Heating up: An arms race on the Korean Peninsula

25 October 2021

In North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un’s eighth Workers’ Party Congress speech in January 2021, he called for a series of desired strategic nuclear weapons to confront the US, including solid-fuel Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that can be launched from land and undersea, hypersonic missiles, military reconnaissance satellites, long-range cruise missiles, multiple warheads, large nuclear warheads, miniaturised nuclear weapons, tactical nukes, military surveillance satellites and hypersonic aircraft. The Kim regime has been true to its word.

In March 2021, North Korea tested a few Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), with little or no reaction from the Biden Administration that was squarely focused on China. This fall, in little more than one month, North Korea has tested five new strategic weapons systems, including a long-range cruise missile, a new rail-based launch system for nuclear missiles, a hypersonic nuclear-capable missile with fuel ampoule, a long-range air defence missile, and a new nuclear-capable Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). By any measurement, it is an incredible feat for an isolated, small, poor country under international sanctions to produce and test five systems in quick succession.

It is bound and determined to hold Washington’s feet to the fire, holding its bases in the region, US cities and their populations hostage now and for the foreseeable future.

It is important to note that it takes two to tango. South Korea is testing its own SLBM and has tested a new ballistic missile boat. Japan, under pressure from Russia, North Korea, and China, is also in the process of a military build-up. Regional arms races are heating up. In North Korea’s mind, nothing has changed, and regime survival remains paramount. The US still has large forces on the Korean peninsula and maintains punishing sanctions on the Hermit Kingdom — two issues that make political settlement between the North and the Biden administration unlikely even with China’s improbable assistance. The North’s response this fall has been startling, to say the least, and it is of great importance that the US and its allies consider the impact of these tests on regional security.

Five new strategic system tests

First, on 11 or 12 September the North tested its first long-range nuclear-capable land-attack cruise missile (LACM) with a range of 1,500 kilometres — enough to cover all of South Korea and most of Japan. One of the most detailed analyses to date comes from 38 North, which reported the LACM travelled over North Korean territory in an oval and figure of 8 route at a speed of 712 kilometres per hour. At this time, it is not known if Pyongyang can miniaturise a nuclear warhead to the size of this missile (potentially 0.5-0.6 meters), but it should be noted that dual nuclear and conventionally tipped missiles are particularly destabilising in crises. Pyongyang likely based the LACM, including its turbofan engine, on the Russian Kh-35 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) and its own clone of the KH-35 the Kumsong-3 (KN-19) missile. The launch vehicle appears to be the same model of vehicle used to carry the multiple-launch rocket system, but the LACM could also be launched from aircraft, submarines, and surface warships. LACMs are hard to defend against in the first place, but an attack employing both ballistic missiles and LACMs would give the North a greater ability to suppress allied air and missile defences. Finally, the appearance of the North Korean LACM is another sign of an increasing arms race with South Korea.

Second, on 14 September, North Korea test-fired two solid-fuel, nuclear-capable SRBMs from a railcar side by side launcher an hour apart that then hit a sea target 500 miles away. The SRBMs appeared to be the North Korean KN-23 model of the Russian Iskander SRBM geared to defeat theatre level missile defences. There is every indication that Pyongyang is trying to develop multiple launch systems to increase the survivability of its nuclear arsenal in times of war. A rail-based launching system increases its options and mobility to launch strategic weapons. Having said that, the country’s lack of railway tracks may make the missile trains easier to find in times of war. However, given the difficulty of road transit and lack of roads in North Korea, it is important to point out that Pyongyang’s KN-27 liquid-fuelled Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), currently the world’s largest mobile ICBM, would be the main beneficiary of rail mobility.

Third, on 28 September North Korea claimed to have tested a nuclear-capable missile armed with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) named Hwasong-8 that can fly to target at speeds higher than Mach 5. HGVs are launched into space by rockets, on command glide back to Earth and manoeuvre to their target at up to 12 times the speed of sound. Photos released shortly after the test suggest that the boost vehicle is likely the Hwasong-12 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and that the North Korean HGV is a derivative of the Chinese DF-ZF HGV for the DF-17 Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). It is noteworthy that the North seems to have developed a missile fuel ampoule that would enable missiles to be fuelled at the factory and sent to the field in canisters, meaning they could stay launch-ready for years. It is still unclear if North Korea has developed the capability to miniaturise nuclear weapons for use on missiles, but an HGV would allow Pyongyang to evade South Korean, Japanese and likely US missile defences. The Hwasong-8 flew to a height of 60 kilometres and a distance of 200 kilometres before falling into the Sea of Japan.

