Japan’s defence plans: What matters is implementation
Japan’s defence plans: what matters is implementation
WRITTEN BY DR RYO HINATA-YAMAGUCHI
8 May 2023
On 16 December 2022, the Japanese government approved three new security documents and plans: the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP). While Japan’s pacifist constitution remains unchanged, the documents mark a new chapter in Tokyo’s post-World War II defence policy, putting Japan and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in a more proactive and realistic posture toward national defence. Under the new defence plan, Japan seeks to enhance the JSDF’s readiness with a particular focus on counterattacks, command and control, and logistics. Although the items laid out in the three security documents are critical to sharpen and strengthen Japan’s defence strategies and readiness, there are still challenges in how the new capabilities can be operationalised. To address these, Tokyo must ensure that its new strategies are actually implemented and supported by sound defence planning.
Regional threats driving defence modernisation
The reasons for Japan’s new defence plans are straightforward. The previous NSS published in 2013, as well as the National Defense Program Guidelines (now replaced by the NDS) issued in 2018, have passed their respective lifecycles, and the perceived threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia have risen beyond Tokyo’s current defence capacities. While Tokyo has made credible efforts to enhance its defence strategies and readiness since the 2000s, it could not keep pace with the fast-growing threats from Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, as well as new trends in conflict and warfare.
China’s military modernisation is continuing at breakneck speed, and its assertive actions in the region have intensified over the past several years. North Korea is also continuing to improve the quantity and quality of strategic and tactical strike capabilities, as well as issuing a new nuclear doctrine that includes preemptive strikes. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also had a powerful impact on Japan’s strategic planning. While the Russia-Ukraine war does not directly involve Japan, it underscores the need for Tokyo to think more realistically about dealing with contingencies and commanding its security operations while also raising awareness among the public about the fact that wars are real and that Japan is vulnerable as well.
Without continuous efforts in Japan including securing monetary and political capital — together with coordinating and cooperating with regional partners — Tokyo’s push for defence modernisation will face a myriad of challenges going forward.
Additional drivers of Japan’s defence plans are new and emerging trends in warfare over the past couple of decades. Military modernisation has advanced dramatically over the past decade, not only with faster, speedier, and more lethal arsenals but also with greater use of computer and electronic systems for enhanced command and control, as well as precision and cyber-attacks. Moreover, enhancements in and spread of information technologies have taken ‘hybrid warfare’ to new levels, allowing state and non-state actors to exploit and weaken opponents through cognitive and psychological warfare.
Greater ambitions and greater challenges
The defence plans laid out in the NDS and DBP address these issues and outline much of the readiness and structures needed for more effective defence. The NDS specifically mentions “key capabilities for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities”, consisting of: “stand-off defense capabilities”, “integrated air and missile defense capabilities”, “unmanned defense capabilities”, “cross-domain operation capabilities”, “command and control and intelligence-related functions”, “mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection”, and “sustainability and resiliency”. All of these are vital for the JSDF to attain adequate readiness to operate under war conditions.
But while the NDS and DBP lay out a collection of required capabilities, much of the plans for implementation are concerned with making better use of the assets already available to the JSDF while further enhancing the JSDF’s readiness for its original missions such as air and missile defence, anti-submarine warfare, minesweeping, and amphibious operations. Even regarding counterstrikes, much of the new plans are about extending available capabilities. For instance, assets originally intended for the defence of remote islands like the Japanese Type 12 Surface-to-Ship missile, the US Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, hypersonic cruise missiles, hypervelocity gliding projectiles, and newly purchased Tomahawk missiles will be used for counterstrike missions. Questions remain, however, whether the effectiveness of existing assets is sufficient, consequently leading to discussions about Tokyo’s need for medium-range strike assets.
More critical developments are expected in logistics, where the JSDF has long suffered from a chronic shortage of ammunition and spare parts. The current defence plans seek to overcome this shortage by boosting the number of supplies, establishing better supply chains, and locating depots in strategically vital locations such as Okinawa. Another step is the establishment of a permanent joint command to commandeer the three JSDF branches, namely the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Japan Air Self-Defense Force. For many years, lack of coordination constituted a major impediment to the JSDF, undermining the ability for cooperation between the three branches and missions being carried out effectively. While the details are yet to be made public, the new arrangement is expected to smoothen the JSDF’s operations by better integrating the three branches to execute their missions.
