UK and Japan consolidate their ties in the Indo-Pacific

28386226189_43f5f67456_o+%281%29.jpg — UK and Japan consolidate their ties in the Indo-Pacific

4 March 2021

Earlier this month, foreign and defence secretaries from the United Kingdom and Japan came together to discuss their respective countries’ geostrategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Drawing off their Joint Statement from 2017, the four ministers reiterated that “Japan and the UK are each other’s closest security partners in Asia and Europe respectively, with shared values and common strategic interests”. This relationship has grown so close that some analysts have described it as a ‘quasi-alliance’ or have drawn parallels with the Anglo-Japanese alliance of the early twentieth century.

It should therefore come as no surprise that the ministers discussed the upcoming deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth, the Royal Navy’s giant new aircraft carrier, to the Indo-Pacific — a tour that is due to get underway later this year. They agreed that the British carrier strike group would undertake naval drills with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force, one of Asia’s largest and most powerful navies, as it reaches the Japanese home islands.

The United Kingdom tilts toward the Indo-Pacific

They also, no-doubt, discussed the contents of Britain’s much-anticipated Integrated [Strategic] Review, which is due to be published in March. As Dominic Raab, the UK Foreign Secretary told a hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Commons in October last year, the Integrated Review is likely to accelerate what is being described in London as Britain’s ‘tilt’ towards the Indo-Pacific.

For Japan, drawing Britain, a global power, into the region provides an additional layer of security above and beyond that provided by the United States. Although the UK may not be the superpower it once was, the Royal Navy still has assets that only the US Navy can match.

For some months, newspaper headlines have implied that HMS Queen Elizabeth’s foray into the Indo-Pacific region is an exceptional development. If truth be told, however, the UK has long been an Indo-Pacific power. Although Britain pivoted away from the region during the Cold War to focus more on the Euro-Atlantic area to contain the Soviet Union, it nonetheless retained a sizable Indo-Pacific presence. In part, it used this to underpin the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand.

Britain’s presence is manifested through a ‘geostrategic array’ of military and logistical facilities, including those located on British overseas territories, as well as those hosted by foreign governments. Stretching from the Sovereign Bases on Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean through to the Gulf, this array also includes the vast UK-US facilities on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Sembawang wharf in Singapore and a Jungle Training Centre in Brunei, as well as recruitment stations for the Ghurkas in Nepal.

This array is not a motley collection of imperial relics, but a dynamic and changing set of facilities, continually adapting to new needs and requirements. Recent additions include upgrades to the British naval station in Bahrain and the opening of a so-called ‘logistics hub’ in Duqm, Oman, which will enable the Royal Navy to service its largest vessels, including the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.

Indeed, so broad is this presence that the UK could lay claim to being the Indo-Pacific’s leading external power. After all, courtesy of its Pacific coast, Hawaii, and other territories, the US is actually located in the Indo-Pacific, in a way that Britain, despite its overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific oceans, is not. That the UK has geostrategic reach into the Indo-Pacific has surely not been lost on Japan, which remains dependent on the Middle East for over three-quarters of its oil imports.

The deepening UK-Japan relationship

The rise of China has given the UK-Japan partnership a renewed purpose. China’s dramatic military build-up in the South China Sea and Belt and Road Initiative together threaten Japan insofar as Beijing would be placed at the centre of a new Asian order, with its hand firmly around the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Like Vietnam, Japan was pleased in August 2018 when the Royal Navy became the only navy other than the US Navy to directly challenge China’s illegitimate maritime claims in the South China Sea with a maritime manoeuvre resembling what the Americans would call a ‘Freedom of Navigation Operation’.

Likewise, closer relations with Japan make sense for Britain, particularly as relations between London and Beijing have continued to sour over China’s mishandling of the Covid-19 crisis, its crack-down on Hong Kong, the incarceration of Uyghurs in concentration camps, and Chinese ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy against smaller Indo-Pacific countries.

At the same time, both the UK and Japan have been committed to deeper relations for over a decade, irrespective of China. They accelerated as Britain and China looked to a ‘golden era’ of relations. In 2012, London and Tokyo agreed to cooperate on military procurement, a first for Japan insofar as it had reserved such cooperation (previously banned under Japan’s constitution) exclusively to the United States. From 2016 cooperation deepened, as Royal Air Force Typhoons visited Japan, Royal Navy warships exercised with Japanese vessels in the Indian Ocean, and the British Army trained with the Self-Defence Force on the Japanese home islands.

Last year, London and Tokyo struck a Free Trade Agreement, which both agreed would act as a precursor to British membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP). This follows a deeper British economic shift after Brexit as UK officials have sought to develop additional trade pacts with India, Australia, and a host of other regional countries, while also seeking ‘dialogue partner’ status with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

A willingness to do what’s necessary

Closer relations between Japan and the UK therefore continue to make sense. London understands that if Britain is to prosper in the twenty-first century, the Indo-Pacific, as the engine for the global economy, will be central to its success. For Japan, drawing Britain, a global power, into the region provides an additional layer of security above and beyond that provided by the United States. Although the UK may not be the superpower it once was, the Royal Navy still has assets that only the US Navy can match. With its recent defence boost, Britain has signalled that it will do what is necessary to uphold a free and open international system — the very order that has enabled Japan to prosper.

So, as Britain ‘tilts’ further towards the Indo-Pacific in the years ahead, Tokyo will likely find in London a willing partner. But strengthened cooperation will also depend on Japan’s acceptance of British efforts to build a more durable Indo-Pacific order. Without attempts to align those whose interests are to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific, the revisionists will inevitably prevail. Despite her size and firepower, HMS Queen Elizabeth and her strike group will not alone deter threats to the peace, but only as part of a broader and deeper effort. Straddling either side of Eurasia, Britain and Japan, in cooperation with the US, India and Australia, are well placed to deter revisionists.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

James Rogers is Co-Founder of the Council on Geostrategy, a new think tank established in London. His research interests include Britain’s global role and the geopolitical interplay between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. Image credit: Flickr/IndoGibraltar.