2022: The Quad, AUKUS and the future Indo-Pacific

The reinvigoration of the Quad and the announcement of AUKUS last year have been a subject of much consternation and debate. While they signal renewed diplomatic energy on Washington’s part, questions remain whether these initiatives will translate to meaningful policy and if they will promote or hinder a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy.

Here, 9DASHLINE invites a select group of experts to explore how these security arrangements may evolve this year.

THE QUAD’S FUTURE HINGES ON INDIA

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan — Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, India.

The rationale of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was to bring in India as a key player because the other three members of the Quad are in any case alliance partners. The US and Australia are now part of AUKUS which is a significant step for their Indo-Pacific partnership. Similarly, the US and Japan are alliance partners and so it opens several channels to step up their cooperation.

But the Quad’s future remains somewhat uncertain, mainly because India is still not entirely off the fence when it comes to its great power relations. The Quad’s future is tied to how India wants to proceed. New Delhi continues to want to maintain some form of ‘strategic autonomy’, though the term itself is no longer in vogue in Indian foreign policy pronouncements.

However, the current border crisis with China could set the tone for the Quad. If India and China are not able to resolve the border crisis in an amicable manner, India could become more active within the Quad. India is also a weak link given its continuing affection for Russia, despite Moscow’s criticism of the Quad and India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Though we can expect some progress, the shape and speed of the Quad will depend on India’s enthusiasm, which is uncertain.

THE QUAD RISKS LOSING FOCUS

Murray Hiebert — Senior Associate, Southeast Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, US.

Multiple concepts of the Quad, involving Australia, India, Japan and the US, have been proposed and floated, risking including so many countries and so many different priorities that it risks losing focus. Initially, when the Quad was rebooted in 2017, it was intended largely as a regional cooperative grouping in response to China’s increasing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. As the Quad evolved, it became largely a strategic dialogue focused on health, infrastructure, and technological challenges through a security prism.

When the Quad Plus was mooted in 2020, it began inviting other countries like South Korea and Vietnam to its meetings, later adding Brazil and Israel to discuss a global response to COVID-19. Quad Plus was intended to connect its four original members to other emerging powers and like-minded partners such as the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Quad’s initiatives over the past year have expanded to include supply chains, semiconductors, cybersecurity, clean energy and high-quality infrastructure. But with too many priorities, the Quad risks losing its focus. The proliferating Quad proposals have created heartburn for ASEAN countries. They fear that the grouping will detract from their vision of a regional architecture built on ASEAN centrality, and ultimately will be too focused on combating China, the most important economic partner for most ASEAN nations.

The bungled rollout of the AUKUS trilateral security agreement last year further fanned ASEAN fears about new mini-lateral mechanisms undermining the grouping’s multilateral regional role. Many ASEAN countries are also concerned that the Quad is too security-focused.

They would like to see more economic initiatives, including on infrastructure, to balance China’s growing role with the Belt and Road Initiative and more recently under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement. Japan is hosting Quad leaders in the first half of 2022, which could lead to the grouping developing more economic heft thanks to Tokyo’s focus on high-quality infrastructure.

PUBLICITY AND RUFFLED FEATHERS BUT NOT MUCH SUBSTANCE — YET

Rebecca Strating — Executive Director of La Trobe Asia at La Trobe University, Australia.

In September 2021, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom signed the historic ‘AUKUS’ trilateral security partnership. At the heart of the deal is technology sharing, with the aim of deepening cooperation, joint capability, and interoperability between the states. However, it was the plan for Australia to build at least eight nuclear-powered submarines that dominated the news headlines.

This plan reflects a significant shift in Australia’s thinking about nuclear power, submarine requirements, and what is required to defend its maritime security interests. Yet, it was the lack of diplomacy around the scrapping of the troubled USD 90 billion submarine program it had with the French Naval Group that held the public’s interest.

