A superpower diminished: Trump’s chaotic foreign policy is undermining US credibility in Asia

24 April 2025

Following US President Donald Trump’s announcement of unprecedented tariffs across the globe on 2 April — which he euphemistically referred to as “liberation day” — Southeast Asia has been left trying to reconcile the widening gap between rhetoric and reality in Washington. The fact that the Trump administration quickly suspended most of the tariffs except those on China (currently 145 per cent) only added to the air of confusion and uncertainty. A 10 per cent baseline tariff remains in place on most countries.

Last month, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth travelled to the Philippines where he reaffirmed the United States’ “ironclad” security guarantee to Manila, before traveling to Japan to signal the Trump administration’s commitment to deterring China by working with allies and partners in Asia.

The net effect — particularly as evidenced by the reactions of shock and dismay to the tariffs — undermines the credibility of US security guarantees and further incentivises Southeast Asian countries to hedge against the increasing uncertainties associated with a dysfunctional Washington by strengthening ties with one another and with extra-regional powers such as India, Japan, Korea, and the European Union.

Upending the existing order

Since the end of WWII and the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (or GATT, which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO)), Washington has by and large pursued economic and security strategy in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner. US leaders reconciled conflicting aims of values and interests à la real politik by making economic concessions to allies and partners when it benefited American national security and adopted a softer approach to autocrats (or even rivals) when it made geopolitical sense for economic purposes.

A classic example is China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, which the Clinton administration vociferously advocated despite objections from human rights proponents in Congress and his own campaign rhetoric lambasting his predecessor

George H.W. Bush for “coddling tyrants” in Beijing in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989. Clinton and those who advocated engaging China to access its large consumer market blended national security strategy with economic policy.

Despite the opportunity presented by American retrenchment, China lacks the soft power to step in as a natural leader and its economic and political influence continue to be met with suspicion by regional elites.

That dual-track approach underpinned US primacy for the better part of a century. It frequently drew criticism and calls of hypocrisy from those who pointed out the inconsistency in Washington’s approach to values of human rights and democracy. Why, for instance, did Saudi Arabia get a free pass when Cambodia or Thailand were regularly targeted for their detention of opposition politicians and civil society activists? (The answer, in case it isn’t obvious, was US access to Saudi Arabia’s crude oil and Riyadh’s support for the US Global War on Terror in the 2000s).

Nevertheless, this occasionally contradictory strategy simultaneously buttressed Washington’s network of alliances and partnerships and perpetuated US dollar dominance by allowing the United States to use the size and power of its market to enforce the rules of the global trading system.

Now with the Trump administration’s reckless embrace of trade protectionism, the divergence between US economic and security policy threatens to upend that delicate balance and bring about a swift and ignominious end to US primacy (or what claim it still holds to its privileged position in the international pecking order). As one analyst summed it up, “The U.S. is pretty much done strategically in Southeast Asia”.

Jettisoning 80 years of US leadership

Trump has (once again) withdrawn the United States from the Paris climate agreement, signalling his administration’s disdain for other countries’ efforts to combat the most pressing international issue of the day, climate change.

The administration unceremoniously suspended the US Agency for International Development and disbanded the US Agency for Global Media, the parent company of Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. In doing so, the US incurred self-inflicted wounds, conceding significant soft power and influence to China.

Finally, in a shocking reversal of US foreign policy, his team publicly upbraided Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a meeting in the Oval Office in February and has openly sided with Vladmir Putin’s Russia.

Despite the state of total upheaval that currently prevails in Washington foreign policy circles, parts of the Trump cabinet have carried on as if they’re reading from a completely different script. Secretary of Defense Hegseth’s recent trip to the Indo-Pacific, for instance, was more or less in line with previous US policy under both Trump and Biden presidencies. Like his predecessor Lloyd Austin III in Manila, Hegseth reiterated that US commitment to the Philippines’ security was “ironclad”.

To demonstrate Washington meant what it said, Hegseth announced USD 500 million in foreign military financing (FMF) to the Philippines, and days later the US approved the sale of F-16s to the country pending Manila’s agreement. On his subsequent visit to Tokyo, Hegseth referred to Japan as an “indispensable partner” in US efforts to deter Chinese military aggression.

Southeast Asian countries unsure how to respond

Southeast Asian countries have struggled to adapt to the shocks of Trump 2.0. Nearly all were caught flat-footed as they had not expected the tariff rates announced on “liberation day” to be as high as they were. Even Singapore and Timor-Leste which run trade deficits with the United States face baseline tariffs of 10 per cent if they cannot negotiate deals with Washington before the 90 day pause ends.

There had been talk of a ASEAN-US summit being organised weeks ahead of the tariffs for ASEAN member states to meet with the Trump administration directly and make their case for why Washington should rethink its threatened tariffs. However, the summit has yet to take place, so regional countries have lobbied the administration individually, undermining their collective bargaining power.

Given that Southeast Asian countries are so dependent on exports as a large proportion of their GDP, the impact of tariffs will be debilitating and have grave implications for their economic development trajectory. Nevertheless, in light of their vulnerability none have floated the possibility of reciprocal punitive tariffs directed against the United States. Instead, they are likely to seek talks to discretely lower their individual rates. Many, like Vietnam, are rushing to do so.

This is exactly the position the Trump administration wants to be in. Trump prefers to deal with countries bilaterally. The US enjoys an enormous asymmetric advantage over Southeast Asian countries, allowing the Trump team to negotiate from a position of power.

China unable to fill the void left by US leadership

While the unilateral tariffs, slashing of USAID, and general unpredictability in American politics at the moment are likely to further alienate the majority of Southeast Asia, a less dominant United States does not necessarily spell the emergence of a Sino-centric regional order, as some analysts have been quick to argue.

Despite the opportunity presented by American retrenchment, China lacks the soft power to step in as a natural leader and its economic and political influence continue to be met with suspicion by regional elites. According to the latest poll by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, nearly 70 per cent express concern about China’s growing political and strategic influence, and more than half of respondents listed “aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea” among their top three geopolitical concerns.

Given such mixed views of the competing superpowers, the majority of Southeast Asian states prefer deepening intraregional connectivity as well as strategic partnerships with Japan and the European Union as alternatives to the US and China. Whether by strategic design or blunder, the Trump administration may cement the multipolar balance of power that Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said is only natural.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography
Hunter Marston is Southeast Asia Associate with 9DASHLINE and an adjunct research fellow with La Trobe Asia in Melbourne. Image credit: Pexels/Josh Withers.