Neither friend or foe: New Delhi’s foreign policy towards China
Neither friend or foe: New Delhi’s foreign policy towards China
WRITTEN BY KRZYSZTOF IWANEK
6 April 2020
The relations between India and China – the world’s two most populous countries by far– are definitely one of the trends we should watch as the 21st century progresses. Yet, while Sino-Indian rivalry is apparent in a number of ways and in a number of places, we should not let our imagination be carried away by the vision of great power rivalry. There are better ways to describe their interactions, although these take more time and may be more boring to many.
Let me start with a more controversial example, to utilise as a springboard to move towards more constructive conclusions. In a recent text, first published for Australian Financial Review and later reprinted by East Asia Forum, Hugh White, a known commentator of international affairs, presents us between two future options. While raising a question if there is a chance of ‘India leading a grand Indo-Pacific coalition against China’, White rejects this possibility and concludes that New Delhi is ‘more likely to cut a deal with China to divide the wider Indo-Pacific region up between them’.
Both of these assumptions are wrong, however, as they are based on a sharp binary – either conflict or a division of zones of influences. Either Napoleonic Wars or Treaty of Tordesillas. Such visions are indeed very attractive but lack nuance at closer scrutiny. In a nutshell, India is too weak for the first option to materialise, while China is too strong for the second one.
India is too independent to be an outspoken ally of any global power but too weak to be a global power by itself. New Delhi is keen to not be seen as a U.S. ally but cannot risk becoming China’s foe.
Perhaps nobody expects India to lead a ‘grand Indo-Pacific coalition against China’ and neither does New Delhi aspire to such a role. As of now, there is only one country in the world to take this position and we all know which one that is. As for a compromise that would ‘divide the wider Indo-Pacific region’ between India and China, New Delhi lacks leverage to push for such a deal – and, again, does not even aspire to this role. India’s real influences are limited to its own region, South Asia, and even there they are apparent and strong in the smaller countries: Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal. As of now, an imaginary ‘Indian zone of influence’ would not extend to the region’s larger nations – Pakistan and Bangladesh – not to speak of a wider sphere beyond South Asia.
Moreover, there is no reason for China to table such an agreement either. Beijing’s power parts of India’s vicinity has already grown to a point in which New Delhi has little capacity to uproot it, although it may attempt to slow down its rise in the already-mentioned smaller South Asian states. But should anybody expect the PRC to cancel its billion dollars-worth investments in Pakistan or even abandon its Djibouti base for the sake of cutting a deal with India? To put it differently: interactions between two nations may be reduced to such two extreme options – conflict or carving out influence zones – in conditions of intense great power rivalry. But India is not a great power.
Rather than a black-and-white picture, we should perceive Sino-Indian relations as a whole spectrum, which, depending on the aspect, includes both shades of conscious rivalry, avoidance of conflict and cooperation. While of these three rivalry is certainly growing, New Delhi is probably aware of its weakness and is not marching towards a direct conflict with its northern neighbour.
I suggest that instead of finding one paradigm to outline the dynamic of interactions between the two giants, we should rather examine their aspects piece by piece, to look for the devil in the details rather than keep asking about the big picture. If the events of the last years offer any suggestions for future trends, I would assume that some of the aspects of New Delhi’s current China policy are:
Avoidance of escalation or direct conflict while not backing down in case of border tensions. The 2017 Doklam standoff was a strong case in this point, albeit the only such one in recent years. While significant, it also appeared as an outlier on the broader canvas of relations, as India hosted the AIIB annual meeting the same year, followed by New Delhi’s participation in two bilateral summits – in Wuhan (2018) and Mamallapuram (2019).
Striving to contain Chinese influence in the above-mentioned smaller Indian states through an indirect conflict of influences. We should not simplify the internal politics of these nations as divided into pro-Beijing and pro-New Delhi factions, however (although the cases of 2019 elections in the Maldives and Sri Lanka tempted some to think along these lines). Neither China nor India are that strong in those countries but their influences and interests have certainly become factors in the local power plays. While tussles between political factions are hard to examine for an external observer, certain other developments, such as Japan and India’s interest in reducing Sri Lanka’s debt dependence on China appear to be instances of this indirect war of influences.
Enhancing capacities to follow and deter Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean. Indian forces’ growing presence in the Andaman and Nicobar islands – where the navy has recently opened its fourth base – is a case in this point, as is India’s cooperation with other countries of the Indo-Pacific, mentioned below.
Openness to Chinese investment and loans in an array of areas, especially when these would come from a multilateral institutions where China holds a huge stake, rather than a Chinese banks. Despite all of the above, India has become a member of the PRC-founded Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, quickly becoming the bank’s biggest borrower, a position it holds till today.
Not bringing politics into bilateral trade, but also attempting not to further deepen its dependence on Chinese goods. While some of the Indian hawks have argued that New Delhi should strive to reduce its massive trade imbalance with China, given its economic position India has little capabilities to do so. At the same time, however, New Delhi’s recent decision not to join RCEP was probably largely based on a concern that this would tilt the trade imbalance even further.
Extending its hand through highest-level bilateral summits. These events, mentioned above, appeared to bring in little substance, but were at least a symbol of both sides’ willingness to keep the avenues of dialogue open, rather than entering a war path. At the same time, New Delhi did not want to be seen as endorsing Beijing foreign policy line by refusing to take part in PRC’s biggest multilateral event, the Belt and Road Forum for Internal Cooperation.
Cooperating with certain countries of the Indo-Pacific region in ways that clearly show that their concern about China’s growing power is a common denominator (as so far it is mainly about the cooperation between the navies). Here India found partners not only in the US, but also Japan, Australia, France and Vietnam. Yet, this is being done without outspokenly declaring this objective, and by carefully striving not to present this collaboration as an alliance. While India-US cooperation is growing and this trend appears certain to continue in the years to come, New Delhi will rather not become Washington’s ally in a formal way, but will cooperate with the US whenever both sides may share a common goal – and containing the Chinese presence on the Indian Ocean is one of such instance.
In summation, India is too strong and independent to be an outspoken ally of any global power but too weak to be a global power by itself. It does not want to be seen as an US ally and cannot risk becoming China’s outspoken foe. As long as its capacities do not grow substantially, New Delhi will probably play a balancing game and bide its time, not allowing itself to be engaged into costly and protracted conflicts beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Krzysztof Iwanek is the Head of the Asia Research Centre (at Center for Security Studies, War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland). He is also a contributor to The Diplomat. He tweets at @Chris_Iwanek. CC BY-NC 4.0/The White House/Flickr