India’s critical role in safeguarding undersea cables

4 June 2025

The internet has become a medium of global connectivity with 5.5 billion users — approximately 67 per cent of the total world population. Almost 99 per cent of global internet traffic flows through undersea cables, making them essential infrastructure for digital connectivity. Compared to satellite-based internet communications, undersea cables offer faster, more reliable, and higher-capacity data transfers, making them indispensable for emerging technologies such as 6G, the Internet of Things (IoT), and advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Consequently, undersea cables constitute the critical infrastructure of a country, carrying almost all communications, and thus require institutionalised protection by both government and private industry.

Cables traversing the Indian Ocean Region, connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia, are especially important channels of information for the Indian consumer market — projected to surpass USD 4 trillion by 2030 — and the ASEAN market, which is expected to reach USD 4.5 trillion by the same year. While these cables face unintentional damage from sea bed trawling they are also subject to sabotage and hacking activity. India, a major stakeholder with dominant economic and political influence in the region, has the capability to maintain a regional consortium handling the maintenance and security for undersea cables.

Threats to undersea cables

Undersea cables have taken on growing geopolitical importance, as their disruption can severely impact government functions, business operations, and economic stability. These cables are typically damaged by human activities such as dredging, trawling, anchor dragging, and seabed mining. The South China Sea and Taiwan Strait are strategic chokepoints for global undersea cable networks with significant implications for Indo-Pacific security. China has used coercive tactics in these areas to reinforce its regional dominance. For example, China stands accused of intentionally damaging undersea cables near the Taiwan Strait by using third-country flagged vessels.

China has recently developed a deep-sea cable-cutting device, created by a team led by Hu Haolong from the Ship Scientific Research Centre (CSSRC) and the affiliated State Key Laboratory of Deep-Sea Manned Vehicles. It is capable of cutting steel-reinforced undersea cables at depths reaching 4,000 metres, raising concerns about the tool being used to gain geopolitical leverage by intentionally damaging critical infrastructure. China has also advanced the human-operated deep-sea vehicle, ‘Fendouzhe,’ which can reach depths of up to 10,000 meters. There is potential for the subsea cable cutter to be integrated with Fendouzhe, enabling it to operate at any ocean depth and increasing concerns about internet stability in the Indo-Pacific. This device also provides China with a technological advantage as it enhances the response time and effectiveness of maintenance operations for damaged undersea cables, since damaged cables typically need to be brought to the surface for repair.

To safeguard its internet infrastructure, India must invest in indigenous undersea cable maintenance capabilities, including commissioning Indian-flagged vessels for rapid response within its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.

According to Telegeography, a telecommunications data provider, approximately two to four undersea cables are damaged every week; and on average, there may be over 150 to 200 cables damaged per year. This makes the technology important in maintaining uninterrupted internet connectivity. Threats to connectivity were most recently illustrated by the Houthi attacks on the undersea cables in the Red Sea, an inlet to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) disrupting the internet connections to 17 African nations. The damage was followed by the Houthi group releasing a map of undersea cables on a Telegram channel, highlighting Yemen’s strategic position along cable routes connecting Asia and Europe. These attacks underscore the vulnerabilities of undersea cables for the IOR littoral states and reveal a new strategic area that belligerent groups may target.

Given the intended and unintended damage to undersea cables, and their importance in maintaining global digital connectivity, protecting them and having advanced technology to respond immediately to any damage is crucial. Though India is situated in a strategic location overlooking the cables passing from ASEAN nations towards East Asia, and from Africa and West Asia to the West, it does not have the technology to ensure a quick response within its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. This raises a question, how does India secure undersea cable infrastructure?

Protection of subsea cable infrastructure within India’s exclusive economic zone

Undersea cables are primarily laid by private companies called ‘cable-operators’. The maintenance of these cables is undertaken by separate private companies that operate specially designated ships with a dedicated crew. Maintenance is carried out via either a ‘Club Agreement’ or ‘Private Maintenance Agreement’. In a Club Agreement, cable operators form a consortium and share maintenance costs. Private Maintenance Agreements are bilateral agreements between cable operators and maintenance ship owners. Maintenance operations carried out under these agreements are categorised into six zones under Club Agreements and four zones under Private Maintenance Agreements.

