Between Trump and turmoil: South Korea’s balancing act
Between Trump and Turmoil: South Korea’s Balancing Act
WRITTEN BY DR WONGI CHOE
19 June 2025
Seoul, recalling the unpredictability of Trump’s first term, viewed his return to the White House with caution rather than despair. Trump has repeatedly described South Korea as a “rich” country or a “money machine”, complaining that while the US is responsible for its defence, South Korea has been free-riding and not contributing its fair share. He even went so far as to claim that, despite being an American ally, Seoul has been exploiting Washington — benefiting from large trade surpluses by engaging in unfair trade practices and imposing tariffs four times higher than those of the US.
Unfortunately, Seoul found itself ill-prepared when the second Trump administration was inaugurated in January, due to unprecedented domestic political turmoil. President Yoon Suk Yeol, now ousted from office, abruptly declared martial law in early December 2024, claiming that extraordinary measures were inevitable in response to what he saw as widespread legislative ‘abuse of power’ by the dominant opposition party, which held nearly two-thirds of the seats in the Korean National Assembly. Yoon's martial law was short-lived and overturned within hours; he was immediately impeached and ultimately removed from office by the Constitutional Court in early April. In the aftermath of the impeachment, South Korea plunged into political turmoil, with the acting presidency changing hands three times. A by-election was eventually held, and on 3 June 2025, Lee Jae-myung, leader of the left-leaning opposition, was elected president.
Seoul now finds itself at a critical crossroads in its seventy-year alliance with Washington. The newly elected Lee Jae-myung administration faces a series of challenges: securing a trade and tariff agreement, redefining ties with a more demanding Trump administration, and recalibrating South Korea’s broader security and economic partnership with its most vital ally.
Trade talks and tough choices
With a trade surplus of USD 66 billion with the US in 2024 alone, South Korea was singled out by Washington as one of the “Dirty Fifteen” countries with the largest trade surpluses with the US. As a result, Seoul was poised to face intense pressure from the Trump administration, which appears determined to rebalance trade relations with one of its closest allies in Asia. The 25 per cent reciprocal tariffs have been temporarily suspended for 90 days, with Seoul agreeing during ministerial talks in April to conclude negotiations with Washington by 8 July, when the suspension expires.
Although working-level bilateral trade talks were underway, a comprehensive agreement had to be postponed until the new Lee administration took office. As a result, the future of Seoul’s trade relations with Washington remains uncertain until the new government settles in and finds a path to strike a deal with the US.
A more fundamental security challenge may emerge from the Trump administration’s evolving defence posture, which could reorient US global military priorities, including troop deployments in South Korea, to better deter China.
Washington is expected to demand greater market access and the removal of what it considers ‘non-tariff barriers’ in sectors such as agriculture, energy, commercial aviation, and digital markets. In response, Seoul aims to eliminate, or at least minimise, reciprocal US tariffs on key South Korean exports, including automobiles, semiconductors, steel, and aluminium. Automobiles particularly are a major concern. As South Korea’s top export to the US, they account for nearly half of the bilateral trade surplus and are especially vulnerable to potential US tariffs. Without a deal, they are likely to be the hardest hit.
Seoul believes it has several cards to play in negotiations with Washington, including its world-class semiconductors, advanced shipbuilding technologies, and potential to increase energy imports to help offset trade imbalances. However, significant asymmetries in the economic and security relationships limit its room to manoeuvre. The key challenge for Seoul will be securing a trade deal that maintains strong economic ties while minimising costly concessions amid sustained US pressure.
Risks of renewed engagement with North Korea
Trump’s repeated mentions of his desire to engage North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in a possible US-DPRK summit continues to unsettle Seoul. Trump met Kim twice during his first term for denuclearisation talks but walked away empty-handed after the “No deal in Hanoi” summit in 2019. Recently, however, Trump has stated on several occasions that he “gets along very well” with Kim and wishes to renew their relationship. Given that Kim remains committed to retaining North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and rejects US demands to dismantle its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Seoul is perplexed by Trump’s intent to meet Kim again and remains wary of any agenda not centred on denuclearisation.
