Indigenous deterrence capabilities and inter-Korean relations
Indigenous deterrence capabilities and inter-Korean relations
WRITTEN BY ELISABETH SUH
24 November 2021
Missile tests by North Korea make headlines on a regular, almost half-yearly basis. While the degree of political attention and public outcry varies, it is obvious to all that Pyongyang maintains its nuclear weapons programme. In fact, it is working hard to bolster its deterrence posture by establishing a nuclear dyad of diverse ground- and sea-launched delivery vehicles for its nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, South Korea is also boosting its deterrence posture by developing indigenous weapons systems and improving its triad of air, ground, and sea launched conventional capabilities.
Technically, the two Koreas have been at war since 1950. The Korean War was frozen in 1953 with an armistice that South Korea never signed. In ridicule to its official name, the ‘Demilitarized Zone’ along the 38th parallel remains one of the most militarised border areas in the world. Inter-Korean relations have shown to be risk-prone and fragile, with past and present efforts at détente and rapprochement going nowhere and alternating with phases of crises and hostilities. How will the most recent strategic arms developments by both Pyongyang and Seoul impact the situation on the Korean Peninsula?
Ongoing nuclear and missile developments in the North
North Korea is modernising its nuclear forces in both dimensions of the term, maintaining its arsenal as well as adding new capabilities. Pyongyang seems to be not only producing fissile material for more nuclear warheads but also expanding its capabilities to produce more fissile material. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inferred from satellite imagery that North Korea has completed a reprocessing campaign at the Yongbyon reactor complex to produce plutonium and tritium. Analysts also assume that North Korea continues its production of uranium concentrate as well as expanding its uranium enrichment facilities at Yongbyon. Weapons-grade plutonium, tritium and highly enriched uranium allow Pyongyang to build nuclear warheads of different designs and compositions, from tactical nuclear weapons with lower yields to boosted fission or thermonuclear bombs with intense yields. Kim Jong-un reaffirmed the pursuit of diverse nuclear weapons in 2017 and in January 2021.
The upcoming presidential elections in March 2022 will set Seoul’s tone for the next five years. Which scenario is more likely to unfold in the medium-term, however, depends also on North Korea and the broader geopolitical setting.
Missile developments are also following suit. Throughout 2019, 2020 and March 2021, North Korea conducted several test events of short-range ballistic missile systems. While these events seemed to fulfil purposes of salvo training and confirming operational readiness, tests of other and more recent systems serve to develop new weapons technology. As Joe Varner outlined for 9DASHLINE, the systems tested in September and October 2021 add new features to Pyongyang’s arsenal of delivery vehicles for conventional or nuclear warheads. Overall, North Korea aims to improve its deterrence posture, warfighting capabilities and increase the survivability of its forces in contingencies.
It does so by, first, increasing the diversity of its arsenal, including cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, different ranges, road or track mobile deployment and launch systems. Second, it claims to work on solid propellants not only for short-range systems but also for its longer-range ballistic missiles. Solid-fuelled ballistic missiles allow greater mobility and operational readiness. Third, Pyongyang also aspires to launch ballistic missiles from the sea or from undersea and thereby operate a nuclear dyad. While the claim to build nuclear-powered submarines and launch longer-range ballistic missiles from underwater is a stretch too ambitious, North Korea could use its diesel-powered submarines to deploy and launch its different ballistic missiles from ashore in an attempt to increase the survivability of its nuclear forces in contingencies.
Indigenous missiles and nuclear talk in the South
South Korea already operates a triad of air, ground and sea launched systems for conventional warheads. In addition to procuring US weapons systems such as the fighter aircraft F-35, Seoul has also been researching and developing capabilities of its own. Ground-launched, short-ranged Hyunmoo variants (2A, 2B, 2C) are the centrepieces of South Korea’s pre-emptive or retaliatory strike strategies for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul is developing and testing several different missile systems for warfighting, including air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles to be launched from its indigenous fighter aircraft. In March 2020, South Korea also tested a ground-launched Hyunmoo variant that can target any part of North Korea with a two tonne-payload.
A lighter payload would technically allow for more range, including nearby China or Russia. Seoul can officially pursue such a capability since the termination of missile guidelines in May 2021, an agreement from 1979 that set range and payload limits for its missile developments. South Korea’s research of solid-fuel engines for satellite launch vehicles might contribute to its (future) development of solid-fuelled longer-range missiles. In July and September 2021, South Korea tested a Hyunmoo variant from sea and underwater, the latter confirming its capability of launching ballistic missiles from submarines. Seoul thereby joins the exclusive club of states possessing such a capability, which also helps deter North Korea, China, and Russia.