According to a consultation paper released by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) in 2022, India hosts 14 landing stations linked to 17 active and developing subsea cable networks. However, Indian waters, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, are served by only two maintenance service providers based out of Singapore and Dubai. The nearest cable depot is in Galle, Sri Lanka, and is operated by ASEAN Cable Ship Pvt Ltd, a Singapore-based company. Maintenance ships take time to mobilise from their ports, delaying repairs within Indian Waters and in the Indian Ocean Region. Issues contributing to the long duration of repairs include permit requirements, the need to avoid conflict zones, and limited availability of resources for repair. To overcome these delays and respond quickly to damage to undersea cables, the TRAI advocates establishing either a private consortium of ‘International Long Distance Operators (ILDOs),’ a term for international undersea cable companies, or an Indian government-backed consortium, to operate an Indian-flagged maintenance vessel within the exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles. It also advises having a dedicated cable depot operating within Indian domestic waters (12 nautical miles from the land), allowing maintenance contractors to respond quickly.

In addition to the above recommendations, one way to protect undersea cables within India’s jurisdiction is to designate them and their associated infrastructure as ‘critical infrastructure’. If India were to formally categorise undersea cables as critical infrastructure, landing stations would be protected by the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). Protection of undersea cables within Indian waters would be carried out by a three-tiered coastal security system consisting of the state marine police, the Indian Coast Guard, and the Indian Navy. However, there is no public information about the readiness and training of security personnel, highlighting the need for new training programs focused on cable protection. Given the critical nature of undersea cables in ensuring communications, a government oversight mechanism would be necessary, which is currently not present in India. One option is to explore how TRAI could potentially serve as the overarching regulator, given its existing mandate to license cable landing stations.

Another way to ensure the protection of undersea cable infrastructure would be to establish cable protection zones. An example is Australia’s Telecommunications Act and New Zealand’s Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act, which establish subsea cable protection zones within territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles) and provide limited enforcement in the exclusive economic zone. These laws safeguard landing stations from threats such as unauthorised trawling, anchoring, and seabed mining. TRAI also suggests the establishment of protection zones, which would be a positive step in the right direction.

However, cables are installed by an international consortium of companies, and data flows through multiple cables crossing different countries. Given the transcontinental nature of data flow and infrastructure crossing international waters, the security of subsea cables cannot solely be a national responsibility.

India can lead the undersea cable protection in the Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) serves as a strategic hub in global connectivity, with fibre-optic cables connecting South Asia, East Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Given India’s strategic position in the IOR and its close ties with the littoral states, it has the capacity to lead a regional consortium focused on protecting this infrastructure and preventing geopolitical tensions from escalating into deliberate cable disruptions. Leveraging new initiatives like MAHASAGAR, India can spearhead regional cooperation frameworks among Indian Ocean littoral states for collective subsea cable protection. This new initiative could expand the security-focused SAGAR (Security and Growth for All) partnership to include developmental aspects, such as the export of India’s digital stack.

Establishing an undersea cable protection framework within MAHASAGAR, complementing the existing ‘Private Maintenance Agreements,’ would be both logical and practical. Such frameworks could involve additional maintenance vessels operated under the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), including dedicated Indian cable repair ships, or vessels jointly commissioned by littoral states, with India potentially leading these efforts. A research and knowledge centre for critical undersea infrastructure should be established in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), modelled on NATO’s Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure launched in May 2024. This centre would enhance the proposed undersea cable protection framework by offering training for security personnel and conducting focused research on enhancing the maintenance and functions of undersea communication and power cables.

To safeguard its internet infrastructure, India must invest in indigenous undersea cable maintenance capabilities, including commissioning Indian-flagged vessels for rapid response within its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. Simultaneously, undersea cables and associated infrastructure should be designated as Critical Infrastructure, enabling coordinated protection by the CISF, Indian Navy, Coast Guard, and state marine police. Establishing cable protection zones, especially around landing stations, would further shield this infrastructure from both accidental and intentional threats. At the regional level, India is well-positioned to lead a multilateral subsea cable protection initiative under the MAHASAGAR framework, fostering collective resilience among Indian Ocean littoral states and strengthening digital security through cooperation.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Arun Teja Polcumpally is the JSW Science and Technology Fellow at ASPI Delhi, a division of Asia Society India Center. He focuses on the intersection of science, emerging technologies, data, geopolitics, and global governance. Image credit: Freepik.