In Brief: Tereza Novotna — South Korea Associate at 9DASHLINE

4 February 2022

This week we are delighted to announce the arrival of Tereza Novotna as our new South Korea Associate. In joining our expanding network of associates her arrival marks the next stage of our development in seeking to connect Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

9DL: You have been focusing on the Korean Peninsula throughout your studies and professional career. You have invested years into getting to know this part of the world by spending time in Seoul, visiting the North, and gaining experience in the Brussels bubble and beyond, in Berlin, and last but not least in your home country, the Czech Republic. When and how did you develop this interest?

TN: My journey of becoming interested in the Korean Peninsula has been quite a convoluted one. I am neither a Korean literature and language scholar, nor do I have any personal links to the peninsula. My interest started when I was working on my doctorate at Boston University. In my PhD dissertation, I was comparing and contrasting the unification of Germany and Eastern enlargement of the EU as two ways how you can unify two states/political entities. I developed two models of political integration — which I called Transplantation and Adaptation — and was looking for other cases where I could apply these models.

There are several historical parallels, but in the contemporary political landscape, the Korean Peninsula is an obvious choice. Then I visited South Korea and thought I should also go to the Northern part of the peninsula, which I did in 2016 for the first time. After my visit, I became fascinated with North Korea as it partly reminded me of my homeland, Czechoslovakia, in the 1980s, while seeing huge differences. That’s where my passion for the peninsula — and especially for relations between the South and North — started.

9DL: You are familiar with the policy-making and policy input scene in Seoul, having spent hours discussing and engaging with the relevant actors on both sides. What is the issue that most interests you in covering the Korean Peninsula, and why?

TN: I am most interested in the relationships between North and South Korea, and how Europe — both the EU and individual EU member states — can help create conditions for reaching a peaceful settlement on the Korean Peninsula. I am also interested in the way in which not only the Europeans but also other actors could help improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans, given how much various external actors helped us, the Czechs, in the past. And, of course, by doing so, I would like to contribute to mutual understanding between the Koreans, both in the South and North, and the Europeans not only on a political but also human level.

9DL: Concerning your exchanges with governmental and non-governmental Korean partners, have you faced difficulties and seen positive developments in terms of mutual understanding and building cooperation through your engagements? And how has your experience been in gaining access to the most relevant actors, mindful of the sensitivity of North Korea in Seoul?

TN: Korean culture — as much as other Asian cultures — is based on cultivating relationships over time. That’s the case in Seoul, and it is even more so the case in Pyongyang. It takes time and effort to build such relationships, and sometimes, it takes a few drinks of soju. I have been working on my skills in that regard although I haven’t reached full proficiency yet. But to put it more seriously, building cooperation with Korean counterparts requires both formal and informal engagement over a long period.

I have therefore seen positive developments in that regard with both South and North Korean interlocutors. It is unfortunate that the COVID19 pandemic has thrown a spanner into the works, particularly informal contacts. No matter how many virtual conferences I can join, it will never substitute an open informal in-person chat. I am nonetheless very hopeful that once the pandemic is over, I will be able to reconnect where I left off rather than starting all over again.

9DL: The Republic of Korea and the EU have much in common, including their political systems, especially their belief in democracy and the respect of fundamental freedoms. Yet, culturally and historically the two societies are quite different, and as a result in their mentality and outlook on life. How have you, personally, bridged this?

TN: I spent nearly a year as a Korea Foundation visiting fellow and professor at Seoul National University in 2017-2018. It was a fascinating period for me because I could witness a geopolitical change on the ground not only due to “fire and fury” and a “Little Rocket Man” to cite Donald Trump at that time but also several high-level summits between the DPRK and the US as well as South Korea. It was also an absolutely rewarding time for me to get to know the Koreans on their home turf and learn more about Korean society.

At that time, the biggest challenge for me was to survive the biting cold during the PyeongChang Winter Olympics that I was fortunate to attend! But after a cup of yuja cha (a hot citrus tea), all was good again. That year helped me immensely in understanding the country better and also helped my Korean friends understand me more, a European, from Central Europe.

9DL: You have studied Korea’s response to the global health crisis extensively. Could you talk about your research on Seoul’s response to COVID? What information do we have on Pyongyang’s response?

TN: To some extent, we can say that the Korean Peninsula includes two countries that represent two models on how to deal with the pandemic. On the one hand, South Korea approached the first phases of the health emergency with mass testing and mass contact tracing, while on the other end of the spectrum, North Korea has been using mass lockdowns and mass border closures. We should, however, note that neither country is “alone” in its approach — other countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, have adopted similar strategies.

For instance, Singapore relied on digital technologies in testing and tracing as Seoul did, while China, Australia, and New Zealand went for a “zero-COVID strategy” — at least until recently — as much as North Korea did. European countries have been oscillating between these two poles. The DPRK has so far claimed zero COVID within its borders, and it seems there has indeed been no major outbreak, but it is hard to be sure that there were no positive cases at all.