While increasing investments in defence and deterrence capabilities enjoy consistent bipartisan support, the issue of nuclear weapons on South Korean territory has returned to muddle the domestic political debate. Thirty years after the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from the South, some politicians have floated the idea of asking Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons and/or engage in bilateral nuclear sharing arrangements. Others have called for the more extreme option of South Korea developing and possessing nuclear weapons itself. While this recurring debate remains relatively confined and aimed at reassurance from Washington, it fuels long-standing fears of nuclear proliferation and stains the perception of Seoul’s interest in nuclear technologies for civilian or other military purposes, such as pyro-processing of spent nuclear fuel or nuclear-powered submarines.
A curse or blessing in disguise?
The efforts at bolstering deterrence on both sides of the 38th parallel can unfold in several different ways. In theory, two essential scenarios lie at opposite ends of this spectrum of medium-term implications: Pyongyang’s and Seoul’s arms developments can either invigorate inter-Korean efforts at military tension reduction or fundamentally impede inter-Korean rapprochement. South Korea’s indigenous deterrence capabilities might incentivise Pyongyang to take the South more seriously and to show sincere interest in inter-Korean talks on military issues. North Korea considers the US its main adversary and Seoul as subordinate to Washington, particularly in terms of security and defence.
The fact that wartime operational control of armed forces on the Korean Peninsula remains with the US only plays into this narrative. South Korea’s development of its own systems, however, could challenge this perception and substantiate its image as a relevant actor for security on the Korean Peninsula. In this positive scenario, indigenous strategic capabilities on both sides of the 38th parallel could manifest the importance of military tension reductions in inter-Korean relations, validating previous efforts in 2007 and 2018. Efforts at risk reduction and conventional arms control matter for stability on the Korean Peninsula. The fate of Pyongyang’s nuclear (weapons) programme will remain a matter of US-North Korean negotiations, nonetheless.
South Korea’s weapons developments might just as well spur tensions on the Korean Peninsula and impede any talks and efforts at détente. North Korea already referred to Seoul’s activities as confirming mutual armament and deteriorated relations. Furthermore, South Korea’s improving deterrence posture contribute to worsening regional tensions as they add to the allied front against China. Although to different extents, Australia, Japan, and Taiwan are each looking into strike capabilities to bolster their conventional deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis Beijing. The arms race on the Korean Peninsula is thus embedded in a regional context of armament and confrontation. In this negative scenario, increasing hostility between China and the US could obstruct substantive inter-Korean relations and independent efforts at détente. Since the division of Korea, geopolitics have mattered greatly to inter-Korean affairs; reinforcing geopolitical drivers in the 21st century, however, will render stability on the Korean Peninsula evermore fragile and contingent upon emerging security complexities.
Military capabilities matter for political relations, but political contexts and involved parties’ interests determine how capabilities impact relations. The ‘progressive’ political camp in South Korea — such as the ruling party and current president — views indigenous deterrence capabilities as a way to increase military sovereignty vis-à-vis the US and bargaining leverage vis-à-vis North Korea. The ‘conservative’ camp sees indigenous deterrence capabilities as a contribution to bolstering the alliance with Washington and presenting a united front against Pyongyang and Beijing. The upcoming presidential elections in March 2022 will set Seoul’s tone for the next five years. Which scenario is more likely to unfold in the medium-term, however, depends also on North Korea and the broader geopolitical setting.
While near-term domestic and international political contexts are rather volatile, weapons developments expand across longer time horizons. One administration’s investments into a certain weapons programme will likely bear fruit under a different administration; in the meantime, such investments incentivise other states’ investments. North and South Korea’s arms developments are thus very likely to fuel existing spirals of armament and deepen confrontation in the region. For the time being, short-lived moments of both détente and intense warmongering are imaginable, cementing the seventy-year-old state of instability and tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Elisabeth Suh is a PhD fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) and a research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Her dissertation discusses North Korea’s nuclear signalling. Issues of nuclear-non-proliferation, arms control and security in the Asia-Pacific are part of her work. Previously, Betty held positions of visiting fellow and research assistant at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and student assistant at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Image credit: Flickr/Lawrence Wang.