Strategic competition in the South Pacific and its implications for New Zealand

4 October 2023

“Our region is now a strategic theatre”

New Zealand Government, Defence Policy and Strategy Statement, August 2023

The global strategic landscape is rapidly evolving, with major implications for the South Pacific’s and New Zealand’s interests. At the macro level, the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific regions are splitting into two ‘security orders’ — a strengthening web of alliances led by the US and a looser alliance led by China. In a self-reinforcing ‘tit-for-tat’ cycle, the strategic competition between these orders is leading to deeper levels of cooperation between their respective members.

Consider: in response to Russia and China’s announcement of a ‘no limits’ partnership just twenty days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US accelerated its drive to tighten its alliances (and encourage networking between US allies independent of Washington) with the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and South Korea — including Biden hosting a historic trilateral summit at Camp David with Japan and South Korea’s presidents where, for the first time, they declared their security to be intertwined. A new alliance is also being forged with Papua New Guinea (PNG) to allow the US military to move freely throughout PNG’s territory. In exchange, the US will help PNG develop its own defence forces.

In response to these developments, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that the US and its allies were implementing “all-round containment, containment and suppression on our country, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our development”. Unsurprisingly, greater US-led collaborations are generating counter-collaboration between China and its partners, with Chinese and Russian naval and air forces conducting exercises, and South Africa joining them for a 10-day joint military exercise along South Africa’s east coast. Meanwhile, Iran and Russian defence ties are advancing; Moscow and Tehran are coordinating with the Syrian regime to expel US forces from Syria; and the North Korean leader recently travelled to Russia to discuss defence cooperation, food, and energy trade.

The South Pacific – Moving towards a geopolitical shatterbelt

What does this mean for New Zealand (NZ)? According to its government, the South Pacific region is now “a strategic theatre” of interstate competition. In short, the US and Chinese strategic competition is now extending into the South Pacific and we are seeing a similar ‘tit-for-tat’ spiral play out. At worst, strategic competition will result in a ‘shatterbelt’ — a region internally divided where great powers actively compete for advantage. In such a scenario, parts of the South Pacific would be pulled into competing spheres of influence. Southeast Asia was one such region throughout the Cold War, and the Middle East remains one today.

While China’s activities are concerning, it should be made clear to Beijing that NZ’s and others’ responses in the security sphere are dependent on China’s approach to the region.

In this context, Wellington has declared that Beijing is growing “its political, economic, and security influence in the Pacific at the expense [italics added] of more traditional partners, such as New Zealand and Australia”. This is a marked change from only a few years ago when NZ considered China to be a potential security partner in the region. What has changed is China’s efforts to expand its influence in the region beyond trade, aid, and diplomacy into the security sphere. This became clear in April 2022, when China signed a security agreement with Solomon Islands that could give way to a military presence — in March 2023, a Chinese firm won a contract to redevelop the port in Honiara. In June 2022, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi toured the region, seeking a regional agreement with ten island countries — the agreement included policing and cyber security provisions. In response, NZ’s then-Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said it was an effort by China “to increase its engagement with sovereign nations, but expanding into a space — the need around security arrangements [italics added] — that we are able to meet within our region”.

Upon hearing of Wang’s visit to the Pacific Island nations, Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong flew to Fiji to dissuade them from signing the pact. The agreement was not signed and was replaced by several bilateral agreements that did not feature policing or cyber. Nonetheless, the planned regional agreement confirmed a pattern of China seeking a stronger security foothold in the area.

NZ has been responding, and Minister of Defence Andrew Little signed a new military Status of Forces agreement with Fiji in June. Fiji justified the agreement by declaring their desire to lean closer to countries with “democratic values”, freezing a police cooperation agreement (signed by the previous Fijian government) with China after just a single year. Furthermore, as part of the NZ government’s ongoing defence review, its Defence Policy and Strategy Statement announced in August 2023 that the NZ Defence Force will be rejuvenated into a “combat-capable” force able to “act early and deliberately to shape our security environment, focusing on supporting security in and for the Pacific”. This will include “proactive shaping activities” to “prevent conflict and activities that threaten our interests”. It went on to declare that “a primary defence goal will be to prevent states that do not share New Zealand’s interests and values from establishing or normalising a military or paramilitary presence in our region”. This places NZ’s objectives in the region squarely at odds with China’s.

The government plans to announce the next steps in its defence review in 2024 — with the replacement of the entire navy likely. Meanwhile, the aforementioned US security agreement with PNG — a state located directly west of Solomon Islands — looks like a response by Washington to China’s growing ties with the Solomons. Notably, Solomon Islands leader Manasseh Sogavare has suggested that his country — like PNG — should now develop its own armed forces. While an inadequate police force was cited as the motivating reason, Sogavare also said that “China is responding” to his country's security needs.

This suggests the self-reinforcing ‘tit-for-tat’ cycle underway at the global level between US and Chinese partners is extending into the South Pacific.

As the region becomes more contested, the tempo of visits from external players to the South Pacific is increasing. For example the Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation and the US–Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ dialogue both took place in May in PNG, and in the same month Japan’s foreign minister visited Solomon Islands and South Korea held its first Korea–Pacific Islands Summit. In July, President Emmanuel Macron of France visited Vanuatu. Fortunately, these states all share NZ’s basic vision of a stable region governed by the rule-of-law.

Where to now?

The above confirms the South Pacific region is now “a strategic theatre” and risks becoming a shatterbelt. NZ should do everything it can to avoid this outcome, and the government’s defence review is a logical step. Much more will be needed. NZ should pool resources and coordinate responses with like-minded partners (the US, Australia, Japan, South Korea, France, and India) in a manner that responds directly to the needs of the Pacific islands. This necessitates, alongside military considerations, an expansive conception of security that emphasises human security, cyber and environmental security, economic and governance challenges.

While China’s activities are concerning, it should be made clear to Beijing that NZ’s and others’ responses in the security sphere are dependent on China’s approach to the region. There remains time — should all players be willing — to step back from the intensifying strategic competition underway.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Reuben Steff is Senior Lecturer of Geopolitics and International Relations at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. Prior to his time in academia, he spent 2.5 years working in the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His research includes Great Power Competition, emerging technologies, nuclear deterrence theory, and NZ geopolitics. He has publications in multiple journals and has authored four books. His forthcoming book is Indo-Pacific Geopolitics in an era of Intensifying Great Power Competition: A New Zealand Security Strategy Perspective (Routledge, 2024). He regularly participates in policy development processes (for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Defence, and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet), attends Academic-Government Roundtables on national security issues, and participates in track 1.5 and track 2 dialogues. Image credit: Unsplash/Nico Smit.