateral efforts.
For New Delhi, there is little to celebrate with the EU’s newfound commitment to the Indo-Pacific. First, the policy remains timid in embracing India compared to the US’ “Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific”. That framework unequivocally professes that India’s “preferred partner on security issues is the United States” and that “India remains preeminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean security”. Given Europe’s trade dependency on China, it seems that Brussels is not willing to upset the apple cart with Beijing. It seems that the EU is still not prepared for an unambiguous tilt towards New Delhi (unlike Washington).
The treaty does not denounce China as an adversary, and Brussels has not given up on its efforts to ratify the EU-China investment treaty. Second, the EU’s resolve for a free and open Indo-Pacific would be tested since Europe no longer boasts its previous naval supremacy (with the exception of France, Germany, and Italy). Of the three, France and Germany are already invested in the Indo-Pacific theatre through their navigational forays into the South China Sea, joint military exercises with India or Japan, and other forms of defence cooperation, all of which are independent of the EU’s position. Still, it is a welcome move compared to no policy at all as the EU’s common Indo-Pacific orientation offers huge political gravitas in the multilateral domain of rulemaking, if not rule-defending, in the high seas. Moreover, as India’s envoy to the EU recently hinted, both side’s geopolitical cosiness would have a spillover effect in other areas such as trade.
Calibrating focus: Diplomatic tensions
From time to time, the European Parliament has become a theatre for rivalry between India and Pakistan. After New Delhi eliminated the autonomy of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, the European Parliament’s ensuing debate about India’s handling of the domestic situation, mostly partisan, tempered the warmth of diplomatic relations. A subsequent parliamentary resolution in Strasbourg on India’s revised citizenship law (although put off at the last minute) further embittered relations. New Delhi feels these are not objective debates as they are considered a product of Islamabad’s outreach through Members of the European Parliament of Pakistani origin.
On the other hand, Pakistan too blames India’s diplomacy for the showdown it faces in Brussels. For instance, Pakistan’s leadership was quick to blame Indian efforts for the EU’s recently adopted motion to review trade ties over Pakistan’s blasphemy laws enabling persecution of minorities. These non-binding resolutions and one-upmanship games drain the diplomatic goodwill necessary to forward the overall agenda. If New Delhi and Brussels are to strengthen their partnership, it is imperative to tap into areas of immediate cooperation, including trade and climate change, while the dialogue on mutually shared values and contentious political issues continues.
Immediate cooperation: Trade and climate change
Trade remains the most significant agenda item for both sides and currently stands at USD$115.6 billion, roughly balanced between them. The figure remains suboptimal due to bilateral tariff barriers and regulatory differences. With the departure of the UK from the EU, India’s exports to the EU will shrink by 16 per cent this year. Following India’s departure from the China-led RCEP and the European Union’s Brexit loss, both sides are trying to scout new markets to expand trade. India is on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences, which is likely to continue after the review in 2023. The suboptimal trade outcome between India and the EU is not merely limited to tariff barriers, but also includes a host of policy and regulatory challenges, as both sides frankly noted in their most recent ministerial interaction.
Earlier attempts at drawing a long-winding and ambitious free trade agreement came to a standstill after 16 rounds of talks between 2007 and 2013, given both side’s inability to eliminate barriers and adjust to mutual policy realities. The situation has grown complex since the new regulatory instruments such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) affects the entire range of IT services. Given the wide chasm between policy and regulatory frameworks, both sides should commit to a long-term plan to incrementally expand market access through annual benchmarks or periodic ‘early harvest deals’.
As both the EU and India remain strongly committed to the Paris Climate Agreement, attending to climate change is a natural point of convergence. Several EU member states also individually support India’s flagship International Solar Alliance (ISA). At the 14th India-EU Summit in 2017, the European Investment Bank (EIB) extended around USD$965 million in financial support to the ISA. Even though both do not share the same understanding of climate mitigation responsibilities, it has not prevented the EU from cooperating with India. While EU states collectively lag behind India in meeting their professed climate goals, it can help expedite India’s journey by availing itself of vital technologies, such as efficient storage and mobility solutions for renewables, which are critical for a cleaner transition.
Inching forward
After decades of neglect, the coming together of New Delhi and Brussels to forge a robust partnership is a welcome move as there remains untapped potential for strategic convergence and shared prosperity. Even though there would remain a considerable gap between the EU’s policy commitment to the Indo-Pacific and actual maritime efforts, India should appreciate and build upon the moral strength that the policy brings to multilateral efforts. As the large South Asian diaspora remains politically active and relays regional conflicts to European capitals through their advocacy, the European Parliament will continue to be a theatre of India-Pakistan rivalry. Allowing political bickering to prevent greater strides in actionable areas such as trade and climate change is certainly not useful.
Recent summits have advanced bilateral causes and ensured concrete deliverables with reports indicating likely first steps towards a broad digital and physical connectivity agreement. To realise the full potential, sustained engagement through annual dialogues at the highest level would prove vital.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Chirayu Thakkar is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at the National University of Singapore. He is simultaneously working for the Margaret Anstee Center and the University of Cambridge as an independent researcher on India's foreign aid in Africa. He has also worked as a political consultant. This article was first published in South Asian Voices and has been republished with the permission of the editor. Image credit: European Union, 2021.