Since entering a military alliance with Russia last year, North Korea has benefited from Russian support in the form of energy, cash, and presumably military technologies, in exchange for backing Putin’s war in Ukraine, including by sending troops. With this strengthened strategic position, Kim has broken out of both diplomatic and economic isolation and no longer sees himself as vulnerable to US pressure. As a result, he has little incentive to respond positively to Trump’s overtures. If Kim does agree to another meeting with Trump, it is unlikely to focus on denuclearisation. Instead, the Trump administration may pursue diplomatic engagement aimed at staging a summit while keeping the end goals deliberately vague. This could pave the way for a limited “small deal” such as a nuclear freeze or a moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests. If Trump’s primary objective is to push halt North Korea's military provocations and claim credit for achieving “peace on the Korean Peninsula”, Kim may well view such a proposal as appealing and respond positively.
Trump may simply want to keep the North Korea issue quiet, with no intention of revisiting denuclearisation. Alternatively, it could be a calculated move to pre-empt provocations from Pyongyang and free Washington to focus on deterring Chinese aggression. While Trump’s precise motives remain unclear, his desire to resume talks with Kim appears genuine — and a new summit may be less a question of if than when. This prospect raises valid concerns in Seoul about being side-lined as Washington engages directly with Pyongyang.
It remains imperative for Seoul to maintain reliable and credible deterrence — in close coordination with Washington — to counter North Korea’s nuclear threats. In recent years, North Korea has made significant progress in upgrading its nuclear weapons and ICBM capabilities. Pyongyang reportedly possesses several dozen nuclear warheads and is believed to be nearing completion of ICBM technologies capable of reaching the US mainland. In this regard, Seoul secured the “Washington Declaration” in 2023, committing the US to more frequent and expanded deployments of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula.
However, public confidence in these newly strengthened deterrence arrangements is relatively low. Many South Koreans question whether the US can “sacrifice New York or Los Angeles for the sake of defending Seoul”. A sizeable number believe Seoul has no other choice but to develop its own nuclear arsenal. With more than 70 per cent of South Koreans supporting the idea of “going nuclear”, an intense nuclear debate is underway within Seoul’s strategic community. However, nuclear armament remains impractical as long as South Korea remains a member of the NPT and party to the military alliance with the US. The key challenge for Seoul, therefore, is how to work with Washington to bolster the credibility of extended deterrence against Pyongyang.
Shifting alliances and strategic uncertainty
A more fundamental security challenge may emerge from the Trump administration’s evolving defence posture, which could reorient US global military priorities, including troop deployments in South Korea, to better deter China. Should this shift materialise, it would likely trigger a long-term transformation of the ROK-US military alliance. Regional allies, including Seoul, would be expected to shoulder greater defence responsibilities. Washington may, in particular, call on Seoul to take the lead in managing conventional threats from Pyongyang, thereby freeing up US resources for contingencies elsewhere, especially in the Taiwan Strait.
Such a recalibration would require a comprehensive overhaul of the bilateral defence relationship: increased defence spending, accelerated transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), and greater strategic flexibility for US forces stationed in South Korea. These changes could reshape South Korea’s military posture and its role in the region.
In parallel, President Lee must quickly resume high-level diplomacy and trade talks with Washington. A key question is whether his administration will reaffirm the foreign policy commitments made under former President Yoon’s Indo-Pacific strategy. While Lee has previously criticised Yoon’s pro-US alignment and advocated for ‘strategic ambiguity’ and equidistance between Beijing and Washington, his inaugural speech on June 4 struck a more pragmatic tone. He pledged to enhance trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan, while also working to repair relations with China, which he claimed had suffered under Yoon’s lopsided diplomacy.
It remains to be seen whether President Lee will maintain Yoon’s alignment with Washington and Tokyo or return to the “balanced diplomacy” approach of his progressive predecessor, Moon Jae-in (2017-22), who prioritised engagement with Pyongyang and strategic flexibility with Beijing.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr. Wongi Choe is a Professor of Indo-Pacific Studies and serves as Director of the Centre for ASEAN-India Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. The views expressed in this article are his own. An earlier version of this article appeared in India’s World. Image credit: David MacSweeney.