India's new strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific
India’s New Strategic Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific
WRITTEN BY RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN
6 April 2020
India’s foreign policy is changing in quite dramatic way when compared to its traditional Cold War non-aligned posture. India’s wariness with alignments is slowly giving way. India’s concerns about the strategic consequences of China’s rise has driven New Delhi to redraw its strategic partnerships and engage with powers of which it was traditionally wary.
India is push for closer ties with countries like the United States, Japan and Australia with greater purpose and direction than before. And it is reaching farther out too. While it has always had a close partnership with France, New Delhi and Paris have been able to find new avenues of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. All of this is thanks to China: As long as China continues with its aggressive maneuvering in India’s backyard, New Delhi will be compelled to engage in diplomatic efforts in pursuit of more strategic options and to reduce its relative material vulnerabilities.
India has traditionally remained wary of balance of power engagements and preferred not to take sides in great power competition. However, India is presented with different sets of challenges than during the Cold War years, where one of the potential great powers is India’s neighbour with whom there are unresolved border and territorial issues and as well as baggage of history that are not conducive for a stable Asian strategic order. Besides, China, the next rising power, has taken every opportunity to restrain India’s strategic space in Asia and beyond. India also a military that is faced with several capacity deficits. Thus, today’s strategic environment does not leave India too many viable options but to engage in extensive strategic outreach to expand its options.
As China expands its footprint in economic and strategic terms into the Indian Ocean, France too has recognised the need to step up its military and security cooperation with India. With France having a large presence in the southwest Indian Ocean, it has both an economic and strategic stake in the Indian Ocean affairs.
The most dramatic of these changes in relationships has been with the US. India’s outreach to the US over the last decade and a half has been significant. Starting with the US-India civil nuclear deal, Washington and New Delhi have gone on to strengthen their bilateral engagements to the point of starting a 2+2 strategic dialogue beginning in September 2018. This has been an impressive change for India, a country that normally prefers to sit on the fence if it could at all.
This change has been helped along by the fact that the US has also been eager to push it, a sentiment shared across ideologically different administrations, and the US has been patient with New Delhi. For example, under President Barack Obama, the US categorized India as a “Major Defense Partner.” Building on the improved ties, the Trump Administration in 2018 gave India STA-1 (Strategic Trade Authorisation-1) status, which was seen as a clear acknowledgment of India as an important strategic partner.
India-Japan relations have seen an uptick too in the last decade. These relations had been cool, especially because of Japan’s negative reaction to India’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998. But, paralleling changes in Indo-US ties, these also warmed up. The India-Japan civil nuclear agreement and the 2+2 dialogue are testament to the nature of close strategic ties between the two countries. The fact that India has the 2+2 dialogue format only with the US and Japan is an indication of the special and strategic nature of these engagements. Both these 2+2 dialogues are driven by the growing fear of China and the desire to maintain a region that is open, free, secure and inclusive. Japan and India have repeatedly emphasized that theirs is an inclusive regional approach, contrasting it with China’s, which they argue has an exclusivist one.
India’s relations with Australia show very similar trends to that of Japan. India-Australia strategic partnership has also seen notable transformation, especially considering how uninterested both New Delhi and Canberra were even a few years ago. Clearly, the China worry has had a major role in driving up this partnership too. And it is set to improve even more: India finally seems set to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercises, which Australia had been asking to join for several years. Also noteworthy is that both India and Australia, in different ways the two countries which were most hesitant about the Quadrilateral initiative, are now well and truly on-board.
The old India-France strategic partnership has also gained greater salience in the contemporary geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. The visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to India in March 2018 achieved a great deal, especially in terms of defence and security collaboration. The two countries, with a shared vision for the Indian Ocean, have highlighted maritime security as a core area of cooperation between India and France. As China expands its footprint in economic and strategic terms into the Indian Ocean, France too has recognised the need to step up its military and security cooperation with India. With France having a large presence in the southwest Indian Ocean, it has both an economic and strategic stake in the Indian Ocean affairs.
India has been fairly strategic and pragmatic in pursuing each of these important partnerships. For the first time in India’s diplomatic history, India signed a number of ‘foundational agreements’ to pursue more effective cooperation in the defence and security domains. It first signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002, followed by the Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA) or what is now called the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016. In 2018 at the first ever US-India 2+2 dialogue, the two countries signed the third foundational agreement called the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) or what was originally called the CISMOA, or a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement.
COMCASA is seen as particularly important in the context of technology transfers as the agreement “requires India to safeguard sensitive and secure US-sourced military communication equipment and, in turn, facilitates Indian use of previously restricted communication channels to enable closer interoperation between U.S. and Indian military assets as well as those of friendly armed forces that have also concluded a similar agreement with the United States.” Similarly, the LEMOA is particularly significant for India as New Delhi can potentially expand its naval footprint by gaining access to US military facilities in Djibouti and Diego Garcia. This would enhance India’s maritime outreach in areas that it traditionally has not been able to play a role.
India has entered into similar arrangements with France too, making it possible for India to access the French military bases in the island of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands, in the southwestern Indian Ocean. India has nearly finalized negotiations with Japan and Australia for similar deals that will enhance New Delhi’s maritime reach as well maximize operational influence in areas far beyond India’s immediate waters.
It should also be noted that despite India’s discomfort with such partnerships, these policies have been evolutionary, supported by multiple governments with different ideological orientations. Thus, it is likely that India’s new partnerships will only become stronger further in the coming years.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Distinguished Fellow & Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative, at the Observer Research Foundation. She is also the senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat. Image credit: by Ministry of External Affairs (India)/Flickr.