In terms of planning and developing a submarine capability fit for the twenty-first-century security environment, the decision to scrap the French deal essentially reverted Australia to the early 2000s. It was declared that the states would take 18 months to make key decisions about the delivery of the submarines.

Many questions remain unanswered: how much they will cost, where they will be built, when they will be delivered, and what submarine type will serve as the model — the US Virginia class has been touted along with the Royal Navy’s Astute class. Will extending the life of the Collins class suffice until the SSNs can be delivered, or will leasing submarines be on the table?

AUKUS suggests that US leadership under Biden is intent on developing and deepening security cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific and pursuing what has become known as ‘integrated deterrence’, ie deterring China’s regional aggression by knitting together the defence capabilities of allied states.

AUKUS may help achieve this broader aim through technology and knowledge sharing, increased interoperability, and reconfiguring its force posture. Yet, at the moment, AUKUS is akin to a Memorandum of Understanding — a significant one no doubt, but one in which substantial activities will now be required to convert it into a policy and partnership of substance.

Australia appears to have been rewarded for its dependable ally status, and there have been mixed messages out of Washington about whether similar deals in nuclear submarine technology sharing might be extended to other allies in the region. It appears that other allies — such as South Korea — may push for their own deal.

As for the region: France’s leaders have been publicly dismayed at the announcement, Southeast Asian attitudes to AUKUS have been mixed, and there are serious concerns among Pacific Island states about Australia’s decision to go nuclear. Essentially, AUKUS revealed conflicting views about how a regional security order can be produced and maintained. While Australia has sought to explain itself to the region, much more work will be required to undo the damage of its clumsy diplomacy.

CARELESS DIPLOMACY ASIDE, AUKUS IS A PRODUCT OF ITS TIME

Martin Thorley — Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the College of Social Science and International Studies, University of Exeter, UK.

AUKUS is still in the very early stages of what is ultimately a multi-decade program. Those looking for progress on the nuclear-powered submarines at the centre of the deal will be disappointed for some time yet — the pact begins with an 18-month “scoping phase” before the design and build. The subs are expected to be operational in the late 2030s at the earliest.

But a pact with such potentially significant geopolitical consequences was always about more than hardware. In the short term, the most notable impact of AUKUS might be felt in Europe rather than Asia, Australasia, or North America. For all the attention on Beijing, how AUKUS was announced proved to be the most significant American misreading of France since Netflix released Emily in Paris.

One can expect 2022 to see some efforts by AUKUS member states to mend fences with France, especially after the imminent presidential election. On the theme of inclusion, one of AUKUS’ failings appears to be a lack of consultation with friendly Asian nations. The danger here is that the pact speaks to a world as it was rather than the world as it is.

Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has spoken of the potential for Japanese cooperation, and while we won’t see a JAUKUS anytime soon, perhaps we will see deeper forms of collaboration with other nations in future. Though AUKUS received a mixed reception in Australia, the majority viewed the pact positively and Labor leader Anthony Albanese confirmed he would continue with the pact if elected. In assessing its prospects, one must remember that it was not created in a vacuum.

To ignore the Chinese party-state’s conduct would be to disregard a key element in its genesis. Indeed, Beijing’s response to AUKUS included comments in a party-state mouthpiece that “China will certainly punish Australia with no mercy”. For the same reason, it is plausible that AUKUS will be viewed more favourably in member and ally states in the medium-term.

The Chinese Communist Party’s grip at home depends on its position as information gatekeeper. The Party is the armed forces and the police, education and media, judiciary and moral authority. As a result, it possesses enormous consciousness-shaping power within its territory. The chasm between that consciousness and the more typically contested arena beyond its borders will become ever more prominent.

Beijing’s treatment of Lithuania late last year — quietly observed in capital cities across the EU — is a case in point. Just as Beijing’s international conduct made AUKUS possible, it will also go some way to shaping observers’ views on whether or not the pact was necessary.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Flickr/The White House.