The case for an overarching US Indo-Pacific strategy

3 July 2026

States across the Indo-Pacific closely watched the signalling and outcomes of Trump’s visit to Beijing in May 2026. Some fears were allayed by the summit: there was no trade deal between Beijing and Washington that would impact Southeast Asian exports or reduce their global supply chain relevance. However, the summit mainly focused on US and Chinese priorities — on securing trade deals and on Taiwan, respectively. The scant attention paid to the most pressing issue for Asian economies — the Strait of Hormuz closure — and to Chinese activities in the South China Sea pointed to American concessions with greatest impact on Southeast Asia. Moreover, defying convention, Trump did not visit other countries in the region — a usual method to show Beijing the strength of American regional ties.

The second Trump administration has overturned long-standing pillars of US policy by slashing foreign aid, weaponising tariffs, and dismantling multilateral commitments — with severe repercussions for the Indo-Pacific. The mainstay of US foreign policy in the past two decades — a coherent overarching Indo-Pacific strategy — has largely disappeared. Instead, the current administration prefers bilateral engagement through discrete economic, diplomatic, and military activities. While this gives the administration greater ability to adapt to changing circumstances, the lack of a coherent strategy leaves the region uncertain of American objectives. Although the logic of an overarching Indo-Pacific strategy has not changed, American calculations have.

A measured approach to consolidation

The US is entering a period of consolidation necessary to extend its power. Recalibration and prioritisation are central to the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS). Both reaffirm the connection between ends and means following decades of unattainable “laundry lists” that have overextended American resources. The NDS speaks of needing to be realistic about the scale of threats and the resources available to meet them. The goal is to preserve and replenish by reprioritising obligations and mobilising the resource base — not retrenchment.

The NSS outlines a measured security approach underpinning a consolidation strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The primary focus is deterrence against Chinese encroachment through denial and defence of the First Island Chain (FIC) (Japan–Taiwan–Philippines). This approach should buy the US time to organise longer-term strategic priorities.

While a consolidation strategy offers a sensible course correction, deterrence in the Indo-Pacific depends as much on regional confidence in long-term political commitments as it does on military capability.

A successful consolidation strategy requires strong security alliances. The April 2026 Senate Hearing on Indo-Pacific Command and US Forces Korea confirmed an ongoing commitment to regional deterrence and strategic advantage. Core strategic alliances with Japan and South Korea, including the continued commitment to extended deterrence, have been reaffirmed as “ironclad”. Similar official statements with the Philippines emphasise the strength of the US–Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty and Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Prioritising military alliances around the FIC could logically meet the objectives of the administration’s regional consolidation strategy. However, there are limitations to a consolidation strategy that overplays the military aspect without being underpinned by a broader Indo-Pacific strategy.

Back to over reliance on the security pillar

The first limitation entails the return of over reliance on the security pillar. A goal of previous Indo-Pacific strategies was to refocus on regional trade and diplomacy, based on the understanding that military defence alone does not anchor US regional leadership. While Indo-Pacific countries have been urged to increase defence spending, the US has not simultaneously incentivised with a major new trade initiative or strategy. Instead, the Trump administration has gutted USAID and imposed heavy trade tariffs, and the Iran war has severely impacted energy supplies.

Disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz have exposed Asian trade, economic, and energy security vulnerabilities. Asia consumes more energy relative to its GDP than any other continent. In 2024, more than 80 per cent of crude oil and LNG via Hormuz arrived in Asia, with 56 per cent destined for ASEAN countries. The energy crisis has focused regional governments, including American allies like the Philippines, on securing viable alternative energy supplies, leading to deepening engagement with China.

The widening gap between words and deeds

The second limitation relates to trade. The April 2025 Liberation Day announcement of sweeping tariffs ranging from 17 to 49 per cent especially affected Southeast Asia. The NSS qualifies such “disciplined economic action” as underpinning strong deterrence because it ultimately provides the US with more resources to sustain deterrence. This approach seems predicated on the idea that strengthening the US economy also paradoxically benefits Southeast Asia.

However, the Trumpian preference for coercion and leverage, coupled with the scaling back of economic engagement and the lack of a coherent trade strategy, undermines trust in the US as a credible and stable economic partner. The rest of Southeast Asia, by its exclusion from the FIC, has been deprioritised. In a region in need of substantial development and infrastructure investment, this strategic vacuum creates an opening for China, which is both willing and well-equipped to fill the gap.

