Tokyo does not need constitutional reform to bolster defence
Tokyo does not need constitutional reform to bolster defence
WRITTEN BY ADRIENNE WU AND MELYNN OLIVER
10 March 2023
Following the resignation of four cabinet members and a controversial state funeral, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s cabinet has suffered a drop in approval ratings. After falling to a 33.1 per cent approval rating in November and December 2022, the Kishida cabinet’s approval rating fell further to 26.5 per cent in January 2023 — now putting its rating solidly in the “danger zone” of less than 30 per cent. Additionally, the public response to the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) newly unveiled defence budget for 2023 — a planned 20 per cent increase that would bring Japan’s defence budget to 2 per cent of its GDP by 2027 — has been mixed. Still, citizens are largely supportive of Tokyo’s efforts to increase defence capabilities despite public criticism of Kishida’s cabinet and its policy decision. Considering the public’s conditional support as well as Japan's security concerns, Japanese policymakers should exhaust the possibilities of the established Article 9 framework before venturing into the politically dangerous territory of constitutional reform.
Article 9 and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces
Despite criticism from US politicians about Japan not pulling its own weight when it comes to defending the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s pacifist constitution was originally drafted by US forces occupying Japan. After Japan surrendered at the end of World War II, US forces drafted a constitution for Japan that, under Article 9, “forever renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the nation” and stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained”.
While Japan’s constitution has never been amended, evolving interpretations of Article 9 have allowed enough leeway for the establishment of Japan’s current Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The first reinterpretation came during the outbreak of the Korean War, when — under pressure from Washington — Japan’s Supreme Court ruled that Article 9 did not “deny the right to self-defence inherent in our nation as a sovereign power”. During the subsequent decade, the government interpreted Article 9 as allowing the minimal force necessary for self-defence, while still barring Japan’s forces from forward deployment or acting in collective defence.
Like the United States, Japan will have to balance the benefits granted by strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity.
Gradually, the scope of the SDF has widened. During his tenure (2006-2007 and 2012-2020), then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe further accelerated the remilitarisation of Japan — first by replacing the Defense Agency with the Ministry of Defense in 2007, and later by removing bans on defence-related exports, reinterpreting Article 9 to potentially allow collective defence, establishing the National Security Council, and publishing Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2013.
Defence support comes with limitations
Remilitarising Japan has been a long-held goal of the LDP. As prime minister, Abe hoped to add a clause to the constitution that would formally legitimise the existence of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and continued to advocate for constitutional reform even after leaving office in 2020. Yet, Japan's constitution has remained unchanged due to the high approval thresholds — any amendment needs to be approved by two-thirds of both Diet chambers and pass a majority vote in a national referendum.
Abe believed that the time was “ripe” for constitutional reform in 2021; not only did his successor Kishida also express support for revision, but a Mainichi Shimbun poll found that 77 per cent of the candidates elected to the House of Representatives were in favour of revising the constitution. Yet, the public has remained split on the issue, with polls indicating either 30 per cent or 51 per cent of respondents support a revision of Article 9 with a May 2022 Kyodo News Survey indicating 50 per cent in favour of revision.
Public support for increasing defence is much greater when considered separately from constitutional reform or questions of where funding will come from. In 2022, Russia’s nuclear threats and fears that China may do the same increased public support for strengthening Japan’s defences to the point where Japan’s staunchly anti-nuclear stance wavered. A slew of 2022 polls also indicated support among respondents for strengthening Japan’s defence — a Yomiuri-Gallup poll reported 68 per cent support for strengthening Japan’s defence and polls by Yomiuri and Reuters also showed a majority support for increasing the defence budget. While public sentiment shows an interest in expanding Japan’s security role in the region, more concrete steps such as constitutional reform or tax hikes to cover an increased defence budget still face backlash from the public.
Significant shifts continue
Under Kishida, Japan has continued to advance its defence through updated security documents that the United States has recognised as a “foundational new step”. The National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Defense Build-up Program (DBP), and the NSS reveal a heightened alert posture in response to Japan’s concerns over global power shifts and growing threats to its security environment. Language in the documents reflects the public sentiment in collectively identifying China as “an unprecedented strategic challenge” and indicates Russia and North Korea as international destabilisers, which require a more comprehensive Japanese defence plan.
Collectively, all three documents reflect a significant shift for Japan. The call for counter-strike capabilities in the NSS is one of the most hotly debated developments. Though Japan has emphasised the ‘counter’ and defence-oriented nature of long-range missiles, critics have still questioned its permissibility under Article 9. Along with the 2 per cent GDP spending budget, the DBP outlines Japan’s new defence procurement and industrial development strategy. The language and content of official Japanese documents and statements are always precise, so the intentional increase in urgency indicates a fundamental defence shift — one still arguably compliant with current constitutional provisions.
Considering the developments that the SDF has achieved without being officially acknowledged in the constitution, amending Article 9 may be thought of as a formality by some observers. It comes, however, with the added cost of upsetting Japan’s closest neighbours. Those who argue for a formal remilitarisation of Japan should consider why they advocate such a move. Amending Japan’s constitution has proven unnecessary to expand the SDF, therefore the only major benefit is to assay the fears of the Japanese public and expand its international role. Ultimately, any defence advancements and increased clarity regarding Tokyo’s defensive stance that can be gained without formal status changes are most beneficial for Japan.
Looking beyond pacifism
Whether the LDP is successful in formally amending Japan’s pacifist constitution or not, growing public support shows that the Japanese government will likely continue to improve Japan’s defence and strengthen its defence capabilities. To further this goal, policymakers in Japan and the United States should focus on two specific points.
First, they need to continue to pursue incremental and informal gains for the SDF. Rather than pushing for constitutional reform — which would likely be difficult to pass and would sow unease amongst Japan’s neighbours — Japanese politicians should continue to push for more practical, incremental changes. Like the United States, Japan will have to balance the benefits granted by strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity.
Second, policymakers should explore avenues for expanding Japan’s role in regional defence alliances. US policymakers should capitalise on the current momentum in Japan to find ways in which Tokyo can play an expanded role in security alliances such as a trilateral security framework between the US, Japan, and Taiwan, the US-Japan Alliance, the Quad, or as a partner to NATO. Growing Japan’s strength incrementally within existing frameworks can provide greater assurances to nearby allies and presents a more unified stance when deterring an invasion of Taiwan.
Due to growing concerns about Chinese aggression, Japan could ultimately revise its constitution and formalise the SDF under the current Kishida administration. However, focusing efforts to deepen the US-Japan alliance would be preferable while Japan is looking to the United States for reassurance and significantly increasing its own defence capabilities. Rather than pushing Japan to take a more concrete position on the status of the SDF, policymakers in Tokyo and Washington should consider introducing less extreme and more practical security measures to make smaller, but more reliable advancements to Japan’s security.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Adrienne Wu is a research assistant at Global Taiwan Institute (GTI). Melynn Oliver is a 2023 Spring Intern at GTI and a second-year MA student in the Asian Studies programme at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Image credit: Flickr/@USARMY.