President Biden’s welcome return to Asian multilateralism

17 November 2021

“Boring” and “dreadfully unproductive” are just some of the words that observers have used to describe regional meetings like the East Asia Summit (EAS). And if they were boring when held in person, then the Zoom versions are surely worse without the diversions provided by colourful costumes or special handshakes. At a virtual meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders earlier in the year, Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a pre-recorded message, summing up the general level of interaction in virtual summits.

So US President Joe Biden should be praised for joining the recent virtual meetings of the EAS, US-ASEAN Summit, and APEC. President Trump snubbed many of these meetings after 2017, sending junior representatives to the chagrin of the ten Southeast Asian countries that make up ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Top-level attendance at these meetings is now read as a signal of the US’ interest in the region, especially after President Obama made turning up a key plank of his ‘Asia pivot’ strategy.

From ambition to pragmatism

Washington once held high hopes for Asia’s regional summits. In 1993, when it elevated APEC to head of government level, it hoped the group would deepen integration with Asia, playing an indirect security role and complementing the US’ bilateral alliances. When Obama began regularly attending the EAS, he stressed its role in supporting the regional rules-based order. Australia, a long-time booster of the EAS, hoped it could develop as a forum for political-security dialogue, building habits of cooperation and lowering the risk of conflict.

The President’s positive statement at least opens the door for US allies and partners to put forward their views on US regional economic engagement. The United States’ offer to host APEC in 2023 should give high-level impetus for the development of this economic framework.

But as Asia changes rapidly, there is a feeling of fading grandeur about the region’s traditional security and economic institutions. In an era increasingly defined by strategic competition between the United States and China, the idea of regional leaders sitting down around a table to nut out their differences seems quaintly anachronistic. And of course, the opportunity for bilateral side conversations — always the real pull of these gatherings — is lost when meetings are virtual.

At the same time, new ‘minilateral’ groupings that better reflect the logic of a more polarised region are springing up. The Quad — an effort by the United States, Japan, India and Australia to balance China’s regional influence — is the most prominent of these and has become the centrepiece of Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Other important minilaterals include China’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) — a Sino-centric meeting including China and the five countries of mainland Southeast Asia.

Speaking during her visit to Singapore, US Vice President Kamala Harris recently referred to the Quad and the United States’ own Mekong forum as “new, results-oriented groups”. Although she also dutifully committed to working through ASEAN, the reference to “results” subtly betrayed a long-running US frustration with the region’s older inclusive institutions. Yet the United States should not evaluate the usefulness of regional institutions based on their ‘results’. If results were the criterion of success for notoriously weak and slow-moving ASEAN processes, then world leaders would have stopped showing up years ago. APEC likewise has few tangible successes to point to in recent years, with real discussions on trade liberalisation having moved elsewhere. Instead, the United States needs to see these meetings for what they are: an unparalleled opportunity for influence.

Opportunities for influence

If the United States is serious about competition with China, the region’s institutions will be a key battleground. Beijing, which was once cautious about regional multilateral groupings, has enthusiastically embraced them. It has invested assiduously in establishing a bewildering array of mechanisms with ASEAN, reflected in ASEAN’s official account of the relationship, which is more than twice as long as the equivalent document about the United States. China has simultaneously developed a range of additional Sino-centric groupings like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and LMC. The risks of an “Asia without the United States”, as Kevin Rudd reportedly warned Hilary Clinton in 2009, remain real.

China has used its standing with ASEAN to advance its own goals during the COVID-19 pandemic, including reframing the regional narrative in its favour. It has supported regional health cooperation in the “ASEAN Plus Three”, a narrower group comprising the ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea, but not the United States. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was able to convene an early meeting with his ASEAN counterparts on the back of a previously scheduled LMC meeting, allowing him to deflect blame from China’s role in the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States should likewise seek to use regional multilateral groups to amplify its own voice and to present itself as a constructive contributor to regional security and prosperity. In the ADMM Plus, a meeting of regional defence ministers, Washington can show its commitment to confidence-building and improving the capacity of partner defence forces through its participation in expert working groups. It can use its dialogue relations with ASEAN to showcase what it is already contributing in the region, for example in terms of vaccines and private sector investment.

Last month, President Biden used the EAS to announce his intention to explore with partners an “Indo-Pacific economic framework” focused on areas like trade facilitation, digital economy standards, supply chain resilience and clean energy. This is a welcome and important recognition from Washington that it needs to group up an economic strategy. Partners should not expect too much from Washington on this front, given the domestic political challenge of re-joining a comprehensive trade deal like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). However, the President’s positive statement at least opens the door for US allies and partners to put forward their views on US regional economic engagement. The United States’ offer to host APEC in 2023 should give high-level impetus for the development of this economic framework.

Finally, joining these meetings is, paradoxically — given their reputation for arcane language and protocol — an efficient way to do diplomacy. As a superpower with global interests, the US President and cabinet officials will never have enough time to be everywhere they need to be. Joining regional meetings like the EAS facilitates interaction and sidebar meetings with several other countries at once. Their place in a regular calendar of meetings helps Asia-focussed officials within the administration drive resources and attention towards the Indo-Pacific.

The Biden administration’s task

In short, the EAS and APEC are powerful tools for the United States: to access regional officials, prevent China from dominating regional affairs, present itself as a positive partner, and focus itself on Asia — as it has long promised to do. Although it is yet to fully articulate its thinking on these questions, the strong record of attendance by the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense at ASEAN meetings this year suggests the Biden administration understands this.

However, Washington was fortunate in 2021. Summits being held virtually meant the President did not need to spend two days travelling to and from Asia. Brunei’s smart choice to exclude Myanmar’s coup leader also helped facilitate Biden’s presence. The choices in future years may not be so easy. But in weighing up the benefits, the Biden administration should steer away from worrying about results and think instead about maximising its influence.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Susannah Patton is a Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program at the United States Studies Centre. Image credit: Adam Schultz/The White House/Flickr.