Forum: The Israel-Palestine conflict and the Indo-Pacific

2 November 2023

Recent events have again shaken the decades-long conflict between Israel and Palestine leading to new unspeakable levels of suffering. As one of the world's most complex and intractable disputes, continued failure to achieve a solution, and the periodic and now familiar upswings in violence have implications far beyond the Middle East.

Here, 9DASHLINE brings together a group of experts to provide us with a view from the Indo-Pacific and explore the conflict’s significance for the region.

THE CONFLICT HIGHLIGHTS THE LIMITATIONS OF BEIJING’S RHETORIC

HELENA LEGARDA, LEAD ANALYST, MERCATOR INSTITUTE FOR CHINA STUDIES

China’s response to Hamas’ attack on Israel and the ensuing conflict has been very reminiscent of its Ukraine playbook. Beijing has called on all parties to exercise restraint and end the hostilities. It has refused to condemn the initial aggression and used state-affiliated media to blame the escalation on the US. And it has sent its Special Envoy to the Middle East to the region with an offer to mediate — leaning on a peace proposal presented by Xi Jinping in June, during Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas’ visit to Beijing.

This conflict, however, is once again showing the limitations of Beijing’s rhetoric. Despite claims that China will “do anything” to restore peace, Beijing is showing little appetite to get actively involved or to delve into the specifics. Xi’s three-point proposal for the Israel-Palestine conflict is not the first one Beijing has put forward. Since 2003 there have been at least three similar plans that have led to little progress. Besides, China would be unlikely to be accepted by both parties as an honest broker in this conflict, given the fact that it has refused to condemn Hamas — an organisation that it does not describe as a terrorist group.

China’s response to the conflict so far is largely a geopolitical one. By calling for a ceasefire on both sides, Beijing hopes to protect its footprint and influence in the region and to present itself as an alternative partner to the US. Even at the risk of irritating its relations with Israel, maintaining good ties with its Arab partners and with Iran is particularly important to Beijing as it pursues its ambition to build its own power base in the Global South.

As the Israel-Hamas war continues, an active mediation role for China seems out of the question. This conflict will test the strength of Beijing’s ties with its regional partners and is likely to expose the limitations of China’s willingness and ability to lean on them to prevent further escalation.

INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA REACT: THE PRO-PALESTINE-DOMESTIC POLITICS NEXUS

DR FELIX HEIDUK, HEAD OF ASIA RESEARCH DIVISION, GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS/ STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK

Indonesia and Malaysia have been the two Southeast Asian nations expressing the firmest views on the violence in Israel and Gaza that escalated on 7 October. The official stance of the two Muslim-majority countries —blaming Israel’s occupation and oppression of Palestine as the root cause of the violence — differs strongly from the positions of most Western states. The leaders of both countries called for a ceasefire while refraining from referring to the attacks on Israeli civilians as “terrorism” and to Hamas as the perpetrator. Both countries also announced the provision of humanitarian aid to Gaza and have long advocated for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The prime reason for Kuala Lumpur’s and Jakarta’s position lies in domestic politics. Palestine might be geographically far away, but pro-Palestinian sentiment is hugely prevalent in both countries. For example, a hospital in Gaza was built in 2011 from money donated by Indonesian charitable organisations. Pro-Palestinian sentiment is also voiced by political parties and civil society organisations across the political spectrum, to the extent that government and opposition in both states almost try to outdo each other in their support for Palestinians and their condemnation of Israel.

Another reason is both states’ bilateral relations with Israel, or more precisely, the lack thereof. Indonesia and Malaysia have no official diplomatic relations with Israel and have shown no signs of normalising relations, like Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Sudan have done in the past. Moreover, Malaysia has for a long time held close ties with Hamas, regardless of the fact that the US and other Western countries have designated Hamas a “terrorist” organisation. Hamas members have reportedly undergone training in Malaysia on how to conduct cyberattacks, improve Hamas’ weapons technologies (especially missiles and drones), and have even been trained in the use of hang gliders. Malaysian officials have rebutted these reports as wrong. However, all of these considerations suggest that neither Indonesia nor Malaysia will moderate their firmly pro-Palestinian stance in the conflict, or join many of Israel’s direct neighbours in their efforts to normalise relations with Tel Aviv, anytime soon.

INTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS SHAPING SINGAPORE’S RESPONSE

DR JA IAN CHONG, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

Singapore’s government is looking at the Israel-Hamas conflict with some trepidation. It has long supported a two-state solution, and its voting record at the United Nations General Assembly is consistent with this position. However, the Singaporean government’s concerns are more proximate. It fears that elements within the country’s pro-Israel Christian evangelical and Muslim communities, where there is broad sympathy for Palestinians, may go overboard in support of their respective causes. Given the Singaporean government’s long history of security cooperation with Israel, including through military training and arms sales, officials worry that the country may become a target for attacks.

To address the risks associated with the Israel-Hamas conflict, the government has stepped up security, including at key installations and religious sites. Concurrently, officials are taking pains to distinguish Hamas and its violent methods from the Palestinian cause while at the same time pointing out the excessiveness of Israeli policies toward Palestinians under successive governments, albeit more subtly. Singapore’s state-affiliated mainstream press is helping to amplify the administration’s messaging. Officials are also engaging in outreach efforts to the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities, but could do more to delineate Israeli politics and Israeli governments from the Jewish faith and Israeli citizens.

INDO-PACIFIC COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED OVER THE SUPPLY OF CRITICAL MATERIALS

SEOHEE PARK, PHD CANDIDATE AT TOHOKU UNIVERSITY (SENDAI, JAPAN), LECTURER AT RITSUMEIKAN ASIA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY (BEPPU, JAPAN), ASSOCIATE EDITOR AT 9DASHLINE

The “Start-up Nation” Israel derives considerable economic benefit from its high-tech sector, which constitutes 18.1 per cent of its GDP. The presence of over 30,000 chip engineers and about 200 semiconductor firms has drawn R&D and fabrication investments from global tech giants, indicating Israel’s pivotal role in the global value chain. However, this deep integration also suggests that any local disruption could resonate globally.

The escalating Israel-Palestine conflict has raised concerns over the supply of critical materials, notably bromine, which South Korean semiconductor manufacturers like Samsung and SK Hynix rely on — almost entirely sourced from Israel. A disruption here could ripple through the industry, creating bottlenecks that hamper production and sales. Japanese semiconductor firms, already wary, are watching the situation closely as the potential for supply chain interruptions mounts. Taiwanese firms might also experience indirect impacts through global chip market fluctuations, changes in demand due to supply constraints in other countries, and potential realignment of international trade policies prompted by geopolitical shifts.

The threat is not just hypothetical — it is already immediate and real. Intel’s substantial operations in Israel, including CPU manufacturing in Kiryat Gat, near the Gaza border, and the construction of advanced facilities for 5nm chip production, are at risk. The safety of facility operations and their workers is of paramount concern, not just for Intel but for the entire semiconductor ecosystem that depends on its output.

Disruptions from the conflict may also set back China’s tech progress, affecting competition in critical sectors like AI. For example, Intel’s stalled Tower Semiconductor deal, halted by Beijing’s regulatory approval in August 2023, reflects how geopolitical strife can influence the US-China technological power struggle, with supply chain vulnerabilities becoming a focal point of contention. Thus, the Israel-Palestine conflict’s impact on semiconductor supply could intensify China’s reliance on Israeli tech imports, which Beijing crucially needs amid US efforts to curb its access to advanced technology.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Image credit: Flickr/Ted Eytan.