The key difference now and in the immediate future is Seoul’s and Pyongyang’s diverging views of vaccines. Although South Korea has been a bit behind in procuring COVID19 jabs, it managed to inoculate over 90 per cent of its population with a booster campaign swiftly ongoing — a target that most European governments can only dream of due to vaccine hesitancy among their citizens.

North Korea, on the other hand, has expressed interest in receiving free vaccines via the COVAX programme but has so far rejected any potential deliveries. Nonetheless, if Pyongyang wants to re-open its borders at some point to help its declining economy, it will need to inoculate its population. It would therefore be advisable that the North Korean leadership starts seriously considering how the vaccines could be delivered — and the Europeans, especially NGOs and EU institutions, can play a key role in this.

9DL: The Indo-Pacific has become the most relevant framework in contemporary regional geopolitics. How do you see Korea’s ability to navigate these waters? And what future do you see for EU-Korea relations in the Indo-Pacific?

TN: To some extent, both South Korea and Europe are in a similar situation: both are being squeezed in the competition between Washington and Beijing, neither wants to be forced to choose sides. The situation in Europe has been changing over the last year or so, with the EU shifting from its ‘triple approach to China’ — partner, competitor, and systemic rival — towards emphasising the third aspect of rivalry, which is closer to the US’ stance. But South Korea is in a more complicated position. Some observers argue that due to its ‘ironclad alliance’ with the US since the Korean War, including thousands of US troops stationed on the peninsula, Seoul is a clear albeit quiet US ally.

Others, including some Brussels officials, consider Seoul to be in the Chinese orbit, partly due to economic links between Seoul and Beijing, and partly because South Korea needs China’s help on the DPRK front. There is a third factor that also needs to be considered: Korea’s difficult relationship with Japan. Although Japan is also a democracy and a strong US ally, it has long been South Korea’s nemesis for historical reasons.

All this needs to be factored in when looking at the future of the EU-Korea relations in the Indo-Pacific context. Over the last year, there has been a flurry of various Indo-Pacific strategies, and what I especially appreciate in the EU’s strategy is the emphasis on cooperation rather than competition. Here, the EU and South Korea can explore areas for advancing their excellent ties beyond trade, from connectivity through digitalisation, up to cooperation with others, such as in Southeast Asia. The French EU Presidency is planning an “Indo-Pacific summit” — it would be good if this leads to the deepening of the partnership with Seoul.

9DL: What role do you see for Beijing in facilitating a return to dialogue with Pyongyang? Can we expect any progress soon, and is there a role for the EU to play?

Although I would very much like to see progress in dialogue with Pyongyang, I am a little sceptical that it will happen this year. The ongoing pandemic is the key issue here. As we can see in how the Beijing Olympics have been organised, China is insisting on its zero-COVID approach, which makes any engagement with North Korea difficult. It’s not only about the DPRK’s borders being closed but also about the Chinese borders that are shut for foreigners.

Therefore, any humanitarian access depends on both Pyongyang and Beijing opening their borders. On a more political level, unless the DPRK upsets its neighbour, for instance by testing ballistic missiles during the Winter Games, Beijing will try to keep Pyongyang afloat and is therefore very unlikely to agree to any ‘maximum pressure 2.0’ approach. Also, there isn’t much incentive for China to pressure North Korea to jumpstart any talks with the US.

This vacuum does leave some space for new initiatives, which is where Europe could potentially jump in. But given all the other crises around and within Europe, North Korea is very much on the back burner in Brussels and other European capitals. Therefore, I expect the status quo to continue in the near future, even as I continue to hope for a breakthrough on the vaccine front, which would start moving things forward. Fingers crossed for the year of the Tiger!

9DL: What are your projects and priorities for the near future?

TN: One of my big priorities is to bring the EU-Korea perspective more to the front, so I am very happy to join 9DASHLINE as its Korea Associate. At the same time, I keep working on EU-North Korea issues at the Free University Berlin. In the second half of 2022, Czechia will take over the EU Presidency, and I hope that the new Czech government will pay more attention to Asia since focusing on the Indo-Pacific is one of its EU Presidency priorities. It would be great if this includes enhanced cooperation with Korea not only on a bilateral but also multilateral-level, such as through joint EU-Korea projects with ASEAN countries.

After all, an EU-ASEAN anniversary summit will take place while the EU is under the Czech helm and the Korean government has been keen on pushing its Southern Policy towards Southeast Asia. My future projects will also go in this direction, especially looking at how the EU-Korea relationship can fit within the various Indo-Pacific strategies and how other partners, particularly Southeast Asia, could be included.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of Tereza Novotna and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Biography

Tereza Novotna is a fellow at The Free University of Berlin and the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy and was previously named as an emerging leader by the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea.

She is also our South Korea Associate and a member of our Associate Network.