New Zealand-China relations under Prime Minister Hipkins: Changes on the horizon?
New Zealand-China relations under Prime Minister Hipkins: Changes
on the horizon?
WRITTEN BY KINA KUNZ
3 May 2023
When Chris Hipkins took office as New Zealand’s new prime minister in January this year, there was little information about the direction in which he might take New Zealand’s foreign policy. After all, his political career up till that point had focused overwhelmingly on domestic issues, particularly education and health. The ‘best bet’ was that he would generally follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Jacinda Ardern, since they are both from the Labour Party and he served in her government. Recent developments suggest that New Zealand will continue to emphasise the value of its relationship with China, but there are also indications that a shift in New Zealand’s security policy is on the horizon.
China continues to be an important partner for New Zealand
During Hipkins’s visit to Australia in early March, he emphasised that his government's foreign policy position remains unchanged from that of his predecessor, stating: "our foreign policy position hasn’t changed just because there’s a change of prime minister”. On the country’s China policy, he noted: “China is an incredibly important partner for New Zealand, [...] that doesn’t mean there aren’t going to be areas where we disagree from time to time, and we’ll continue to voice our disagreements with China when that happens”.
This approach of offering gentle criticisms while emphasising the importance of the relationship is in line with the previous Ardern administration. At times this has caused controversy, particularly facing backlash from Australia when it became embroiled in a diplomatic dispute with China. From the perspective of an Australian news outlet, New Zealand was taking a “softer line” on China, which helped Wellington “escape the trade sanctions and breakdown in diplomatic relations experienced by Australia under the Morrison government”.
If the current trend continues, we may be witnessing New Zealand in the process of edging away from its hedging position and instead committing to the US bloc in this ‘new Cold War’.
New Zealand’s options are constrained by the fact that China makes up 23 per cent of its total trade, which in turn makes up a whopping 60 per cent of New Zealand’s total economic activity. Several commentators in New Zealand, including Nicholas Khoo and Anne-Marie Brady, argue that it would be beneficial for the country to diversify its economic ties. The Ardern administration was aware of this. So has been Hipkins, who encouraged New Zealand exporters to diversify in March this year.
Aotearoa Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta’s visit to China in late March this year also broadly echoed previous interactions between New Zealand and China. On the one hand, there was an emphasis on the importance of the fifty-year diplomatic relationship, particularly its economic dimension. Apparently, they also discussed a potential visit by Prime Minister Hipkins.
On the other hand, Mahuta also raised concerns both about the human rights situation in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and China’s approach to the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, all the while using New Zealand’s usual “respectful approach”. According to Mahuta, she encouraged China to use its influence with Russia to help bring about a peaceful end to the war and expressed that New Zealand would be “very concerned” if China were to provide Russia with lethal weapons.
Possible changes over AUKUS
Respectful criticisms and calls for economic diversification are nothing new, but other developments are more remarkable. For one, Hipkins may diverge from Ardern over AUKUS. So far, New Zealand has not been involved — as Mahuta reaffirmed during the meeting with her Chinese counterparts. Many in New Zealand have cited its anti-nuclear stance as a reason not to join. However, just days after Mahuta visited China, the Hipkins administration indicated it was considering joining the non-nuclear pillar of AUKUS. Responses to this development in New Zealand have been varied.
Some proponents of joining argue that staying out of AUKUS would exclude New Zealand from important discussions about the newest developments in defence technology in the region. Others point out that New Zealand currently only has one formal alliance, which is with Australia. If we recognise that there is value in economic diversification, the same can be said of security ties. Additionally, joining AUKUS unambiguously signals New Zealand’s intentions, thus providing a deterrent to destabilising forces in the Asia-Pacific, lowering the likelihood of miscalculations resulting from incomplete information.
There are also opposing arguments, however. Joining AUKUS would realistically come at a financial cost, in addition to the possibility of economic retaliation by China. Some argue that New Zealand might be better off staying out of the US-China rivalry and ‘walking a tightrope’ to try to benefit from cooperation with both sides. Minimising its involvement in programmes like AUKUS may allow New Zealand to keep its policy options open and its foreign policy independent, as former Prime Minister Helen Clark suggests.
By contrast, joining AUKUS would likely deteriorate its relationship not just with China, but potentially also with Pacific and Southeast Asian states. By clearly committing to one side of the US-China rivalry, New Zealand might also be contributing to the solidification of the two opposing camps in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, there are calls for the government to seek feedback from the public, including from Maori, given its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. Given the wide-reaching effects this decision might have, careful considerations with public consultations do seem justified.
Robert Patman has argued that AUKUS is based on the assumption that the future of the Indo-Pacific region will be determined by US-China competition, thus exaggerating the capacity of great powers in today’s interconnected world and neglecting the distinctive economic and security interests of many other significant actors in the Indo-Pacific region. Instead, he argues, a broader multilateral security arrangement is needed to uphold the international rules-based order in the region.
Other security policy shifts on the horizon
Although New Zealand is not a NATO member, it has been confirmed that Hipkins will be attending the upcoming summit in Vilnius in July 2023. This is not a departure from the government’s previous policy — Ardern also attended the last NATO summit in June 2022. However, it is significant because it shows that Ardern’s decision was not an outlier. Instead, it set the precedent for New Zealand to become more involved with NATO for the foreseeable future. Given NATO’s geographical focus, New Zealand cannot join as a formal member, but it may become de facto affiliated with NATO as part of the Asia Pacific Four (AP4).
If so, New Zealand may also (have to) aim to meet NATO’s military spending target of 2 per cent of its GDP, up from the 1.5 per cent it currently spends. Indeed, there have been voices — including Defence Minister Andrew Little — emphasising the need for more military (especially naval) resources. When Hipkins was pressed during his recent Australia visit about whether New Zealand was reluctant to be more assertive towards China, he insisted that Wellington was making “very significant” investments into its defence portfolio, which was going through “significant transformations”. In all likelihood, the next few weeks will bring clarity on this front, as New Zealand completes its defence policy review.
Finally, New Zealand may also be increasing its coordination with Australia. This past weekend, Hipkins paid his second visit to Australia. As New Zealand’s only formal ally, Australia has always been an important partner. Nevertheless, the meeting is remarkable, considering Hipkins has been in office less than four months and has yet to visit any other states. Add to that the additional context relating to NATO, AUKUS, and TikTok bans in both Australia and New Zealand, and there are signs of increasing security alignment between the two states.
All in all, New Zealand’s foreign policy under the Hipkins administration largely continues the Ardern approach of placing significant value on its relationship with China. At the same time, there are indications that New Zealand may be shifting towards stronger security ties with ‘like-minded’ partners. New Zealand’s elections in October are fast approaching. The Labour Party and the National Party have been roughly neck to neck for over a year, so it is uncertain whether Hipkins is here to stay. If not, it is unclear how a government led by the National Party will proceed in terms of foreign policy. However, if the current trend continues, we may be witnessing New Zealand in the process of edging away from its hedging position and instead committing to the US bloc in this ‘new Cold War’.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Kina Kunz is a PhD candidate at the University of Otago studying Japan and South Korea's decision-making processes in response to the rise of China. Her research interests include Northeast Asian international relations, US foreign policy, New Zealand foreign policy, conflict management, and decision-making processes. Image credit: Flickr/Iain Farrell.