Qin Gang — 9DASHLINE

Written by Lyle J. Morris

Corruption in China’s military is not a case of a “few bad apples”. Rather, it is indicative of a PLA that has systemic problems with corruption whereby kickbacks and buying and selling of promotions have been standard practice for decades.

East Asia9DLMarch 25, 20249dashline, lyle J morris, Corruption in the PLA and Xi’s purge, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Chinese President Xi Jinping, China-watching community, National People’s Congress (NPC), PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), China’s conventional and nuclear missile programme, Gen. Ding Laihang, PLA Air Force, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Liu Shiquan, China North Industries Group, China Aerospace Science, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp, chair of weapons manufacturer China North Industries Group, China Aerospace Science & Industry Corp executive Wang Changqing, Defence Minister, Li Shangfu, Qin Gang, national security violations, Wu Guohua, the deputy commander of the PLARF, General Armaments Department, Major General Li Mingquan, General Equipment Support Department of the General Armaments Department, EDD, PLARF, SOE, Lin Biao, CIA, Inner Mongolia, Sino-Soviet border conflict, Cold War, Mao, Directive 1, Directive 2, James Mulvenon, graft, military readiness, China’s nuclear strategy, PLA leadership, whistle blower, whistle-blower, China’s military bureaucracy, corruption, i’s senior technocrats, Xi’s purge and corruption in the PLA

US-China in 2024: One year after the spy balloon incident

Written by Rorry Daniels

While breakthroughs remain unlikely, the test in 2024 is whether the US and China can manage differences quietly and directly while under the political magnifying glass.

Faultlines9DLMarch 12, 2024US-China in 2024: One year after the spy balloon incident, 9DASHLINE, Rorry Daniels, US-China relationship, China, US, United States, balloon, spy balloon, Chinese surveillance, espionage, US-China diplomatic interaction, US elections, Taiwan, spy balloon incident, Biden administration, Joe Biden, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Beijing, bureaucracies, domestic politics, homeland security, bipartisan consensus, Washington, Xi Jinping, propaganda, state-driven, 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, Gaza, Middle East, NATO, Ukraine, Xi Jinping’s inner circle, US sanctions, Qin Gang, Li Shangfu, COVID recovery, authoritarianism, co-exist peacefully, free market principles, diversification, hedging, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, cross-Strait, US presidential and congressional elections, diplomacy, Taipei, non-proliferation, humanitarian aid

No land in sight: Prospects of a South China Sea Code of Conduct

Written by Dr Apila Sangtam

The differing stances on the legal nature of the COC and China's assertive actions in contested waters pose significant obstacles to reaching a comprehensive and effective agreement.

Southeast Asia9DLAugust 3, 20239DashLine, Apila Sangtam, ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference with China, ASEAN, China, Jakarta, Code of Conduct (COC), south china sea, Wang Yi, Qin Gang, Beijing, Vietnam, Johnson Reef, the Philippines, Mischief Reef, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), Ian Storey, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, Arbitration Tribunal under Annex VII of UNCLOS, UNCLOS, Spratly Islands, Le Thu Huong, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Arbitral Tribunal's Award in 2016, nine-dash line, international law, Li Keqiang, 37th ASEAN Summit, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Covid-19 pandemic, Myanmar, 2021 military coup, v, transnational crime, marine environmental protection, maritime safety, oil and gas, militarising, Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), Paracel Islands, Hanoi, 2016 South China Sea Award, grey zone, Chinese fishing boats, Chinese research vessel, No land in sight: Prospects for the South China Sea Code of Conduct, Nine Dash Line

China refuses to ‘acknowledge’ US one-China policy

Written by Pak K. Lee and Anisa Heritage

In order to minimise the chances of conflict with Beijing, Washington must now clarify its one-China policy rather than maintain strategic ambiguity over the matter of Taiwan’s indeterminate status.