Why the Philippines and Indonesia have warmed to AUKUS
Why the Philippines and Indonesia have warmed to AUKUS
WRITTEN BY JULIAN NEUWEILER AND PATRICK TRIGLAVCANIN
1 November 2023
One of the main challenges facing AUKUS and its members is not in the realm of the military or science and technology but rather diplomacy: managing non-member countries’ perspectives and genuine concerns about the group. This task is particularly pertinent to Southeast Asia, a region that will be affected greatly by the transformation of military capabilities AUKUS promises to facilitate — notably Australia’s acquisition of next-generation nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs).
Southeast Asia is also home to many key partners of AUKUS members. Ensuring these partners are welcoming or at least not hostile toward the group is crucial for AUKUS countries in maintaining bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific and global perceptions of the agreement. The Philippines and Indonesia are two of the most important partners, especially to Australia, and also two nations that have demonstrated clear warming toward AUKUS since it was announced in September 2021.
Shifting AUKUS sands in the Philippines and Indonesia
The Philippines has had an inconsistent and at times incoherent stance on AUKUS. Initially, those in the Philippines’ foreign policy and national security institutions were receptive to AUKUS and accepting of it. Conversely, former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte had to be convinced of AUKUS’ merit, as he was somewhat sceptical; Duterte worried that the security agreement could lead to a “nuclear arms race” in the region. Duterte still held reservations at the end of his presidency but seemingly came to welcome the agreement, as he noted during the 9th ASEAN-United States (US) Summit that ASEAN takes “full account of the statements made by AUKUS members” that AUKUS will promote peace and stability in the region. However, in what has become somewhat of a mantra for ASEAN member states, Duterte stated that AUKUS must complement rather than complicate ASEAN centrality.
Continuing efforts in transparency are also important. A formal mechanism for communication should be established between AUKUS members and Southeast Asia.
While “welcome” differs from “support”, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the Philippines has openly supported AUKUS. This is demonstrated by the recent joint statement of the Philippines-Australia Ministerial Meeting (PAMM) on 10 October 2023, which stated that both countries “looked forward to the positive contribution AUKUS … will make to regional balance and the collective security of the region”. The Philippines no longer appears to have reservations regarding AUKUS as a destabilising force in the region and instead views it as a promising counterbalance that could aid in securing the country’s national and regional interests.
There has also been a shift in Indonesia. Indonesia’s first reaction to AUKUS came via a five-point statement, where the government was “deeply concerned” with the potential of the group to fuel a regional arms race. However, in an interview in May 2023, Indonesian President Joko Widodo said AUKUS (and the Quad) should be viewed as “partners, and not competitors”.
This was a clear shift, but it should be treated with caution as Indonesia’s perception of the group remains multifaceted. Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry still does not appear completely reassured that the trilateral agreement will leave Indonesia’s security and interests uncompromised. Following the March 2023 AUKUS announcement in San Diego — which detailed Australia’s pathway to acquiring SSNs through the delivery of the trilaterally-developed ‘SSN-AUKUS’ — Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry reiterated that it was “the responsibility of all countries to maintain peace and stability in the region”. Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry has consistently expressed this stance. It is nonetheless a slight shift from its statement in 2021, which noted “deep concern over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region”.
It is clear that there has been a shift in both the Philippines and Indonesia towards more positive perceptions of AUKUS. But what caused these shifts?
Communication is key
One factor is communication. The announcement of AUKUS was sudden and unexpected. Given the secrecy surrounding the issues within AUKUS’ scope, the average citizen would have expected the announcement to unroll in this manner. However, the same cannot be said for heads of state, particularly those around and closest to Australia — the country whose defence capabilities will be transformed if the group’s aspirations are realised. Unsurprisingly, the Philippines and Indonesia were frustrated with the initial lack of communication.
Providing greater transparency around AUKUS to Southeast Asia has subsequently become a concern of AUKUS members, particularly Australia, an effort wrapped tightly around Australia’s current effort to better understand the region overall. AUKUS was an important aspect of the Australia-Indonesia ‘2+2’ meeting in February 2023, and Australia’s Chief of Navy flew to Singapore the week of the March 2023 announcement to discuss the grouping and its intentions.
