China's growing presence in the Western Indian Ocean
CHINA’S GROWING PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN
WRITTEN BY CLAUDE RAKISITS
6 April 2020
Most of the world’s attention has been focussed on China’s aggressive military behaviour and impressive infrastructure build-up in the South China Sea in the last few years. And this is understandable given the massive geo-strategic implications this will have in the long-term on Washington’s ability to pursue without hindrance its military strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
This, in turn, has immense implications for America’s military relationships with the countries of the region. However, probably just as important in the long-term in geo-strategic terms is the steady build-up of China’s military capacity in the western Indian Ocean—the western bookend of China’s Indian Ocean strategy. And this development, which has effectively gone underneath the world’s radar, has been progressing for almost five years. Let’s examine the main components of this development and what it means for the Indian Ocean region.
In April 2015 Chinese President Xi came to Pakistan to sign off on a very expensive project —the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—of around $60 billion. CPEC, a 15-year development scheme, is a massive multi-purpose project which includes the construction of roads, railroads, oil and gas pipelines and solar power stations, and the development of the deep-sea Indian Ocean port of Gwadar and its adjoining airport. When completed in 2030, this project will link by road and rail western China to the Indian Ocean, effectively making China a two-ocean nation.
Beijing also has its eyes on The Maldives with which it signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2017. However, following the 2018 election in Sri Lanka, which led to a change of government, the warm bilateral relationship has been put in doubt as has the future of the FTA. So it’s not all smooth sailing on these two fronts.
Once fully operational and oil begins to flow from Gwadar to western China, the transport route will be some 6,000 miles shorter, by-passing the Strait of Malacca, China’s principal and most vulnerable choke point. Not surprisingly, CPEC is the jewel in China’s trans-Asian Belt and Road Initiative (ABRI) crown. But more significant than Gwadar in military terms is the construction of a joint Pakistan-Chinese operated naval and air base in Jiwani, about 80km west of Gwadar. When completed this would be China’s second foreign military base. It would also be located at the mouth of the Gulf of Oman, the strategic entrance to the Persian Gulf.
Besides the commercial port of Gwadar—where China has a 40-year lease, Beijing has a military base in Djibouti since August 2017. Given Djibouti’s location at the mouth of the Mandeb Strait—the choke point that connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, this is a huge strategic development with long-term implications for the region. Two important points about this base: about half of China’s oil imports comes through the Mandeb Strait and this is China’s first overseas base. So this base has much more than simply symbolic value.
China is also courting other Indian Ocean nations in the hope of widening its strategic partnership. For example, Beijing has a 99-year lease for the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which has potential to service naval ships. That relationship made headlines in 2014 when Chinese submarines docked at Hambantota. Interestingly, when the Chinese requested a submarine visit in 2018 this was turned down, probably because Colombo wanted to avoid damaging its relationship with India.
Notwithstanding the above, one should not overstate the Chinese naval presence in the western Indian Ocean. On any given day, there is usually only about half a dozen or so naval ships, including a nuclear attack submarine, in the northern Indian Ocean. Or to put it differently, but not surprisingly, there are many more Indian ships in the region today. Of course, once more Chinese bases in the western Indian Ocean come online, more Chinese ships will be able to be serviced and supplied, and therefore more will ply those waters. However, regardless of the number of bases China builds in the Indian Ocean, including in Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, India will always have the critical advantage of its geographic location effectively in the middle of the Indian Ocean. And this is why China is willing to expand enormous resources to box India in South Asia by building bases and alliances in India’s neighbourhood to hamper Delhi’s ability to project naval power further afield in the Indian Ocean.
This explains why Gwadar is so important not only to China but to Pakistan as well. Gwadar, which is only about 240 miles from the Strait of Hormuz, has made Pakistan a force multiplier for Beijing. Potentially, the importance of Gwadar could be even further enhanced if India’s role in the development of Chabahar, the Iranian port on the Arabian Sea about 100 miles west of Gwadar, stalls and Iran turns to China as an alternative strategic partner. If this were to happen, Chabahar could be included in the CPEC project and turn the Chabahar-Gwadar association into a formidable commercial hub.
So, all in all, as China continues to build up its naval capability and develops more bases, we can expect to see an increased Chinese presence—not limited to naval—in the western Indian Ocean region in the coming years. Arguably, in the short to medium term, the Chinese navy’s principal task would be to protect the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and, in particular the oil imports, from the Persian Gulf to Gwadar. Further into the future China’s strategic plans for the Indian Ocean would most likely be more ambitious.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Claude Rakisits is Honorary Associate Professor in Diplomacy at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University and an Associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Image credit: CC BY-NC 4.0/U.S. Pacific Fleet/Flickr.