The Trump administration views tariffs as a coherent strategy that confirms American economic power, linking investment to national security and economic prosperity. However, the unpredictability created by Trumpian economic statecraft has been viewed as punitive sanctions to draw out unilateral concessions from East Asian states. “Deals” reducing tariff rates are executive understandings, not legally binding treaties, giving the White House discretion to reapply pressure through the re-imposition of tariffs, citing trade, economic or security grounds. Without positive economic re-engagement, the US is handing China the opportunity to promote itself as a “stable partner”.

The third limitation involves the transactional approach. The NSS speaks of “burden-sharing” as a means to avoid American overextension that is not in the region’s interests. Japan, Australia, and the Philippines have increased defence spending, along with Southeast Asia more widely. Pressuring allies to spend more might strengthen deterrence. The sting is the transactional element — the inference that American assistance might be predicated on how well the administration feels its requirements have been met. The NSS specifies the alignment of export controls, and greater access to ports and other facilities for US military use. ‘Burden-sharing’ is thus increasingly viewed as ‘burden-shifting’ by regional allies.

The war against Iran exemplifies the widening gap. When Trump’s calls for allies to help the US in securing the Strait of Hormuz largely fell on deaf ears, he criticised Japan, South Korea, and Australia for their lack of support.

Consolidation requires buy-in

The fourth limitation links to reduced investment in diplomacy, reinforcing perceived indifference towards sustaining American political influence. Consolidation is contingent on the commitment of allies and regional partners, which requires serious diplomacy, frequent conversations, and the alignment of words and deeds. The US continues to project hard power but is less interested in mobilising legitimacy for its actions. The failure to build broader coalitions, or invest in relationships through sustained regional diplomacy, reinforces rapidly declining confidence in American reliability.

There are deep fears that the administration’s preference for economic leverage will weaken security guarantees. The administration prioritises coercive trade pressure without confirming its commitment to regional multilateral mechanisms such as ASEAN, or supporting APEC’s founding commitment to free trade. The region is further exposed to economic and diplomatic gaps from tariffs and aid cuts. Moreover, Trump’s aversion to multilateral mechanisms limits America’s ability to speak with partners on the sidelines, which forms the basis of much regional dialogue.

While a consolidation strategy offers a sensible course correction, deterrence in the Indo-Pacific depends as much on regional confidence in long-term political commitments as it does on military capability. By narrowing focus to national security objectives, the Trump administration misses an opportunity to contest Chinese economic and political influence across the region. The administration’s military consolidation relies on allies in the Indo-Pacific. Yet regional perceptions of the administration’s unpredictability undermine its success. Mixed signals at the Trump–Xi summit — especially the easing of rhetoric on China — create ambiguity in US intentions, reinforcing the shift towards recalibration by many regional states. The growing trend of economic diversification and strategic balancing seeks to generate a buffer against US unpredictability.

The lack of an overarching Indo-Pacific strategy leaves the region exposed to executive whim. For Southeast Asia in particular, its value to the US becomes dependent on shifting, circumstantial, and often commercial interests defined by Trump. A contingent and expedient approach driven by the president’s impulses, and by short-term deals struck outside formal deal-making structures, institutionalises regional vulnerability vis-à-vis the US.

While Southeast Asian states are not collectively turning to China, they are incrementally leaning more on Chinese economic stability. Trade and security are deeply connected, and the US is likely to lose economic and strategic influence to China. Without a coherent trade agenda, the US will have limited leverage to shape regional trade rules. Greater trade dependence on China might limit options in the security domain if states fear Beijing’s economic retaliation.

This fragmented approach to the Indo-Pacific is likely to undermine a consolidation strategy dependent on regional support. If Asian governments lose confidence in the US as a stable regional anchor, US influence in the region will inevitably weaken.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Anisa Heritage is a senior lecturer in the Department of Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK. She writes about US–China relations in the Indo-Pacific, and about UK defence.

Opinions expressed here are her own. Dr Heritage does not speak for the UK government or the UK Ministry of Defence. Image credit: Flickr/White House.