Britain has also revamped its diplomatic efforts in Southeast Asia. The Integrated Review’s 2023 ‘refresh’ acknowledged the benefits of “regular strategic-level dialogues to build confidence and transparency around security ambitions”, as well as the importance of better understanding the worldview of “middle-ground powers”. The Philippines and Indonesia are two of these “middle-ground powers”, and the United Kingdom has been consistent in engaging them and communicating its desire for greater transparency around security and greater strategic association. Although it does not explicitly mention AUKUS, the group is a topic of great sensitivity and it can be assumed it is key in bilateral discussions around Indo-Pacific security.
The changing geopolitical context
Another factor is how the geopolitical context of the Philippines and Indonesia has changed since the initial announcement of AUKUS in September 2021. This is predominately a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine and increased Chinese activity in the South China Sea in contravention of international norms.
Putin’s war against Ukraine has recalibrated the geopolitical calculus of nations worldwide by exposing leaders to the instability of the current international order and the level of support for an alternative. Russia’s war against Ukraine also showed world leaders how inter-state conflict can and will be started by powers prepared to erode the tenets of the international order, despite these powers’ insistence that they uphold and respect international norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
For Indonesia, Russia’s war and the geopolitical reality it exposed coincided with its leadership of the G20 in 2022 and ASEAN in 2023. Through Indonesia’s G20 presidency, President Joko Widodo may have had greater exposure to the beliefs and pressures of those hostile to Russian actions and potentially a greater desire to display international leadership than had he not chaired the format. Given the exposure to the war and its impact on the strategic thinking of many nations, Widodo’s discussions with leaders and senior officials — and the competing priorities he would have needed to manage — may have influenced his outlook on regional and global security. This factor has arguably contributed to Indonesia’s slight shift on AUKUS. Indonesia now envisions a regional security environment where AUKUS is begrudgingly necessary.
In the Philippines, the deterioration in Manila’s immediate strategic environment as a result of China’s increasingly destabilising activity in the South China Sea has likely been the core factor contributing to its shift on AUKUS.
The Philippines has had issues defending its claims in the South China Sea long before Marcos Jr entered office. Yet, there has been a noticeable increase in the number and volume of provocations and harassments in the last year committed by China’s coast guard and ‘maritime militia’ toward the Philippine Navy, its Coast Guard, and fishermen in the disputed Scarborough Shoal — claimed by both China and the Philippines. This increase in Chinese provocations has resulted in the Philippines more resolutely pushing back against Chinese claims, primarily by publicising China’s aggressive actions via official communications channels, and frequently employing rhetoric about the Philippines’ commitment to a peaceful, prosperous, and stable maritime Southeast Asia. It has also led the Philippines to seek greater strategic association at the bilateral level with Australia, the UK, and the US, presumably leading it to warm towards AUKUS.
Will the softening of perspectives continue?
It is clear that the perspectives of the Philippines and Indonesia towards AUKUS have become more positive. But there are no guarantees that this trend will continue.
AUKUS nations still have to prepare for the outcome in which support wanes among these nations. Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto notwithstanding, Indonesia’s future foreign policy is relatively unknown under the possible presidencies of Ganjar Pranowo or Anies Baswedan (outside of a few general comments on the latter two candidates’ foreign policy outlook delivered during speeches) in the upcoming February 2024 elections. The economic relationship between the Philippines and China also continues to grow, with no certainty that a future Philippine government will not look for greater strategic association with China.
AUKUS members must maintain their solid relationships with Indonesia, irrespective of the outcome of Indonesia’s presidential election next year, and should work hard to cultivate close relations between the next iteration of senior figures that will populate Indonesia’s governing cabinet. This applies particularly to Australia — the closest AUKUS member to Indonesia both geographically and politically. A first line of action for Canberra should be to make clear to Indonesian officials that Australia is fulfilling its nuclear-non-proliferation obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. AUKUS members should give the same assurances to the Philippines, and they should continue the trend of welcoming Manila’s desire for greater strategic association with open arms and concrete action.
Continuing efforts in transparency are also important. A formal mechanism for communication should be established between AUKUS members and Southeast Asia. This could be primarily led by Australia but a trilateral effort at heart, allowing for greater transparency around each country’s adherence to anti-nuclear proliferation standards and upcoming developments in the partnership.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Patrick Triglavcanin is a Senior Research Assistant at the Council on Geostrategy. Julian Neuweiler is a Senior Analyst at BowerGroup Asia. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/U.S. Secretary of Defense.