Ukraine — A wakeup call for the United States

8 February 2022

The United States is currently facing one of its most challenging periods of international relations since the end of the Cold War. Washington needs to “wake up and smell the coffee” by replacing its putative “global” grand strategy with more nuanced strategies that better reflect the evolving power dynamics of the international and regional systems. Without realistic adjustments, the United States and its allies face a difficult future of regional great power competitions in Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

After five years of relative dormancy, the Ukraine crisis has re-ignited from its freeze — thanks to Russia’s latest “scheming” — and has become the crucial current flashpoint of international security. The catapulting of Ukraine back to the fore of international politics has, for the time being, diverted eyes away from the Indo-Pacific and the ongoing deterioration of the Sino-American relationship. Yet, many commentators have suggested that what happens in Ukraine will be of consequence for this relationship, especially given the obvious Ukraine analogue in the East Asian regional security complex: Taiwan.

Others have dismissed the value of using what is happening in Ukraine as a lens for appraising and forecasting future issues with regard to Taiwan. Rightfully, these commentators point out not only the significant differences between Ukraine and Taiwan but also between the broader geopolitical contexts in which each finds itself. However, the Ukraine crisis is at the very least a symptom of a changing international system, and it quite well illustrates the implications of this change not only for the preeminent hegemon (the United States) but also for all the other actors in the system — from regional great powers to more modest ones.

The shifting global distribution of power is creating regional security conundrums

The key change in the international system is the waning of American power combined with the rise of China and India, the resurgence of Russia, and (potentially) the evolution of the EU into a more capable international actor. Thus, the international system is transitioning from being a system of unquestioned United States global dominance to something closer to a multipolar system, although as it currently stands it is probably best characterised as a “uni-multipolar system”.

This is a system in which the United States remains the top dog, but other players are now more influential than they previously were. Most importantly, this systemic change is incentivising certain regional great powers — namely Russia and China — to undertake revisionist aims. So far, attempted revisionism is primarily happening at the regional level, partly because neither Russia nor China is big enough (even together) to be “global” competitors to the United States. Still, both Russia and China are challenging the status quo of the key regional security complexes they are members of.

The United States and Taiwan (among others) should use Ukraine, and the deterioration of the wider geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe over the past decade, as a learning opportunity.

So far, Eastern Europe, with Ukraine as the epicentre, is the most notable flashpoint due to Russia’s clearly articulated revisionist aims there. However, the Indo-Pacific super-region, especially those areas directly in Beijing’s geopolitical purview are already experiencing far greater tension. Many fear what the future will hold.

In some ways, therefore, Ukraine is a canary down the mine for what might happen in the Indo-Pacific in the coming years. However, most of the analysis of the current situation in Ukraine in the context of the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan concerns what China might learn from the crisis. Michael Schuman writes in The Atlantic that Xi Jinping “will be looking to measure the level of American resolve” in Ukraine.

As he says, “how Xi interprets (or worse, misinterprets) the outcome of the Ukraine standoff could influence whether and how China tries to reunify with Taiwan and thus has implications for the security and stability of East Asia”. But the United States and Taiwan (among others) should also use Ukraine, and the deterioration of the wider geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe over the past decade, as a learning opportunity.

The Taiwan predicament

Worryingly for the United States and Taiwan, like in Eastern Europe, there is no longer an agreed security architecture for Sino-American relations in East Asia. Disagreement is arguably at its most irreconcilable over the status of Taiwan. Taiwan should not dismiss the ostensible similarities between itself and Ukraine. Like Ukraine, Taiwan has a domineering neighbour (China) that does not respect its (de facto) sovereignty.

And, like Ukraine, it also desires a Western pathway but has struggled to elicit concrete support from the West in the face of its neighbour’s actions. Taiwan can take some comfort in the fact that the United States clearly sees the Indo-Pacific as its number one security challenge. Furthermore, so far, the United States has signalled that it would support Taiwan in the face of increased Chinese antagonism. With regards to Ukraine, the United States is far more timid in its signalling.

Yet, Taiwan should still harbour some doubt as to whether the United States would risk war with China to protect it. The United States’ support for Taiwan remains extremely ambiguous and there is no bona fide legal agreement — like, say, with NATO — that commits Washington to protect Taiwan. Ukraine was punished in 2014 because, on the one hand, it naively underestimated Russia’s willingness to act on its perceived national interest (regardless of costs), while on the other hand overestimating the United States’ support. Taiwan should be wary of committing a similar mistake.

For the United States, dealing with the growing challenges of Russia and China is not just a material question but an ideological one too. Clearly, the revisionists — Russia and China — deserve significant blame and criticism for pursuing zero-sum policies that threaten the much smaller countries in their shadows. Furthermore, both Russia and China are authoritarian countries that increasingly rely on nationalism to justify their domestic and international policies, making them harder to reason or negotiate with.

The United States, under Biden, still sees itself as an antidote to the illiberalism of Russia and China. However, the United States needs to get with the times and accept that not only is its reign as the unquestioned hegemon over but its liberal mission has also failed. This is a shame, as Taiwan has become a rare beacon of freedom and democracy and it deserves to be supported. But when the aims of promoting democracy and ensuring security collide, it is the latter that tends to gain preference in Washington.

Furthermore, the United States needs to accept that revisionism is a natural by-product of a significantly altering international system. With the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia, it is (somewhat) understandable that they covet changes to the putative American-centric status quo. It is also understandable that China and Russia might work together in the short-term to strengthen their international standing, although this does not necessarily mean they are best friends or allies.

The United States needs to get realistic

If the United States continues to blindly pursue its status quo strategic preferences — whether in Eastern Europe or East Asia — then it will keep finding itself in these kinds of confrontations without the strategic nous or geopolitical foresight to find solutions that advance its national interest. The irony is that in this newly evolving period of international relations, the United States’ strategic obstinance is pushing these regions towards more confrontation. On top of this, half-hearted support of countries like Ukraine and Taiwan breeds more insecurity than security for these countries.

Ultimately, despite all the rhetoric of “grave consequences”, the sad truth for countries like Ukraine and Taiwan that find themselves in the middle of these regional battles is that the United States will not be prepared to pay the same costs as either Russia or China (if tensions turn into violence). Although public support for defending Taiwan and Ukraine has risen in recent times, conflict with China or Russia would be significantly costlier than previous American misadventures in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Therefore, until the United States finds pragmatic ways of balancing the demands of Russia and China with its putative aim of supporting places like Ukraine and Taiwan, these regional security complexes are doomed to remain testy and unstable. There are no winners in such environments, just different degrees of losers. Thus, the United States needs to find a realistic vision of its international role, one that accepts its unipolar moment has faded and that accommodating some revision is a necessary aspect of mediating the changing international and regional power dynamics.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Nicholas Ross Smith is an adjunct fellow at the University of Canterbury’s National Centre for Research on Europe. He was previously an Associate Professor of International Studies at the University of Nottingham (Ningbo campus). His research coalesces around the regional implications of great power competition, with a particular interest in EU, Russian, and Chinese foreign policies. A full list of publications can be accessed here. Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Embassy Kyiv Ukraine.