Even though the NSS, NDS, and DBP have set Japan’s strategic and defence planning in the right direction, questions remain over whether all the items outlined can be implemented over the next ten years under the current NSS. Japan will have greater resource capacity in the coming years, with the defence budget for 2023 boosted to JPY 6.82 trillion (USD 51 billion), and forthcoming defence outlays are set to be steadily increased to 2 per cent of the country’s GDP by 2027. Still, considering the host of agendas in the three documents, there are questions about whether this amount is enough. It remains to be seen how Japan can refine its defence planning in the most cost-effective manner to make the most of the defence spending increases.
International defence cooperation
Concerning defence cooperation, much of the NDS is about deepening and expanding its alliance with the US. Indeed, Japan has always developed its defence strategies and readiness on the premise that the JSDF operates within the alliance. But what differs between the new NSS and NDS is Japan’s greater role to enhance the alliance’s capabilities both in deterrence and warfighting. Overall, the new defence plans will foster greater readiness of the US-Japan alliance by better synergising capabilities and operations in the ground, naval, air, cyber, and outer space domains. At the same time, the most important questions going forward concern Japan and the US effectively coordinating their readiness to deter and defend against China, North Korea, and Russia. Japan will be particularly critical for providing the readiness to deny threats in the maritime domain, especially through submarine and mine warfare, as well as air and missile defence and cyber warfare.
Deepening and expanding its international cooperation network with other US allies and like-minded states has been another vital agenda for Japan during the past couple of decades. Given the threats in the region, as well as the possibility of a dual contingency on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, US-Japan-South Korea trilateral coordination is critical. Despite the troubled relations between Seoul and Tokyo, over the past year, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio have both made credible efforts to enhance the trilateral security partnership.
In the broader “free and open Indo-Pacific” context, Japan has deepened its security partnerships with Australia and India both bilaterally and through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with the US. Tokyo has also worked to deepen its security relations with NATO states and to cooperate through capacity building with selected Southeast Asian states. Further deepening the security relations with these countries as well as with Taiwan in the future will be critical not only in enhancing Japan’s security, but also protecting stability of the international order based on the rule of law.
It is also critical to understand the mixed reactions from states in the region and beyond. Naturally, China, North Korea, and Russia would react strongly against any sort of Japanese defence modernisation that has the potential to undermine Russian strategies and readiness. Moreover, while South Korea may overall benefit from a stronger Japanese defence role in the US-Japan-South Korea security cooperation context, progressives in Seoul frequently weaponise anti-Japanese sentiments and oppose any enhancements in Japanese defence strategies and capabilities. In Southeast Asia, many feel that Japan’s move to counter China’s aggression makes sense, but they also fear that this could lead to even greater aggression by Beijing, which would ultimately exacerbate the instability in the region. Instead, they prefer softer measures such as capacity- and norms-building for now. Still, despite the security dilemmas and mixed reactions, Japan’s moves are necessary given the threats and vulnerabilities it faces.
Implementation matters
Given that the NSS, NDS, and DBP have been announced quite recently, there is still uncertainty over how the JSDF’s strategies and readiness will be shaped in the coming years. While a host of domestic and international questions and sensitivities remain, there is little doubt that Japan’s defence planning has entered a new chapter to shape the JSDF and its readiness in order to deal with present threats. The problem, however, rests in how Japan can implement and operationalise the items laid out in the new defence plans, not only concerning questions over funding and human resources, but also regarding training personnel for new capabilities and missions, and composing effective operational doctrines. Without continuous efforts in Japan including securing monetary and political capital — together with coordinating and cooperating with regional partners — Tokyo’s push for defence modernisation will face a myriad of challenges going forward.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a Project Assistant Professor at the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology at the University of Tokyo and also an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Pacific Forum. Ryo specialises in issues relating to defence, security, and transport governance in the Indo-Pacific, and is the author of the book “Defense Planning and Readiness of North Korea: Armed to Rule” (2021). Image credit: Flickr/keroyon.