Fourth, on 30 September, according to Pyongyang, it test-fired what it called a ‘remarkable’ new anti-aircraft missile that featured rapid responsiveness, increased guidance, accuracy, and increased range. It was also reported that the new anti-aircraft missile had a twin rudder control and a double impulse flight engine. The North Korean Academy of National Defense Science said the test was “aimed at confirming the practical functionality of the missile’s launcher, radar, comprehensive battle command vehicle and combat performance”. In real terms, we do not know a great deal about this new anti-aircraft missile system.

Fifth, on 19 October Pyongyang launched a new solid-fuel, nuclear-capable, Pukguksong-series Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) that reached a height of 60 kilometres and flew 450 kilometres before landing in the Sea of Japan. It appears the SLBM was launched from Sinpo, and it is still too early to tell if it was launched from a submersible barge stationed at Sinpo or North Korea’s conventional-powered ballistic missile submarine Gorae Sinpo-B. The true range of this new SLBM appears to be somewhere around 1,900 kilometres, giving it coverage of South Korea and Japan. SLBM are harder to find and, with a submarine as a launch platform, they can carry the missiles farther afield to engage other targets. Some of the photographs suggest this new SLBM could be a derivative of the KN-23 SRBM or North Korean Iskander and would represent the third launch of an SLBM variant since 2015. While a smaller design than previous Pukguksong series SLBMs, the smaller size may enable more missiles per submarine and easier conversions of other North Korean submarines to missile boats.

What is the North up to?

So, what does all this mean for regional security and the future security environment in the Indo-Pacific? First, it suggests that despite international pressure and punishing sanctions, Pyongyang remains committed to its nuclear programme and a plethora of missile programmes aimed at both deterrence and warfighting within the region. To be sure, testing a weapon system does not mean that system will ever be deployed in peacetime or battle. However, the North’s move to rail-launched nuclear-tipped missiles goes to Kim Jong-un’s push for increased survivability of his nuclear arsenal along with submarine deployed nuclear missiles and likely foreshadows what we will see in the deployment of the KN-27 ICBM on a rail. When coupled with the new LACM and other systems, Pyongyang’s Hwasong-8 HGV demonstrates the North’s wish to both defeat regional air defences and gain coverage overall South Korea and Japan in time of war.

It is only a matter of time before the North develops intermediate and long-range HGV’s capable of attacking the US. A mix of ground-based ballistic, long-range cruise, SLBM, and HGV would provide the North with greatly increased warfighting capability and enhanced conventional military power. We still do not know whether North Korea has been able to miniaturise nuclear weapons for these new and older nuclear weapon systems, but it is likely only a matter of time if they have not done so already. While described as strategic or nuclear, many of these systems could also be used to deploy conventional warheads, which constitutes a major destabilising factor in crisis and a concern for the entire region.

At the grand strategic level, only time will tell if Japan or South Korea decide to arm with nuclear weapons. South Korean public support for its own nuclear deterrent reached a new high in 2020 with 69 per cent of the population voicing support, while 61 per cent want the US to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula — points likely to play a part in the March presidential election. The Conservative candidate Hong Joon-pyo said he would support a nuclear sharing agreement with the US, while the likely Moon-led governing party candidate Lee Jae-myung opposes nuclear sharing because it diminishes South Korea’s demand that the North denuclearise. Japan’s new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, once considered a dove, comes from the Hiroshima prefecture with old-entrenched views on nuclear weapons. He was elected by his promises of stabilising both the internal and foreign policy situation. However, Kishida has become increasingly hawkish, and the nuclear issue could well become the proverbial ‘elephant in the room’ during his tenure set against the backdrop of Chinese, Russian, and North Korean hostility and intransigence on territorial claims and historic grievances.

Meanwhile, regarding North Korea, an increasingly China-focused Biden administration still recovering from its missteps on the foreign policy front, particularly in Afghanistan, seems bound to repeat the policies of the Clinton and Obama administrations. North Korea, on the other hand, has in the last month made clear it is going nowhere. It is bound and determined to hold Washington’s feet to the fire, holding its bases in the region, US cities and their populations hostage now and for the foreseeable future.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Joe Varner is a former Director of Policy to Canada's Minister of Defence and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point's Modern War Institute. Image credit: Flickr/Loco Steve.