Indian Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region: Security and stature

9 June 2021

Australia and Japan recently posted liaison officers to the Indian Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), where a US liaison officer has served since 2019. IFC-IOR, a maritime information hub initiated by India, brings all Quad members under one roof to exchange vital maritime information in the IOR. New Delhi has deliberately divorced promoting the IFC-IOR from the Quad as it does not want to limit the project’s appeal, but its initial uptake among Quad countries signals their collective interest in a stable and secure IOR.

The fusion centre emboldens India’s role as a ‘net security provider’ in the IOR as envisaged in the US’ strategic framework as well as in India’s self-conception. According to India’s Maritime Security Strategy of 2015, this net security provider role entails a goal of shaping a favourable and secure maritime environment for India’s interests and for others who actively share the global commons. India’s geopolitical positioning and decades of operational experience in the Indian Ocean position it as the most suitable country for this role.

In accordance with its rising international profile and in order to meet its strategic interests, it is critical that India does the necessary heavy lifting to maintain a stable maritime order in the IOR. Information sharing through IFC-IOR on a real-time basis is an essential step towards maritime stability for both commercial and strategic purposes. Going forward, the IFC-IOR needs to prove its utility to all countries that employ IOR sea lanes for the transit of vital goods and enhance its technical ability beyond white shipping data to ensure total security of the high seas.

Maritime information hub

The perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack entered India’s financial capital through a coastal access point using a stolen vessel, which exposed lapses in coastal security and surveillance. In the aftermath, India instituted the Information Management and Analysis Centre for intra-agency information coordination, especially between the country’s navy and coast guard, the two principal agencies with the mandate for coastal security. This endeavour equipped India with the technical know-how to monitor coastal waters, aggregate and assess information, and disseminate it across 51 nodes responsible for various phases of security. In a subsequent step, India installed a Coastal Radar Surveillance System (CSRS) across friendly nations in the Indian Ocean littoral, including Seychelles, Mauritius, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, to monitor a broader swathe of the ocean.

By shouldering the vital responsibility of maritime domain awareness through the dissemination of critical information, India is gearing towards enhancing the stability of the high seas and raising its global stature.

With this capacity in place, India was prepared to go international. India first announced its intention to host a joint Information Fusion Centre to strengthen maritime domain awareness at the 2017 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Summit in Jakarta. However, any attempt to institute a multilateral centre under the aegis of IORA would have been challenging as it would require bringing countries as diverse as Iran and Australia to work together on such a project despite IORA partner countries signing some good-intentioned memoranda.

Eventually, India decided to establish a maritime information hub in 2018 that it would open to international partners, assuming that such a project would invite interest from key Indian Ocean players in the future. Most littoral countries with some naval capabilities usually have information processing centres, but those are limited in scope to national security. India’s IFC-IOR joins the rank of successful regional initiatives, such as the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, which support regional operations with reliable and real-time information to multiple stakeholders.

In its first three years, IFC-IOR has secured white shipping agreements with 36 countries and three multilateral constructs. It can host up to 40 International Liaison Officers (ILOs). Currently, Australia, the US, France, Singapore and Japan have their ILOs in place and a total of 13 friendly countries have been invited to join. Among other things, the IFC-IOR monitors thousands of vessels a month (average 36,830 in 2020) and produces a monthly summary and analysis of maritime security incidents across all four major sectors of the Indian Ocean.

Next steps and challenges

By instituting IFC-IOR, India has signalled to its partners that it is willing to shoulder the security burden and that it has adequate capacity to do so. However, a few steps would strengthen India’s resolve and prepare it for future challenges.

First, the primary tracking of vessel movement is based on AIS transponders that are mandated by the International Maritime Organisation for all vehicles of 300 gross tonnage and above. For smaller vessels, including those used in criminal activities, the reliability of data depends on satellite imagery and India’s CSRS installed across the IOR. Here, India not only needs to invest immensely in monitoring technology and capacity building but also partner with like-minded countries to enhance both fronts.

Second, the data is sourced from multiple sources and integrated at IFC. Integrating the data in a uniform system and making it accessible for timely interpretation will remain an area for continuous improvement. Third, the Indian navy would need to continually evolve and reinvent itself as the threat profile of the IOR becomes increasingly complex. For instance, in its first report, IFC classified incidents into six categories but has since added two new categories — Natural Events, and Environmental Security.

Fourth, although starting with white shipping information is a laudable first step, the future of security depends on tracking strategic vessels and sub-surface vehicles. To meet this goal, India would require the technical prowess of international partners and a strong commitment from the international comity for transparency and free movement of global maritime traffic. All stakeholders must agree to the principle that subterfuge cannot have space in the management of IOR as a global common, which would require the collective to stand up to Beijing if necessary.

Finally, by producing reliable insights through this project, the Indian Navy needs to prove its efficacy and utility to all those countries that remain commercially and strategically invested in this region. It can learn from best practices adopted by its counterparts in the US, Madagascar, and Singapore, all of whom are friendly countries and would be willing to help India make this a state-of-the-art centre.

With this centre becoming a part of India’s critical infrastructure, it also needs to take issues like cybersecurity quite seriously. The project’s credibility depends on its ability to withstand cyber-attacks from inimical forces who have earlier targeted critical infrastructure in India both to disrupt its functioning and dent the country’s image.

Proving its worth

As the centre proves its utility, those reluctant to partner with it at this early stage would be more likely to reconsider their choices in the future. Since it is in India’s interest to broaden the alliance of countries who are interested in a peaceful and stable IOR, the country should avoid any framing of this idea as anti-China as that would make many countries reluctant to partner by sharing information or sending liaison officers.

The role of net security provider involves many critical functions, ranging from maritime deterrence to stability of the region. Information collating and processing is a small yet crucial step in that direction. The strategic acceptance and purchase of the Indo-Pacific internationally might take some time. However, the stability of the IOR for its commercial viability is already a given for the world. By shouldering the vital responsibility of maritime domain awareness through the dissemination of critical information, India is gearing towards enhancing the stability of the high seas and raising its global stature.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Chirayu Thakkar is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at the National University of Singapore. He is simultaneously working for the Margaret Anstee Center and the University of Cambridge as an independent researcher on India's foreign aid in Africa. He has also worked as a political consultant. This article was first published in South Asian Voices and has been republished with the permission of the editor. Image credit: Wikipedia.